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Cameroon

* Leaders' Attitudes Threaten Liberalization

90AF0675A Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE
in French Jul 90 pp 112, 114-115

[Article by Celestin Monga: "Liberalization at Risk"; first paragraph is JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE introduction]

[Text] After the lawyers, now it is the prelates who are beginning to clamor for multipartyism. "Quibbles, given the economic crisis!", fulminate the government chiefs. Meanwhile, the opposition's slogans still show no hint of concrete plans.

The least one can say is that President Paul Biya's advisers were singularly uninspired. At the beginning of last April, in a much-awaited, short televised speech, they had him pronounce three sentences that subsequently received wide echo throughout the media: "Cameroon today has a major problem: the economic crisis. Anything else is just a maneuver to divert, indoctrinate, and destabilize. I am counting on your vigilance."

That was all it took to spur the opportunists and apparatchiks of the regime. In the ruling bodies of the sole party, the Democratic Rally of the Cameroonian People (RDPC), and in the mysterious upper reaches of the administration, the latter incarnate unreasonable opposition to the least change.

Benjamin Itoe, a former justice minister who has wrangled with the Cameroonian bar for years, mounted the ramparts. Finding in the President's speech an official nod for his single-party apologia, he violently stigmatized defenders of political pluralism.

His remarks, reported in full by the official media, succeeded only in inflaming bitterness and goading those inclined to express an opinion to escalate the tone. More especially as, a few days later, the Yaounde military court sentenced the attorney Yondo Black and his supporters: three to five years of prison for those who had dared to contemplate the formation of a committee combining unauthorized parties (See JAE No 131).

Pushed To Escalate

The Social Democratic Front (SDF), a party held "illegal" by authorities but that had filed its legalization request at the Mezam prefecture (northwest), immediately responded with a protest march in the streets of Bamenda. It was brutally put down by police and resulted in six deaths. At the same time, hundreds of university students were organizing a similar demonstration in the capital. There too, the forces of order intervened to arrest scores of students and teachers. But this tug-of-war between the political power's hardliners and proponents of a hard-won multipartyism was not enough to cool the fever. In May and June, other voices were raised: Bello Bouba Maigari, a former prime minister in

voluntary exile in Nigeria, occupied newspaper columns and France's airwaves to announce his support of multipartyism and the creation of his party, the National Union for Democracy and Progress. There was much amusement in Yaounde and Daoula at this act of eleventh-hour bravura and for good reason: Bello Bouba Maigari was for many years one of the defenders of a sole party when the latter was known as Cameroon National Union (UNC). He was also secretary-general of the Defense Ministry and assistant secretary-general to the president, with special responsibility for security questions, when the Ahidjo regime was hunting down and eliminating by any available means opponents of the Cameroon Peoples Union (UPC).

The position taken by the Catholic church at the end of May caused a greater stir. The Cameroon episcopate decided to break its silence by disseminating in all its chapels a document entitled: "Pastoral Letter from Cameroon's Episcopal Conference on the Country's Economic Crisis." Concealed behind this rebarbative title was a virulent string of accusations that Cardinal Christian Tumi underscored in person in an interview granted to a private Douala magazine: "The probity of those who manage our country must be faultless, their honesty absolute. I am not a financial expert, but some people think that, if our affairs were well managed, we would not be where we are today. Although I have not any figures to quote, I know that, despite the present economic slump, money still leaves the country illegally... I wonder who should decide whether or not multipartyism is opportune in a country like Cameroon, where the constitution provides for it... As far as I know, there is no law against a multiparty system. On the other hand, there is one authorizing the creation of associations that may be political in nature." Remarks worthy of Monsignor Albert Ndongmo¹, but unusual coming from today's Cameroonian prelates, who temperamentally share little with R.P. Jean-Marc Ela.

All in all, Paul Biya's statement, far from pouring oil on troubled waters, helped institutionalize a debate on which few people—apart from opposition politicians in exile—dared publicly express an opinion. This was so true that organizers of the first RDPC congress (announced for 28, 29, and 30 June in Yaounde) thought it worthwhile to put pluralism on the agenda.

Now it is the conservatives' turn to worry. Besides the specter of the hate, division, violent clashes, and rifts they consider inherent to multipartyism, they point up the inanity of the latter given the "major problem." In other words, how can democratic liberalization stimulate GNP growth (which fell from 4,071 billion CFA [African Financial Community] francs in 1985-86 to 2,867 billion in 1988-89) or growth of the state budget (cut from 800 to 600 billion in two fiscal years), and better distribute national income?

The Cameroonian economy is running up against several structural impediments. The first is its extroversion. Several economists have shown the perils of relying on

outside sources of income in building a nation. The dictates imposed both by moneylenders and by speculators on the cash-crop market has proved that such reliance was a serious strategic error.

Next is the very definition of the state's role. Immediately after independence was declared, the state monopolized all the important production and wealth-distributing functions. It was not up to the task. Having thus become the principal economic agent in all important sectors, the state mortgaged the health of the entire system. The government is represented in the field by a centralized corps of civil servants (143,312 people as of 31 December 1989). It is invested with every power, perpetuates archaic procedures, and continues to organize economic activity at its own speed, creating vagueness and lack of motivation.

Three Impediments: Extroversion, Statism, and Monetary Repression

The notion of productivity has been replaced by a culture of secrecy and random decision making. Corruption has become the rule, and the figures published are astonishing: 1,500 billion CFA francs lost by the state in five years (from 1981 to 1986). The figure includes 600 billion lost to customs fraud and 500 billion to imaginary bills settled by the Ministry of Finances; 260 billion in bank bills illegally exported in 1988 and 1989; 450 billion in outstanding debts to the state; a "cash" budget deficit of 445 billion as of 30 June, 1990; 360 billion in compromised bank debt; and a predicted cost of 330 billion to restructure state companies....

The third impediment is what Joseph Tchoundjang Pouemi called the country's "monetary repression": the creaking wheels of a financial system that does nothing but hinder economic development. Upstream, the issuing institution—the Bank of Central African States (BEAC)—has the power to define or guide monetary policy. Its means of doing so are stymied by the laws regulating the free zone. The power of a sovereign country to use instruments such as exchange rates or interest rates is basic in affecting economic activity. Likewise, a rigid tax policy has been designed in the Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (UDEAC) for countries whose performance and situation are extremely diverse. Downstream, commercial banks have only short-term funds (deposits collected, loans refinanced on the central bank or outside markets), but are expected to finance company investments that can only be brought to fruition in the long term.

The first merit of a well-constructed multiparty system would be to bring these basic economic shortcomings out into the open. Giving a voice to civil society would in itself be truly revolutionary. Because, except for a few isolated cases, the most brilliant intellectuals at home are silent. Yet in this period where history seems on the brink of teetering, politicians could sorely use academics and artists to restate ideologies and arguments. Pluralism's strength lies above all in its ability to introduce

criticism and the threat of sanctions, if only in the form of popular rejection, into the conduct of affairs. Solidly established, such a system can even enable better education of men on subjects as crucial as work, productivity, discipline, civic spirit, and on important social issues such as education and health.

More out of political convenience than conviction, the authorities often adopt economic-policy decisions that bear no relation to market realities. Agricultural officials, for example, repeat year after year that planters must rely on traditional export crops (coffee, cocoa, cotton). No one, however, still harbors any illusions about the future of those crops. Yet for lack of political courage, rationalism, and openness about the choice of priorities, officials opt for facile demagoguery.

It is true that SODECOTON [Cotton Development Company] provides a livelihood for a good 1 million people in northern Cameroon, and that cocoa and coffee are the only sources of annual revenue for planters in the western, central, and southern provinces. And no one can predict the reaction of these men and women, who make up the bulk of a rural population of 6 million, to a truth too long concealed from them...

Another considerable advantage of liberalization would be to clarify public investment policy. Its vagaries have been costly to Cameroon's social fabric, and continue to deepen the foreign debt. Everyone still remembers the Cellulose de Cameroun (CELLUCAM [Cameroon Cellulose Company]) scandal. When the plan to create a state company was initiated in the secrecy of cabinet meetings in 1976, all the experts consulted were skeptical about its profitability. Construction costs were too steep, financing difficult to raise, skilled manpower virtually nonexistent at the site, and predicted sales ridiculously low. Despite all this, decisionmakers opted to found the company. CELLUCAM was built in Edea. The cost of the operation was 75 billion, 17 billion more than expected. Inaugurated with great pomp and circumstance in March 1981, the company hired thousands of employees in the region, which the government had long "punished" for its active participation in the nationalist struggle (1955-60).

Production was troubled from the start by shortages in the lumberyard, whose capacity was half that of the factory. This design "error," combined with unexplained accidents (a defective boiler, the destruction of the chemistry department after an explosion) caused production to drop by half in two years: It fell to 80,000 tons. Sales during the first two fiscal years amounted to only one-fifth of the general and financial costs, to which had to be added the cost of rebuilding the chemistry department. Personnel were put on the technical unemployment rolls. The dream was over.

Today, the specter of the CELLUCAM syndrome still hovers over all plans to create state enterprises. It is undoubtedly one of the reasons why recent similar initiatives by the National Investment Company,

although targeting thriving niches such as agribusiness, have for now met only with disillusioned skepticism. The secrecy surrounding certain aspects of these affairs makes small savers wary. It is very obvious that, in an open political environment, cases such as the CELLUCAM affair, which squandered considerable public monies, traumatized thousands of families, and tarnished the country's credibility in the eyes of foreign investors, would have been the subject of great debate within society and the media. And perhaps could have been curtailed in their damage.

Social Unrest Would Be Fatal to a Fragile Industrial Base

But the openness pluralism claims to bring with it also has its perverse side. Cameroon's industrial fabric is so fragile that any challenge to the stability of companies and of social peace could be fatal to it. There is a real risk, in a strategic industrial area like Douala, of seeing condemnation of poor management turned into an anarchic interpretation of labor laws by some wage earners.

Just as the constitution provides for multipartyism (article 3), the 27 November 1974 law stipulates working conditions: "The law recognizes the right of workers, without restrictions of any kind and without any need for prior authorization, to freely form labor unions for the purpose of studying, defending, developing, and protecting their interests, in particular their economic, industrial, commercial, and agricultural interests." Should political liberalization happen, the sole labor union, the Workers Labor Organization of Cameroon, imposed by the government despite the provisions above, would lose its monopoly. Who could then guarantee the docility of wage earners discovering the right to make demands?

Yet is this a reason to despair of the ability of Cameroonians to manage, in the economic realm, greater political freedom?

Footnotes

1. This former bishop of Nkongsamba was sentenced to death in 1971 for aiding and abetting the rebellion of the UPC. Pardoned through Vatican intervention, he has been living in exile in Canada for what will soon be 20 years.

Gabon

*** Kombila: MORENA Not Puppet Party**

90AF0701A Libreville L'UNION in French
15-19 Aug 90 p 8

[Interview with Prof. Kombila Koumba, first secretary of the MORENA, and Father Mba Abessole, by Claude Moussavou; date and place not given]

[Text] Just at the beginning of the campaign preceding the legislative elections, we met with the principal officials of the MORENA [National Recovery Movement] Lumberjacks [a MORENA faction], in particular the

first secretary, Prof. Kombila Koumba, who told us about the mobilization of the troops within his party. Also, naturally, we met with Father Mba Abessole following his return from Paris, France, where he had gone to finalize matters with a view to settling permanently in Gabon and continuing to follow the development of democracy in our country and to playing a very active part in the campaign preceding the legislative elections.

[Moussavou] Professor, how are the MORENA Lumberjacks doing?

[Koumba] Before answering your question, I would like to voice certain fears about freedom of action and the faithful transcription of the statements by political officials in our country, apart from those of the PDG [Gabonese Democratic Party], by our media, since we find it regrettable that quite regularly, our speeches are not reported in full because of censorship.

Apart from that, to answer your question now, I would like to tell you sincerely that the MORENA Lumberjacks are doing very well.

[Moussavou] What is the reaction of your movement to the changes that have been made in the dates set for the initiation of the electoral campaign, on the one hand, and for the first and second rounds of the legislative elections, on the other?

[Koumba] Our reaction is simple, for two reasons:

1. Since the national conference, we have been preparing for the legislative elections, focusing on 2 September as the date, because the present legislature will end its term on that date. Logically, we thought that the new Chamber would follow immediately. We have also been working to organize the party throughout the whole of the national territory.

2. After his return from La Baule, the president of the Republic met with the political parties and associations. During that meeting, he spoke of the legislative elections which were to be held during the first half of September 1990. Naturally, the electoral code and all of the regulatory laws pertaining to the campaign had not yet been promulgated, and we found it desirable to make our preparations on that basis. Thus we planned this great national demonstration after the independence celebration. Moreover, we have the impression that these new dates resulted from the reservations we voiced concerning the first 8 September date. Thus the new provisions fall within the spirit of our plan of work.

[Moussavou] Is the first secretary of MORENA Lumberjacks able to make a statement about the financing of the parties?

[Koumba] In this connection, two things must be said. On the one hand, the authorities have let it be understood that the parties are forbidden to accept foreign financing, and also to solicit local aid.

On the other hand, it was acknowledged during the national conference that the authorities (government) would finance the establishment of political movements, and also the parties' electoral campaigns. We also believe it to be true that the PDG is regularly receiving financing and aid for its various political activities. We, for our part, are in the process of defining our needs, and at the proper time, we will present them to the government that, we hope, will meet them. Moreover, the chief of state, during the meeting to which I have referred, gave instructions to the prime minister.

[Moussavou] The public no longer hesitates to say that the MORENA Lumberjacks are merely the PDG in disguise. Is this true?

[Koumba] This is a rumor that derives either from fantasy, bad faith, or petty political calculation. What you see here is petty political maneuvering. We are accused of playing into the hands of the PDG because we negotiate with the government, because we urge nonviolence. In response we say that at one time, only the MORENA Lumberjacks were in a position to negotiate with the government, because we were the only party that existed in May of 1989. That was when Father Mba Abessole initiated negotiations with the PDG (the single party) with a view to opening up the country toward pluralistic democracy.

Apart from that, our political concept makes a distinction between political opposition and armed confrontation, rebellion, and all other forms of violence. For democracy presumes political coexistence in diversity, that is to say, with respect for others. Because of this, MORENA lumberjacks will never embark upon personal attacks or defamation. We will pursue a campaign of ideas. And in this connection, we will avoid complacency. Thus we will all come to the moment of change with unity linking all of the children of this country.

[Moussavou] What party does the MORENA Lumberjacks fear during this period, and with what party could it establish an alliance?

[Koumba] In Gabon, we see two parties—the PDG, which is in power, and ourselves, the Lumberjacks. And in this capacity, we will work to win power on the basis of a program for society that is different from that of the PDG. We will set forth this program in detail during the campaign. Moreover, it is described in our statements and pamphlets. But in major outlines, we are working to achieve a secular state. We are and we will remain faithful to the nation's commitments to the international organizations, and we opt for a liberal economy. Domestically, it is our duty to reorganize the administration. And on the sociocultural level, we want to promote veritable development, for this is something that has never even been initiated. We will do this by adapting

our educational system to our program for development and by establishing as a basis a social system that permits fair distribution of the national income to all the citizens of Gabon.

[Moussavou] Father Mba Abessole, you have just returned from France. What is your view of this legislative campaign which is beginning, and of the outcome of the legislative elections?

[Abessole] We will win the legislative elections.

* State of Siege Lifted in Ogooue-Maritime

90AF0701B Libreville L'UNION in French
15-19 Aug 90 p 8

[Address to the nation delivered by the prime minister; date and place not given]

[Text] My dear Gabonese compatriots:

On 23 May 1990, the news of the loss of our fellow citizen Joseph Rendjambe plunged us into stupefaction and consternation. But very soon after his death, disorderly demonstrations of very great violence broke out. We have witnessed the kidnapping of individuals, plundering, and destruction of all kinds. There have been serious breaches of the public order. The freedom to work and to move about on public thoroughfares has been hindered. Oil production came to a total halt for several days in Ogooue-Maritime. Public and private buildings have been burned and destroyed in Libreville, Port-Gentil, and Lambarene.

In Port-Gentil in particular, violence reached an intolerable level, leading a number of Gabonese citizens and foreigners to leave the city. The wildest rumors, spread and amplified at will, caused the specter of civil war to hover over the country. Fear took over people's minds, and a breach of frightening width was thus created, threatening the future negation of the state of law in our country.

It was within this context that I informed you on 28 May 1990 of the decision made by the chief of state, pursuant to Article 18 of the Constitution, to decree a state of emergency in the province of Ogooue-Maritime.

The result of this decision was that the province of Ogooue-Maritime came under the direct and sole jurisdiction of the National Armed Forces. In having recourse to this solution in the exercise of his responsibility to the nation, the chief of state hoped above all to prevent the country from sinking into chaos.

Since then, more than two months have elapsed, a period that has allowed the public authorities to determine that public order has been reestablished in Ogooue-Maritime today. The safety of individuals and property is again guaranteed. Work has resumed in the factories, at the work sites, and in the office departments. Oil production is back to its normal rate, and social calm and peace

again prevail. In short, all of the conditions needed for life to resume its normal course in Ogooue-Maritime now exist.

It is for this reason that I can inform you that the chief of state, after personally ascertaining the rehabilitation of the situation in this province, has decided by a decree dated today to order the state of emergency in Ogooue-Maritime lifted as of midnight on Tuesday, 14 August.

This step certainly represents the product of the good will shown by all. This includes the good will of the National Armed Forces, which have demonstrated their ability carry out their mission in strict respect for the assignment given them by the government, that is to say without excesses of any sort, but also the good will of the people of Ogooue-Maritime. While they provided the final proof of civic spirit and responsibility, they also understood that not only did the chaos benefit no one, but above all, also that quite the contrary, it was contributing to the destruction of the results of numerous years of effort and sacrifice.

It is a question now of binding up the wounds and eliminating the consequences of this torment. Many billions of francs have gone up in smoke, and we now need to rebuild, on the material level, what has been destroyed. But also, on the moral level, we must consolidate the national unity that has been subjected to a test.

But we cannot rebuild except in peace. We cannot consolidate national unity except in peace. We must become fully aware that peace is the asset that ranks first for any nation. This asset is also the result of the good will and the efforts of everyone. This is why I am counting on your good will once again, and I am appealing for your efforts.

My dear compatriots, in a few weeks you are going to be called upon to carry out your duty to vote, in full freedom, within the multiparty framework, which emerged from the consensus at the national conference.

You will remember, in this connection, that the government was asked to make an effort to provide financing for the political associations that were presented at the conference and recognized by its documents.

The finance law, which was approved in December of 1989 by our National Assembly, or in other words prior to this great historic gathering, obviously could not foresee the possibility of multiparty elections within the course of this year. Homage must be rendered once again to President Bongo for having the clarity of thinking to foresee the probable development of our institutions, with all of the political and financial consequences that it might entail.

And so, despite the financial difficulties of the moment, which forced the government to submit to this same National Assembly a corrected finance law incorporating

a new reduction in our resources, the president of the Republic decided to make a significant gesture to finance the parties.

As a result of this decision, each of these associations of a political nature, without exception, has been granted the sum of 20 million CFA [African Financial Community francs]. Here you will see the concern for justice and clarity that motivates the chief of state in the consolidation of our young democracy. It goes without saying that each association will have full freedom to use the sum allocated within the context of its electoral campaign.

As to the government, it will continue its efforts to consolidate the gains of our newborn democracy. It will continue to work for social peace and political stability. It will guarantee to all, without restrictions of any sort, freedom of opinion and its expression. But it will in all cases react boldly against anything which might contribute to threatening the safety of individuals or property or to compromising national unity.

Long live the Republic!

Long live Gabon!"

Zaire

* \$450 Million From Gecamines Reported Embezzled

90AF0726D Lubumbashi TAIFA in French 30 Aug 90
pp 2, 20

[Text] Who would have believed it? A coup under the fourth legislature was unthinkable! Yet it was reported at the time in a Belgian newspaper, which thereby may have pointed a finger at the maneuvering of the SBK (Seti-Bemba-Kengo) trio. The president was in fact surrounded by several hand-picked "eminences," most of them from the equatorial zone, the president's own region. His tribe predominated: this was Ngbandi rule! Moreover, as is now an open secret, the equatorial zone is divided into two opposing camps: the northerners—among whom the natives of Yakoma, including Seti, Baramoto, and others, were in the ascendancy—and the southerners—mainly the Mongos, one of whose sons, Joseph Ilea, a former prime minister under the first legislature, had just established the Democratic Social Christian Party.

However, among themselves, the Ngbandi were fighting tooth and nail. Vunduawe-te-Pemake (VTP to those who know him well) headed the black Ngbandi faction. The tribe's mulattoes were led by Seti Yale. A silent quarrel (over what?) had one camp set against the other. Kengo wa Dondo, a mixed-blood (mulatto) left the prime minister's office and was replaced by Sambwa—but not for long! Kengo returned and, it was whispered in several cafes, "thereby consecrated the supremacy of the mulattoes over the blacks." A significant detail should be noted. Each appointment and dismissal of a prime

minister was matched by a dismissal and new appointment in the Republic's juicy big companies—mainly the Bank of Zaire, Gecamines [General Quarries and Mines] Operations, and MIBA [Bakwanga Mining Company], where the country's foreign currencies are handled. This "placement" obligated the beneficiaries and enslaved them to the new prime minister. The chairmen of the boards of the public companies groveled at the feet of the "prime," who had presumably facilitated their appointment.

The game apparently lasted until last 24 April. The multiparty state surprised everyone. Open management absolutely had to become the golden rule. However, there was great fear that the MPR chieftains would perpetuate their hobby. The Nationalist Common Front (FCN) spoke out against this endless "conspiracy." It was followed by Professor Vunduaawe, who, in a memorable bid for power, protested the financial and economic mafia that had imprisoned the president and poisoned the national political scene for so long.

The Truth?

The rumor swept the entire country: approximately \$450 million had been taken from Gecamines Operations accounts. It is impossible to calculate the true consequences and scope of this scandal. However, it will be remembered that the state budget for the fiscal year in progress had to be revised downward, that is, cut by—are you ready?—\$450 million! No one was surprised anymore, since rumor had it that, through one of its Belgian banks, the SBK trio had used one of its most influential members to finalize a juicy transaction for the purchase of a non-negligible part of the Zairian debt. For each dollar paid out by Gecamines for this purpose, the trio reportedly took in 25 cents, or one quarter of an American dollar.

This payback is said to have come to around \$112.5 million, which was reportedly pocketed by the SBK trio and shared without further ado among its top brass and its accomplices. At the time of this financial transaction, 11 Zairian billionaires are said to have figured on a list covertly circulated abroad. The members of the SBK and their allies and accomplices supposedly headed the list. Compared to them, it was said President Mobutu was only a choirboy, somewhere down near the bottom of the list.

From other sources, it has been learned that an infiltration effort was organized and that the country's institutions were infiltrated for the purpose of taking power. The sudden death of the late Zondomio, the National Assembly speaker, will be recalled in this connection. Had not the assembly just passed a law strengthening the requirements for eligibility for presidency of the republic ("born of Zairian father and mother")? Within the SBK itself, changes in the political wind were becoming more and more prevalent. At one time, one of its members was apparently accused by the others of betrayal for "having given the head of state certain information deemed

compromising for the trio." However, according to the latest information, the group is apparently back together and stronger and more united than before. This justifies the fear of Professor Vunduaawe, spokesman for the black Ngbandi, that the group may be preparing a stab in the back to seize power and take over the country, since they hold the head of state prisoner.

Observers of the little Vunduaawe-Nsinga war see it as a comic interlude, with Vunduaawe accusing the Nsinga of having embezzled 500 million zaires, while he himself is muddled by a system in which he has been sloshing about for years as a member of the crew.

However, the scandal over the \$450 million is not all. There is also the "coup" brought off at the expense of MIBA and reported by our excellent sister paper, LE POTENTIEL. The perpetrator is none other than a mulatto who is the national representative of his state. A probable ally of the SBK, he has brought them some \$20 million.

What happened? Very simply, our good fellow, who was appointed to the MIBA board under as-yet unexplained conditions, picked up 1.5 kg of diamonds at this company's sorting center in the name of the head of state and, with no further ado, took off with his "loot" for an unknown destination on board the MIBA jet.

* Nguza Explains Opposition Parties' Agenda

90AF0726F Brussels LE SOIR in French 9 Sept 90 p 9

[Article by Colette Braeckman: "Nguza Karl-I-Bond: Anything Could Happen to Me"; first paragraph is LE SOIR introduction]

[Text] The Zairian press is wondering whether Mobutu is afraid of Nguza. Good question.

A strange destiny, that of Mr. Nguza Karl-I-Bond. Sentenced to death as prime minister, mistreated in prison, then pardoned, he became prime minister again after his release—but not for long. At the first opportunity, he found himself exiled to Belgium, where, in books and articles and at the head of the Zairian opposition, he inveighed against the Zairian regime and condemned its base acts. He then returned to Zaire and became minister for foreign affairs. Today, Nguza Karl-I-Bond, who has maintained an ever lucid, love-hate relationship with President Mobutu, is back in the opposition again. He enjoys the advantage of a solid network of international friendships and, more important, strong support in his native province of the Shaba, since he is related to the traditional chief, le Mwat Yav. Taking the 24 April speech promising a multiparty system literally, he has established his own political formation, the Independent Republican Party, which has representatives in every region of the country. Mr. Nguza Karl-I-Bond, who has met with numerous Belgian officials and will be flying to Canada and the United States, does not hide his ambition to become president of the Republic. However, Marshal Mobutu once told him: "They will never say of

me that I am the former president of Zaïre. They will say: 'Here lies the president of Zaïre.'"

Knowing the man who is now his political opponent, Mr. Karl-I-Bond does not hesitate to say, "Anything could happen to me now." The divided nature of the Zaïrian opposition does not dismay Mr. Karl-I-Bond, who thinks that it is normal for everyone to want to express himself after a quarter century of dictatorship: "After a time, coalitions will form along the lines of opinion, according to the major tendencies. The important thing is to organize a national conference of all the opposition parties as quickly as possible so that a transitional government can be formed that will take charge of organizing first the legislative, then the presidential elections." This position has already received the support of the Christian Democrats, the Lumumbists, and a coalition of 30 parties. The UDPS [Union for Democracy and Social Progress], which negotiated separately with the president and asked outright for a certain number of seats in the future government, has not yet ratified the document. However, Mr. Nguza hopes that it will if its negotiations with Mobutu fail, as they may, because the UDPS is demanding no less than the posts of minister of defense and minister of finance. In the immediate future, the man who is both a former minister and a former opponent says that fear must be exorcised. This is the reason for his visit to his hometown of Lubumbashi, where he was greeted spontaneously by thousands of people. "However," he said, "the capital of the Shaba is still traumatized by the May massacres in which, as I can confirm, many people were killed. There was no mourning because it was forbidden, but the entire town went on strike. For the 30 June ceremonies, millions of zaïres were distributed by the president in order to ensure the people's support, including a million Belgian francs to one of my relatives."

On a political level, the PRI [Independent Republican Party] has allied itself with various federalist parties. In the mouth of a Shaba native, the word "federalism" is frightening. "We are moving towards a union of all the federalist parties, but this in no way implies a threat of dissolution for the country. We only want the diversity of the country to be taken into account and federalism to be considered a method of management, as opposed to the Jacobinism we have known. We will always defend the idea of a nation, but we would like to see a certain decentralization of power and income. I also stress the principle of freedom and republican ideas. For a quarter century, we have lived under a sort of monarchy. Today, the country's resources should become the common property of all, and the officials should be called to account."

If he goes to Canada, Mr. Nguza Karl-I-Bond intends to plead for the postponement or relocation of the summit of the French-speaking world that is scheduled for the fall of 1991 in Kinshasa. "We are against this, because the regime still has not consented to the request for an international investigation into Lubumbashi, because this summit would represent a considerable burden for

an already stricken economy, because the West should establish a link between democracy and cooperation in Zaïre, too, and because this summit would take place during the presidential elections, which would give President Mobutu a particular advantage."

* 40 Opposition Parties Call for Sweeping Changes

90AF0698A Kinshasa ELIMA in French 2-3 Sep 90 p 8

[Text] As we reported in our edition of 28 August 1990, every day that passes brings us closer to the announcement of the Government of National Union that would take the place of the current administration, which, it is claimed, is not properly handling the transition to the Third Republic.

The commentary we published on that occasion was entitled "The Government of National Unity Said To Be Announced This Week" and, as one could have expected, was echoed by other local colleagues returning from Gbadolite, scene of a series of contacts dealing with formation of the government.

At a time when the finishing touches were to be put on the new cabinet, rumblings came from yet another political faction generally claiming to be cool to the formation of such a so-called National Unity Government.

Troubled by the situation now prevailing in the country four months after the announcement that Zaïre would be open to political pluralism, 40 opposition political parties met yesterday (Friday), 31 August 1990, at the home of Ileo Nsongo Amba, president of the PDSC [Christian Democratic and Social Party].

At the conclusion of this meeting, a major national event by virtue of the issues discussed and the fact that it was attended by prominent figures who had not been together since 24 April 1990, the leaders of these 40 political opposition parties, motivated by Zaïre's political, economic, and social situation, issued a joint statement of national interest.

In the document, they drafted resolutions including: the immediate calling of a national conference summoning all political factions and live forces of the nation, including students, the Army, and religious denominations; formation of a committee entrusted with the task of drafting a new constitution, determining the fundamental options of the Third Republic and phases in the process of democratization, formation of a neutral, representative government of transition, the establishment of a technical commission to audit the management of the Bank of Zaïre, companies belonging to the GECAMINES [General Quarries and Mines Company] Group, MIBA [Bakwanga Mining Company], and other public and parapublic enterprises, the immediate departure of territorial governors and cadres belonging to the MPR [People's Movement of the Revolution], and their replacement by a neutral administration; immediate

dissolution of the National Assembly and all deliberative bodies following the example of other organs springing from the MPR, the party-state, impartial access of political parties to national radio and television, general amnesty for all political prisoners and exiles, and moral compensation paid to officers, noncommissioned officers, corporals, and enlisted men discharged from the Army for political reasons, resulting in equitable reparations.

The following is the complete text of that document, devoid of commentary:

Joint Statement by Zairian Opposition Political Parties

We, the Zairian opposition political parties and signers of this declaration:

1) profoundly concerned by the failure to keep pledges of democratization announced by the chief of state in his speech of 24 April 1990 to the Zairian people, their governing bodies, and duly accredited diplomatic representatives;

2) observing the obvious lack of political will, notorious inability of the current government to bring about a peaceful, loyal transition to a pluralistic democracy, particularly because of its inability to complete a census of the people, issue new identity cards, or even organize simple municipal elections in Kivu;

3) sickened by the inability of the regime in power to master economic parameters, its scorched-earth social and financial policy, its diplomacy, which is unconcerned about the country's honor, and its disdain of the well being of the people, which policy continues to be practiced by the so-called transition government;

4) frightened by the vertiginous drop in the Zaire currency and uncontrolled drawing on our foreign exchange reserves as well as resources in local currency, with total contempt for budgetary procedures and excessive issuance of paper money, exacerbating inflation and demobilizing economic operators;

5) scandalized by corruption that has grown even worse since 24 April 1990, corruption systematized by the government, and by the political, material, and financial support, which the chief of state continues to grant to the MPR and associated parties, in flagrant violation of its solemn commitment to transcend parties; and

6) concerned about the concrete establishment of the Third Republic on a constitutional basis and emerging from a national consensus;

Hereby vehemently and unremittingly condemn:

1) the harmful influence of the marabouts and other occult, destructive practices that govern us through the MPR;

2) the dilatory maneuvers aimed at blocking the process of democratization, particularly through the vote on the revised constitution and the iniquitous, nefarious law on political parties by a Legislative Council manipulated by

the MPR. Blockage of this democratization process makes it impossible to hold the next conference of French speakers in Kinshasa, with the aid of France, cradle of human rights, and other friendly countries.

3) excessive use of certain law enforcement forces to quell the legitimate demands of students, teachers, doctors, civil servants, and other government officials, the most horrifying manifestation of which was the Lumumbashi massacre.

Reject the law on political parties with, as its consequences, the failure to file dossiers with the territorial administration, nonpayment of the 5-million-zaire security, and nonparticipation in primary elections.

Demand:

1) the immediate calling of a national conference of all political factions and live forces of the nation, including students, the Army, and all religious denominations, whose task will be to:

a) set up a committee responsible for drafting a new constitution;

b) define the fundamental options of the Third Republic and the phases of the process of democratization;

c) form a neutral and representative government of transition;

d) create a technical committee responsible for auditing the management of the Bank of Zaire, enterprises belonging to the GECAMINES group, MIBA, and other public and parapublic enterprises, for the obvious goal of instituting transparency in the management and rebuilding of the national patrimony; and

e) bring about the immediate departure of territorial governors and cadres belonging to the MPR and their replacement by a neutral administration;

2) immediate dissolution of the Legislative Council and all governing bodies, as well as other organs springing from the MPR party-state;

3) impartial access of political parties to national radio and television; and

4) the following measures:

a) general amnesty in favor of all political prisoners and exiles; and

b) moral amends to the officers, noncommissioned officers, corporals, and enlisted men discharged from the Army for political reasons, leading to equitable compensation;

5) continuation of the investigation into the Lubumbashi massacre within a more independent context and the punishment of guilty parties through a public trial.

We, the below-signed political parties, hereby make a solemn pledge to respect the spirit and letter of this declaration and make an appeal to the Zairian people to mobilize to defend their democratic rights making them solely sovereign.

Kinshasa

31 August 1990

For the PDSC, Ileo Nsongo Amba Joseph; for the UFERI [expansion unknown], Jean Nguz a Karl-I-Bond; for the RDR [expansion unknown], Bernadin Mungul Diaka; for PADDECOM [expansion unknown], Mwana Nteba; for the MNC/[Congolesse National Movement of Patrice Emery]/Lubumba, Edouard Tupa-Baruti, and for the Cartel of 30 Parties, Mabika Kalanda, Tshoboi-Noana.

* Dispute With Belgium Said To Affect Business

90AF0698B Brussels LE VIF/L'EXPRESS in French
3 Aug 90 p 11

[Article by Valerie Hirsch: "The Show Must Go On"]

[Text] As soon as Zaire is mentioned, businesses go as mute as a fish. Requesting anonymity, many of the 300 or so Belgian companies maintaining close relations with that country express their irritation over the new cooling of relations with Kinshasa.

The first to be hit by the "freeze" was Sabena in 1989, when the company lost 500 million francs due to the reduction in the number of flights from four to two for four months. The blockage of government-to-government loans (350 million francs for 1989, to be used for Zairian purchases in Belgium) also represents a loss for Belgian suppliers. Beyond that, the repeated "crises" do not seem to have any effect on commercial relations between the two countries, but they do create a climate of uncertainty in which some French-speaking managers—the most closely linked to the Zairian economy—see a desire on the part of the Flemish political world to strain relations with the former colony.

Indeed, Belgium remains Kinshasa's leading trading partner. And yet, Zaire's share of the Belgian economy is paltry: 0.3 percent of the world exports of the Belgian-Luxembourg Union (12.6 billion francs in 1989), a drop in the bucket! However, one must add services (transportation, consulting firms, banks) and processing of Zairian diamonds (often smuggled in) in Anvers. "But one has to admit there are few 'Belgians' in Zaire," observes Olivier Lippens, 37, managing director of the Sugar Group. This former subsidiary of the General Company of Belgium (SGB), which it took over in 1983, is one of the few Belgium firms still to invest in Mobutu's country. The leading local sugar plant (8,000-employees), it has just acquired tea plantations in northern Kivu. Sales will make it possible to finance the group's imports. Indeed, obtaining foreign exchange comes with the territory! The sugar shortage is such that the Lippens Company does not feel the drop in purchasing power of the local people.

The same is true of Interbrew [expansion unknown], which in the early 1980's bought back the 40 Zairian SGB breweries. And yet, Unibra, its direct rival in Zaire, does not seem to find such a rosy situation: Sales of its "Skol" dropped 21 percent in 1989. Furthermore, two textile subsidiaries of Michel Relecom's group are in the red.

Nevertheless, veteran firms such as the Sugar Group and Unibra [expansion unknown] (established in Zaire since 1930 and 1960, respectively) have always managed to survive, whether dealing with impossible transport conditions or political upheavals. "The thunder goes right over our heads," Lippens says. "It has never affected relations with our Zairian partners."

"Actually, even if business does not go well, if investors demonstrate a certain apathy, the latter prefer to remain in a country that still has fabulous potential," writes Francoise Masson, editor of the BELGIUM ECONOMIC JOURNAL. Nor must one underestimate the sentimental attachment of an entire generation born there or that knew persons who used to live in the colony. "Feeling 'more Zairian than Belgian,' they have difficulty understanding the policies of a government they feel has never helped them. 'We have never received a cent,' Lippens claims. "In contrast, France has granted us 713 million francs in aid to patch up one of our sugar mills!"

Furthermore, is it not a French holding that controls the leading Belgian group in Central Africa? In fact, the General Company continues to occupy a leading place in trade with Zaire. Metallurgie-Hoboken-Overpelt (MHO imports some 30 billion francs worth of copper and cobalt a year from Shaba), the Belgian Maritime Company, the Belgolaise Bank, Sibeka (industrial diamonds), Finoutremer, Tractebel: Nearly all the subsidiaries of the firm, whose history has been closely linked to that of the Belgian Congo since 1906, maintain fairly close links to the former colony. They have naturally been careful to diversify suppliers (MHO signed a major contract to deliver copper to Mexico in 1989) or customers (like Belgolaise, the "Zaire" risk is small). The fact remains that the construction of a refinery in Shaba (in partnership with the German Kloeckner firm) capable of processing refined copper in Limbourg is very poorly looked upon on Rue Royale!

Whatever the case, business circles think the "Frenchification" of General has reduced its capacity for influence over the government and supplied the Flemish with arguments preaching the end of privileged relations with Zaire. For the time being, owners are mainly worried about the risk of closing Belgian schools. Added to the departure of doctors involved with Belgian cooperation, it could drive expatriates from the private sector to pack their bags. Furthermore, using a well-known argument, South Africans are reportedly ready to take the place of Belgians. It is true that the country of apartheid does not require visas for Zairian businessmen....

* Belgian Doctors' Removal May Affect 20,000

90AF0698C Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE
in French 6 Aug 90 pp 1, 3

[Text] "Action must be taken in the field of health or the Belgian-Zairian crisis could cause the deaths of 10,000 to 20,000 persons over the next two weeks." This warning

was issued Saturday [4 Aug] by Dr. Jean-Francois Ruppel, who headed up the medical sector of Belgian cooperation in Zaire from 1976 to August 1989.

Born in Zaire 50 years ago and having always practiced in that country, Dr. Ruppel is convinced he speaks for the majority of his Belgian and Zairian colleagues. "For us physicians, to fail to speak out now on the gravity of the situation would be to refuse to grant aid to a person in danger."

Since 1 January 1989, the Belgian Government has freed no more funds for cooperation with Zaire. While Belgian technical assistants have continued to be paid, the projects they headed along with their Zairian colleagues have been without operating funds since that time. Nor has the situation, not remedied by agreements concluded in Rabat in July 1989 or those signed in Kinshasa in March of this year, improved with the departure of Belgian technical assistants. For a year and a half, physicians were able to continue projects under way thanks to the use of funds left over. Such means have now been exhausted and Zairian doctors have no logistical support, medicines, or laboratory equipment left.

AIDS—"Among the activities the cessation of which will have tragic consequences is first of all the fight against sleeping sickness, more than 90 percent of which was financed by Belgian cooperation," the Belgian doctor said.

The end of assistance will also cripple the fight against tuberculosis, still fatal in Zaire, and AIDS. "Even now, most blood transfusions are done with no control due to a lack of tracking," says Dr. Ruppel. "We can estimate that one out of every 10 persons transfused will be contaminated by the virus."

Belgian cooperation assistance to health clinics (24 in Kinshasa and 40 in rural areas) and rural hospitals will also stop, meaning that most of them will have absolutely no means to fight anemia, dehydration, malaria, and diarrhea. Finally, Dr. Ruppel is worried about the quality of care administered in the future at the only general hospital center in the Zairian capital, Ngielma Clinic, mainly frequented by Belgians residing in Zaire.

Proposals: To prevent the continuing political crisis between the two countries from having such humanitarian consequences, Dr. Ruppel proposes the Belgian Government make the health sector an exception in the process of halting cooperation. If this is impossible, he proposes that both government and international organizations agree to finance ASBL [nonprofit associations] and nongovernmental organizations that handle medical programs in Zaire. Their resumption would result in expenses of 300 to 400 million, sums Dr. Ruppel says could easily be borne by the Belgian Government's "cooperation" budget.

* FNLC To Discuss Future Policy To Follow

90AF0728A London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL
in English 10 Aug 90 p 8

[Article: "Angola/Zaire: FNLC Congress"]

[Text] The Angolan government has given permission for the Congolese National Liberation Front (FNLC), and anti-President Mobutu Sese Seko movement, to hold a congress in Luanda next month.

There are three items on the agenda:

1. The possibility of returning to Zaire.
2. The transformation of the FNLC into a social democratic party.
3. The expulsion of Nathaniel Mbumba, the organization's president.

It was Mbumba, a former gendarme from Katanga, who led the infamous Katangese gendarmes in their invasion of Zaire's Shaba Province in 1977-8. From his base in Tanzania, Mbumba has announced that he will return to Zaire at the end of this month. His opponents in the FNLC claim that he has been induced to do so by promises of money from Mobutu.

Next month's Congress seems certain to cement the division of the FNLC into two parts, one following Mbumba back to Zaire, and the other remaining in exile. The fact that the congress will be in Luanda is being seen as a warning from the Luanda government to Mobutu against his continuing aid to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The United States has intensified its aid to UNITA, now in a position of strength in its contest with the Luanda government (AC Vol 31 No 13).

* Causes of Conflict Between Two Nations Viewed

90AF0698D Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE
in French 3 Aug 90 p 3

[Article by Eric de Bellefroid: "The Beginnings of a Hard Winter for Belgium and Zaire"]

[Text] Throughout the crisis in the winter of 1988-1989 during which tension between Belgium and Zaire reached the breaking point, one hypothesis after another was advanced concerning the underlying cause of the new tension. The most commonly perceived issue generally had to do with Zaire's debt and the president's impatience to be done with it.

While this was indeed the most apparent reason for the crisis, other factors also seemed to act as ingredients, although not the major cause. "It was in a calculated, deliberate manner, rather than as the result of anger or passion or to respond to provocation or lance an abscess, that in late 1988 President Mobutu instigated a dispute

with Belgium that was more serious than any of those marking relations between the two countries since he came to power in 1965."

Privileged observer: The author of these lines was in a perfect position, as a Belgian sociologist at Kisangani University, to observe this resurgence in tension. He was even a reluctant participant because Zairian authorities deported him on the pretext of subversive activities. However, such vicissitudes did not prevent him from writing a brilliant chronical of this (next-to-) last crisis entitled, "Belgium-Zaire: The Great Confrontation." ("Belgique-Zaire: le grand affrontement," by Gauthier de Villers, with the collaboration of Jean-Claude Willame, "Les cahiers du Cedaf," January-March 1990. Centre d'étude et de documentation africaines, 7 Place Royale, 1000 Brussels.)

And yet, Gauthier de Villers does not venture to retrace the most salient features of this new domestic quarrel without first going back over the erratic history of Belgian-Zairian relations. He notes that by the second half of the 1970's, shortly after the 1973 Zairianization measures, there began a new phase, "that of the relationship between two sovereign states that had supposedly turned the page of colonization and decolonization." From that time on and, more specifically, as the new decade began, Belgium would try out an attitude of reserve already expressed at the time of the second war in Shaba in 1978, when the government hesitated to respond to Zaire's calls for aid.

Impossible Normalization: In the author's eyes, this was already a period of an "impossible normalization." In 1983, there would be the document on Leo Tindemans' African policy followed, in June 1985, by a trip to Kinshasa during which the King would visibly not follow in President Mobutu's footsteps in the field of "relations of mutual esteem and friendship" of which the latter availed himself.

At the same time, however, Mobutu retained a few good friends in the world: Reagan in the United States, Mitterrand and Chirac in France, Martens-Gol in Belgium. In Kinshasa, First State Commissioner Kengo since 1983 had followed a policy of forced austerity that could not last. The burden of the debt grew increasingly unwieldy and soon absolutely intolerable for Zaire, which was forced to pay back twice the sum of money it received.

In bilateral terms, two new factors would transform relations between the former colony and the mother country: Frenchification of the General Company of Belgium and the appearance of Flemish socialists, the Marshal's sworn enemies, instead of the more tolerant Liberals. "In much of Flemish public opinion," writes G.

de Villers, there is a prevailing sentiment that the Congo-Zaire, the private reserve of the SGB [General Company of Belgium], was and remains mainly the affair of French-speaking Belgium." That sentiment could only increase the new control exercised by the French over the main Belgian holding.

DC-8 Affair: But before the major crisis of the fall of 1988, there would be another conflict "which looked like a dress rehearsal": In March 1986, when Kengo's austerity policy was increasingly openly disputed in Zaire, the latter tried to "anchor" Belgium to a concerted program of recovery of the Zairian economy for the next three years. The Belgian Government barely wanted to touch it. Communique followed communique until the tone reached such a pitch, on 5 April, that a judge in Bruges proceeded to seize an Air Zaire DC-8 parked at the Ostende Airport.

Measures were taken against Sabena in retaliation and when, on 7 April, the seizure was lifted, it was not enough to defuse the crisis. Several visits by ministers were needed—Tindemans and De Donnea to Kinshasa—to arrange a new reconciliation and there was some question of a "round-table discussion," "privileged relations," and even mechanisms of consultation and reconciliation such as a "red telephone," for example. Tindemans would go so far as to declare: "After domestic quarrels, couples always loves one another more."

Question of Money: "Everything indicates that the matter of the debt, and therefore a question of big money, was the basic cause and reason behind the 'mini' crisis of 1986," Gauthier de Villers comments. But the strategy of the Zairian leaders consisted, using old and new complaints, with or without grounds, of transforming a private conflict into a global conflict. The advantage was also to emerge from the multilateral arena where the Third World debt is debated and be able to confront Belgium in a singular conflict.

The way had thus been paved for a subsequent crisis the progression of which Gauthier de Villers tracks in minute detail. It is a particularly bitter conflict that this time will end once and for all the "privileged relations" existing between the two countries, in exchange for liquidation of the old dispute dragged around like a dead cat since decolonization days.

The great "round table" so dear to "Leo the African" will indeed not take place, torpedoed like most of his other moves in this painful affair. Only the "spirit of Dakar" can truly triumph over this exacerbated confrontation: "a generous attitude on the part of Belgium regarding the debt in exchange for the Zairians' giving up the dispute." No more privileged relations or conflict: Zaire and Belgium must henceforth become accustomed to a new feeling of emptiness.

*** SADF Developments in Night Vision Equipment**
90AF0693B Pretoria PARATUS in English Aug 90 p 33

[Article by Lt Etienne Garnett-Bennett: "Under Cover of the Dark"]

[Text] In the world of darkness the only light available for centuries came from the moon, stars and fire. Because of man's inability to see in the dark, night was a mystery, a time to hide away from enemies and nocturnal predators.

Even today the cover of darkness provides the perfect setting for surprise military operations. Infiltrators move at night to pursue acts of terrorism and sabotage. The Russian forces spend up to 50 percent of their training time on night exercises.

Night vision equipment was developed to improve man's ability to see in the dark. South African-designed and manufactured night vision equipment is equal to anything else in the world and is in fact better than most. With this equipment the trained soldier becomes a formidable fighting machine, 24 hours a day.

The SA [Republic of South Africa] Army first used active equipment, but in the middle sixties started using passive night vision equipment. Infra-red systems have to project a light source onto the target, whose image is reflected and interpreted. These systems are active and therefore can be detected by the enemy.

Passive equipment emits no light and can therefore not be traced by enemy scanners. Passive systems only amplify available light from the moon, stars and other sources, making vision in the dark possible, while allowing the user to observe or shoot without fear of detection.

Internationally night vision equipment has developed from bulky first generation equipment to the modern day third generation instruments. These are much lighter, more compact and more efficient than their predecessors.

Local complex electro-optical systems such as sights, laser equipment and night vision binoculars are manufactured by Eloptra, a Kempton Park-based affiliate of Armscor. Their research in this field is world renowned.

South African forces utilize this equipment in all operational circumstances. Observation equipment, such as night goggles and binoculars, is used to scan an area at night. By the amplification of available light, enemy movements can be monitored.

These binoculars can observe up to 600m at night, depending on prevailing light levels, enabling commanders to make split-second decisions during night operations.

Light and mobile weapon sights enable our forces to see and shoot the enemy, even under cover of darkness. These sights can be mounted on any of the conventional

rifles, assault weapons and rocket launchers used by the SADF [South African Defense Forces].

Night vision and other complex electro-optical systems are also used by the Armoured Division on their Olifant tanks and Eland and Rooikat armoured cars. Each member of the crew has the training and ability to use various devices to see in the dark. In preparing for night time operations, these armoured fighting vehicles can switch over from day to night sights at a moment's notice.

Unique Fighting Ability

The night sights for the Eland 90 vehicle are externally mounted. This is unique and gives our Eland armoured cars a night fighting ability which few other vehicles of their class possess.

During operations the driver uses the night driverscope to navigate the vehicle in the dark while the crew commander has a pair of Night Vision goggles for observation.

A further addition to both the Olifant and the Rooikat's night arsenal is the laser range finder. This accurate piece of equipment is used to range the enemy from inside the vehicle. It enables the crew commander to make calculated decisions as to his attack on the enemy. This will also determine the type of ammunition used and where to aim. By fitting infra-red filters to the lights of armoured vehicles, their night vision ability can be enhanced to enable fast, safe movement at night, without being detected.

Eloptra is presently busy developing industrial, medical and commercial markets for electro-optical equipment and technology. An exciting development is the possible adaptation of night vision goggles for people with night blindness. Night binoculars are currently being used by the Transvaal Museum to gather data on the habits of certain nocturnal birds of prey in the Eastern Transvaal.

Night vision itself cannot win a war. Good training and good night adaptation of the trained soldier will allow night vision to be used effectively as an important aid to the South African arsenal.

*** SADF Parade Marks 78th Anniversary**

90AF0711B Pretoria PARATUS in Afrikaans
Aug 90 pp 24-25

[Article by Lt Amanda Snyman: "SA Defense Force [SADF] 78 Years Old: Spectacle in Pretoria"]

[Text] With much show, the SA Defense Force [SADF] recently celebrated its 78th anniversary with a parade in Pretoria. During the ceremony, 10 members of the Defense Force were honored with the Honoris Crux medal, one of the highest awards for bravery in the Defense Force. Minister of Defense General Magnus

Malan also used the occasion to announce the retirement of General Jannie Geldenhuys, chief of the SA Defense Force.

"This parade is a special event," Gen. Malan said in his speech. It was the first armed forces parade in the 1990s, and thus clearly the beginning of a new era. During the ceremony, the Defense Force flag and charter were handed over by the commander of the Western Province to the commander of the Northern Transvaal, and several members of the SADF were honored with medals for extraordinary bravery and performance.

The 10 Honoris Crux recipients stood proudly before the podium, eyes rigidly fixed ahead of them while scenes of their frightening experiences in the operational area were certainly replayed in their mind's eye.

SSgt [Staff Sergeant] Jacobus Hendrik Labuschagne of 4 SA Infantry Battalion and Lance Corporal Johannes Antonie Venter of 44 Brigade were honored with the Honoris Crux (silver) after they carried their wounded comrades to safety under heavy fire during isolated skirmishes in Angola in 1987.

Captain Alan Mark Slade of 22 Squadron SA Air Force performed special service as a helicopter pilot at Ondangwa Air Force Base during 1989. It was during his service here that he and his flight technician, Sergeant Kurt Frederikson of 31 Squadron SA Air Force, were forced to move wounded policemen to safety under heavy enemy fire on two separate occasions, on 1 and 2 April.

Another helicopter team also had narrow escapes during skirmishes with the enemy. Major Alan McCarthy of 16 Squadron, and his flight technician, Flight Sergeant Esias E. Steyn of 17 Squadron, together with Captain Mario Vergottini of 17 Squadron and Sergeant Emmanuel de Roubaix of 17 Squadron, were active from 1 to 3 April in operations supporting the South-West African police against terrorists that had infiltrated Ovamboland from Angola. Despite the heavy gunfire and missiles raining down on them, they managed, with the help of two gunner helicopters, to lend assistance to the ground forces.

What goes through your head during contact with the enemy—are you afraid? Captain Etienne Eksteen of 31 Squadron SA Air Force: "Of course we were afraid!" Capt. Eksteen and his flight technician, Sergeant Gerhard Fourie of 87 Helicopter Flight Training School, nevertheless managed, with the help of the other helicopter team, to kill 17 of the enemy during the period of contact over the next few days.

"Now that I have paid tribute to our soldiers, I will single out one of them. It is the chief of the SADF, Gen. Jannie Geldenhuys, who will retire on 31 October after 36 years of service. His has been and still is exemplary, selfless, reliable, and dedicated service by a professional soldier, an extraordinary man, and a fine philosopher-diplomat," Gen. Malan said.

He also said that South Africa's military involvement in Namibia is over. "There are still people today—I believe a minority—who say that that struggle was in vain. It was anything but in vain."

Because of the current situation in our country, the SADF has been asked by the government to lend assistance in areas such as Natal, as well as to monitor the country's borders.

"Where our troops in the past were deployed in northern Namibia, they have now been shifted to the middle of our own local populace." According to Gen. Malan, the Defense Force will thus play an increasing role in national security.

In his reference to the unrest in Natal, Gen. Malan said the following about Mr. Nelson Mandela of the ANC [African National Congress]: "In the Groote Schuur agreement of 4 May, he and his ANC consented to a joint commitment to finding a solution to the prevailing climate of violence and intimidation, as well as pursuing stability and a climate in which negotiations can finally take place.

"In the meantime, Mr. Mandela has clearly become the most overpublicized politician in the world media outside this country. His statements concerning economic policy and his adherence to the so-called struggle, be it armed or otherwise, are in contradiction to the spirit and letter of the Groote Schuur agreement."

According to Gen. Malan, the time has come for Mr. Mandela and the ANC to face reality. Thus far, the government has acted in accordance with the Groote Schuur agreement.

Up to now, the ANC has insisted that all stumbling-blocks be removed before negotiations can take place. "Let me make it clear today—the armed struggle is one such stumblingblock. We utterly reject terrorism, be it from right-wing or left-wing extremists, and we intend to put an end to both.

While Mr. Mandela travels overseas, the violence among blacks in Natal continues. However, the presence of the Defense Force has led to a dramatic decrease in violent incidents.

Gen. Malan also made it clear that "it is still only the ANC and its supporters who scream, 'Get the troops out!' The fact is that the SADF is the greatest stumbling-block to an ANC takeover of power. The success of the SADF is due to its dedication to stability, and good human relations.

"If everyone does their part," said Gen. Malan, "then the decades of violence in southern Africa will be over. We are entering the building phase. It is in this spirit that the SADF is serving along our borders. It is a peace initiative with which we hope to propagate a spirit of good will and cooperation far beyond our borders."

A gun salute in honor of the SA Defense Force flag resounded through the streets of Pretoria...followed by the deep rumble of many mechanized vehicles. Groups of people flocked together along the street to get a better view of the numerous Ratels, Battaleurs, 35-mm antiaircraft guns, and Rooikats that took part in the parade.

Two Cactus antiaircraft systems, Wit Hings recovery vehicles, and numerous other mechanized vehicles were on display in the parade. Various school cadets, veterans, and ceremonial and flag companies lent luster and color to the parade.

* Agricultural Sector GDP Shows Improvement

90AF0714C Johannesburg *FINANCIAL MAIL*
in English 17 Aug 90 p 40

[Article: "Agriboost"]

[Text] The second quarter saw a deceleration in the economic slowdown. Central Statistical Service reports a 0.8 percent decline in GDP (following declines of 1.3 percent in the first quarter and 1.7 percent in the last quarter of 1989) at market prices. The figures record quarterly changes, in constant 1985 prices, at seasonally adjusted annual rates.

Biggest boost came from agriculture, which showed a 15 percent rise (opposed to -7.5 percent first quarter, -42.7 percent fourth quarter 1989), measured by factor incomes. Improvements over a broad front include: field crops, viticulture, subtropical fruit, deciduous fruit, wool, ostrich feathers, cattle slaughtered, dry beans, sunflower seeds, vegetables and poultry products. Maize was also up but this was because last year wet weather delayed harvesting until July.

At factor incomes, non-agricultural sector GDP fell 1.9 percent (-0.9 percent, +2.5 percent). Mining was down 3.4 percent (-11.8 percent + 10.6 percent) and manufacturing 3 percent (+0.7 percent + 0.9 percent). Tertiary industries were down 0.9 percent (+1.2 percent + 1.4 percent).

* Labor Head Discusses White Worker Issues

90AF0713D Johannesburg *THE NEW NATION*
in English 24-30 Aug 90 p 20

[Interview with Abe Koekemoer, Federation of the SATS Trade Union General Secretary: "Rumblings From White Workers"; date and place not given]

[Text] With major political shifts within the ruling laager, more and more white workers feel they have been betrayed. Their frustrations have gained expression in radical rhetoric and sporadic industrial action.

NEW NATION spoke to the general secretary of the Federation of SATS [South African Transport Services] Trade Union, Abe Koekemoer, about these developments.

[NEW NATION] What is the size of the Federation of SATS Trade Unions?

[Koekemoer] There are currently 11 unions in the federation—five are all-white unions. Of the 170,000 Transnet workers, about 90,000 belong to the federation.

[NEW NATION] Is the Running and Operating Staff Union affiliated to the federation?

[Koekemoer] Yes. Incidentally, this union has changed its name to the Transnet Union of South Africa (Tusa).

[NEW NATION] What is your federation's position on job reservation?

[Koekemoer] We are against discrimination against any worker because of his colour. We are also for complete parity in all respects.

[NEW NATION] Does Tusa support this position?

[Koekemoer] I'm not so sure what their position is. If their views would differ from that of the federation, it would be a minority view.

[NEW NATION] What membership of the federation do the five all-white unions represent collectively?

[Koekemoer] About 65,000 out of 90,000. They are in the majority, yes.

[NEW NATION] Collectively, what is their position on job reservation?

[Koekemoer] All of them are for parity, with the exception of Tusa, which is furthest towards the right.

[NEW NATION] Tusa has supported the idea of a super-white union to protect the interests and status of white workers. Does the federation support the idea?

[Koekemoer] No. We are actually vehemently opposing this initiative. First of all, we differ ideologically. I'm convinced that I cannot serve the interests of the white members better by isolating them in a small group on their own.

[NEW NATION] There is clearly a contest for support in your federation. Do you expect that your losses to the right-wing will be significant?

[Koekemoer] We will lose members but I don't think it will be significant. One of our advantages is that, financially, we are far better off than the Transnet union. So, even those members that are ideologically supporting them, will stay with us because of the benefits we are giving.

Broadly, the divisions will be along the same lines as we see on the political front, where the majority voted for the NP [National Party] and the remainder for the Conservative Party [CP].

[NEW NATION] There have been repeated demonstrations of militancy among black railway-workers in recent

years—three major strikes—and, as a result, there has been a white backlash that has taken the form of victimisation of workers and even physical assaults of black workers. How does your union propose to deal with this?

[Koekemoer] Despite what you are saying, I think there is some admiration rather than animosity among the conservative white workers, the AWB's [Afrikaner Resistance Movement]. They are looking at black workers and saying: look, they are succeeding and why can't we do this.

They haven't been doing this because they have been supporting the system that was protecting them. The white workers at no stage wanted to embarrass the government. The government was doing the right thing, it was protecting them—they had job reservation and all sorts of measures to protect them.

I've seen it so often, when workers were dissatisfied and discontented with their salaries and working conditions, we went to the minister and put our complaints. But, when the prime minister stood up and said: "Listen, I am making a call to the workers," everybody said OK.

So that caused an artificial situation whereby we had no labour unrest and we all lived happily ever after—we are living in our fools' paradises.

But that is changing a lot now and all they need is a good Ramaphosa or somebody like that, that could come along and sweep up these emotions.

[NEW NATION] Those promoting the concept of a super-white union have warned that they could call a strike of white workers that could bring this economy to a standstill in just three days. Do you see this happening?

[Koekemoer] Although I am not for a moment denying that they could do a lot of damage, I'm not so sure—although there is a significant group that would want to strike there is a significant group that wouldn't want to strike.

Take train drivers for instance; there would still be enough train drivers to keep all the trains going.

I think the church also plays a very important role here in teaching people not to do all these nasty things. So I don't think there could be a total strike among white workers.

[NEW NATION] Given the developments on the political front, we could conceivably have an interim government made up of both the ANC [African National Congress] and the Nationalist Party, and, at some stage, even an ANC government. Do you think that people like yourselves and others who still owe their loyalty to the NP could shift and make a total strike by white workers more likely?

[Koekemoer] If a situation is forced upon the whites, it's a serious possibility that they would change those loyalties they had in the sixties and seventies and use it against the system. But I'm cautiously optimistic that we can avoid that.

[NEW NATION] The ANC and the SACP [South African Communist Party] have made a call on white workers to join COSATU [Congress of South African Trade Unions]. What is the position of your federation?

[Koekemoer] I think we cannot disregard the fact that we are living in South Africa. I think we can co-operate and we can work with them, that is with COSATU.

Unfortunately we are at the moment distinct groups, the more conservative in the traditional sense.

[NEW NATION] What would you say are the major differences between your federation and COSATU?

[Koekemoer] I don't there is such a big difference ideologically—it's simply a matter of association. But we have different traditions and have done things differently.

[NEW NATION] If you say there are no major differences, would you then agree with COSATU's demand for a living wage, the right to strike etc?

[Koekemoer] Yes. We have said on the Labour Council that we want a minimum wage. We might differ on what the minimum wage should be—but that there should be a minimum wage, a living wage, yes, we support that.

We also support them on the right to strike. We have said this all along. As a matter of fact, we are trying now to get out from the situation where we are governed by our own labour law in Transnet and we want to go under the Labour Relations Act.

[NEW NATION] COSATU has adopted the Freedom Charter—what is your position on the Charter?

[Koekemoer] I haven't read the Freedom Charter but from the little I've seen of it here and there, there is no reason why I should be against that.

[NEW NATION] What about COSATU's support for socialism?

[Koekemoer] I differ with them. I don't think that is going to work to the benefit of society.

[NEW NATION] What is your union's position on privatisation?

[Koekemoer] This is another issue over which we differ with them.

[NEW NATION] Do you agree with the position where the Communist Party is seen as representing the interests of the working class?

[Koekemoer] If the Communist Party claims to be representing the interests of the working class in South

Africa, I'd love to see what they have been doing, because communism all over the world has shown that it works to the detriment of society.

[NEW NATION] Do you see the need for a party that represents the interests of workers in South Africa?

[Koekemoer] I think there should be—a kind of Labour Party perhaps.

* No Oil Shortage Foreseen During Gulf Crisis

90AF0714B Johannesburg *FINANCIAL MAIL*
in English 17 Aug 90 pp 39-40

[Article: "Gold vs Oil"]

[Text] If the worst comes to the worst in the Gulf, SA [Republic of South Africa] should be reasonably placed in an oil shortage. It uses no oil for producing electricity. Eskom [Electricity Supply Commission] relies on its grid of modern coal-fired stations, with an important input from Koeberg nuclear plant. Nor do we depend in winter on oil-fired domestic furnaces to keep out cold, as does the northern hemisphere. Space heating is provided—to the extent necessary in our milder climate—by coal or electricity. In industry, process steam is largely provided by coal-fired furnaces.

As for liquid fuels, Sasol [South African Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation] still provides a major proportion of needs of petrol, diesel, and aviation kerosene. This proportion has surely dropped, since the high point of self-sufficiency reached when Sasol 2 and Sasol 3 were commissioned, because the petrol market has grown significantly. A guess (we are not allowed access to the statistics for security reasons) would be that Sasol now provides at least a third, possibly more, of total requirements. When Mossagas comes into production the proportion provided by synfuels could rise significantly above 40 percent.

SA also accumulated a large stockpile of crude oil before 1979 (when the Shah of Iran fell). It is reasonable to suppose it is still substantially intact in the worked-out coal mines where most is stored. (Oil in the ground may be turned over to prevent loss of more volatile components, but this would not affect the net amount).

On the balance of payments, a prolonged oil crisis would lead to a big debit item. In the first half of 1990 the unclassified item on the trade account stood at R2,553bn [rands].

We can assume the bulk of this is oil imports, as we can hardly be importing much armaments in the changed circumstances. If this is so, a full year with oil prices at US\$25/barrel could see an increase in imports of say R1.5bn-R2bn for a full year.

This estimate assumes that SA has been paying around \$18/barrel averaged over the first half of 1990. If a price of \$18 is assumed, it becomes possible to make a further guess—that SA is now importing oil at a rate of about

100m barrels a year. So for every further \$5/barrel on the oil price, SA will have to pay an extra \$500m—or R1.3bn—annually for imports.

(This does not allow for any price-elasticity of demand for petrol—which is surely too pessimistic, especially if the price rises sharply and suddenly).

Against this debit item, the inflationary implications and general insecurity associated with a prolonged crisis must have a powerful influence on gold. With output around 17.5m oz and the present exchange rate, a gain of \$50/oz would add more than R2.2bn annually to the current account.

If one takes the price of gold, washed of oil price influences, as \$365/oz, the crisis has already added \$40 (at \$404). Were this to be next year's average, it would generate about R1.8bn, enough to neutralise a \$7 increase in the oil price (say from \$18 to \$25).

To suppose a continuing oil and political crisis in the Gulf would imply an increase in the gold price of no more than \$40 from the base is a modest assumption.

A very rough indicator is that every dollar on the oil price needs \$6 on gold to offset it.

On the debit side, there might also be a slowing in the world economy, which would hit non-gold exports hard. But Armscor could find increased demand. Less speculatively, both the price of and demand for coal would surely increase substantially.

While it is impossible to quantify the aggregate of these influences, SA could come out well on the right side.

* Conservatives Deride Madagascar Agreement

90AF0712G Pretoria *DIE PATRIOT* in English
24 Aug 90 p 1

[Editorial: "Madagascar: What's in It for Us?"]

[Text] While South Africa burned last week, Mr. F.W. de Klerk and his entourage were welcomed in tiny Madagascar, the 11th poorest country in the world with a basket-case economy created by years of socialism.

South Africa and Madagascar have signed an agreement for economic and commercial "cooperation". This in all probability means that South Africa will send in money, materials, investment and other forms of help for the dubious pleasure of landing our airplanes at Antananarive, the country's capital.

It would appear that obtaining landing rights in Madagascar is, as the Americans would put it, "no big deal". SAA [South African Airways] flights will depart from Johannesburg every Saturday morning, will arrive in Madagascar early afternoon and then go on to Mauritius. SAA already has landing rights in Mauritius, so it would seem on the face of it that landing in Madagascar is not a coup.

Pitiful

The only other advantage would appear to be the public relations hoopla given out that South Africa has "broken through" into Africa; that we now have a new-found friend in the OAU and that psychologically, this new relationship is of benefit to xenophobic South Africans who have been isolated all these years. We are being portrayed as Africa's Albanians.

With all due respect to Madagascar and its people, it is actually pitiful to see a country like South Africa creep to a third-world land like Madagascar so that we can be loved once more.

Does South Africa need "acceptance" so much that it is prepared to buy a few friendly words from a third world basket case?

Is its "breakthrough" to be given permission to plough money into a bankrupt African island in exchange for some guarded praise about getting rid of apartheid?

Madagascar's president said at the welcoming news conference that "Madagascar had abandoned its policy of isolating South Africa because negotiations were taking place in SA".

How exactly has Madagascar isolated South Africa? Are we so brainwashed and cowed that we will accept this pat on the head from one of the poorest countries in the world?

Already more than 5,000 tons of chemical fertiliser has been proffered by South Africa as a goodwill gesture to Madagascar.

It is time South Africa stuck its chin out and put its head up. We should not have to go cap in hand to African basket cases for "recognition". Most of Africa needs us, not the other way round. If they don't like us, they can always do their shopping elsewhere. We don't put conditions on relationships with other countries; and we shouldn't have to accept them either.

*** National Land Committee Against Privatization**

90AF0713B Johannesburg CITY PRESS in English
19 Aug 90 p 13

[Article by Zb Molefe: "Land a Burning Issue-NLC"]

[Text] President F.W. de Klerk has often said private property and free enterprise should be the cornerstone of a new South Africa, says the National Land Committee [NLC].

"Yet no one has answered the question of how black people who lost their land, their livestock, their capital and their homes through forced removal and eviction will be able to compete in a free market," it adds.

The extent of black impoverishment through apartheid "means they (blacks) will not afford to buy land or farm it effectively unless there is a programme of redressing

historical wrongs and compensating people for these losses," says the NLC in its latest publication LAND UPDATE.

The publication said to open a free market in land, before questions of its affordability are answered, would cause wide-scale property speculation—and increase land prices.

It said the government remained silent on what it intended in place of the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts, adding a free market approach "applied blandly" to the land question would have devastating consequences for the rural poor.

But, it said, future government policy would probably do away with the racial character of land ownership.

The NLC—formerly the National Committee Against Removals [NCAR]—predicted a bleak future for blacks should land fall under the government's free market plans.

"Unless the new policy addresses the dispossession which apartheid has brought about, landlessness and poverty will continue to plague the poorest of our country...and the land question will remain a burning, unresolved issue."

People who needed land most—or depended on it for their livelihood—did not have the substantial capital needed to buy land at current market rates, it said, citing the "Coloured" reserves of Namaqualand and the northern Cape where the House of Representatives has adopted a policy of privatising communal land.

This has been fiercely resisted by the predominantly semi-nomadic farming communities in the area.

"Privatisation means surveyed plots are to be sold to individual owners who will acquire exclusive holding to a portion of the land.

"For the poor majority of farmers in the area, privatisation brings the prospect of losing access not only to residential land, but also to grazing land.

"Towards the end of May this year the government was preparing to sell a number of state-held farms in the western Transvaal—some of which previously belonged to black freehold communities who were forcibly moved to the Bantustans.

The government planned to sell the farms to white farmers before it could abolish the Land Acts, the NLC claimed.

On May 20 this year Transvaal representatives from 28 rural areas called for "a moratorium on the sale of all state-owned land until a process of negotiation between the government, local communities and their political representatives can work out a way in which historical wrongs can be redressed—and landless people supported in their attempt to gain land," said the NLC.

*** ANC Branches in Cape Recruit 7,000 Members***90AF0712B Cape Town THE ARGUS in English
22 Aug 90 p 5*

[Article by Michael Morris, Political Correspondent:
"ANC Recruits 7,000 Members in Cape"]

[Text] African National Congress [ANC] branches in the Western and Southern Cape have recruited more than 7,000 paid-up members so far.

Organisers expect the figure to be much higher after the official launch of outstanding branches this weekend.

The ANC has set the end of this month as the deadline for setting up its organisation in the region. There will ultimately be about 90 branches.

The region is divided into zones of several branches each.

Figures given by the ANC are based on returns from branches reflecting the number of people who have paid their R12 [rand] annual subscription. Not all branches have sent in their returns yet.

Crossroads tops the list with a membership of 963 so far, followed by Mbekweni with 914, Guguletu Section Three—one of three branches in the township—with 364 and Athlone with 342.

As a region, Namaqualand has 215 members so far, the South Cape—at this stage there are figures only for Oudtshoorn and Mossel Bay—has 327, Boland has 1,213 and the North-West Coast has 33.

In the Peninsula, there are 463 spread among five branches in the northern suburbs, about 750 in the southern suburbs from Woodstock to Heathfield, and nearly 300 in Mitchell's Plain and Strandfontein.

There are 46 paid-up members in Blue Downs, 172 in the Strand and 169 in Kuils River.

*** Unemployment Seen as Major Factor in Unrest***90AF0712A Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English
17 Aug 90 p 4*

[Article by Gerald Reilly: "Jobless are Major Factor in Unrest—Economist"]

[Text] Pretoria—A major factor in the unrest sweeping some of the country's major industrial areas is the high and rising level of unemployment, according to Econometrix chief economist Azar Jammie.

He said yesterday there was no way of putting an accurate figure on the numbers of workless, but what could be said with some accuracy was that there was little hope of an increase in employment during the rest of the year and in 1991.

Even if the downswing hit bottom in the middle of next year and there were indications of an upturn, no increase in job opportunities could be reasonably expected until well into 1992.

"It's a gloomy prospect and it is a fact that the growing workless element has become a major one in the violence and disarray in urban townships."

To be taken into account, too, were the estimated 300,000 or more new workers, many of them without education, seeking jobs annually.

Most would join the ranks of the unemployed, increasing the potential for unrest.

Central Statistical Service (CSS) figures show the number of unemployed coloured workers, especially in the age group below 25, has risen sharply.

CSS said in the February-April period the number of unemployed in this group rose from 34,000 to 54,000—or by almost 59 percent.

In the age group 25 years and older, the increase was 18 percent.

Latest figures for the other population groups are not yet available, but economists stress an increase in the workless is unavoidable in the face of an economy wallowing in a recession.

Active

The coloured unemployment rate for April was estimated at 7.6 percent of the economically active population. This compared with 6.5 percent in March.

According to the CSS, total coloured population has reached 3.2-million. The economically active group is estimated at 1.245-million. That includes 1.15-million workers and 95,000 unemployed.

The unemployment rate for men in April was 7.1 percent and for women 8.4 percent. Figures for the previous months were 6.4 percent and 6.5 percent.

*** COSATU Replans Antiprivatization Campaign***90AF0713C Johannesburg THE NEW NATION
in English 24-30 Aug 90 p 19*

[Article: "COSATU Peps Up Anti-Privatisation Plan"]

[Text] COSATU [Congress of South African Trade Unions] has worked out a two-pronged approach to revive its flagging anti-privatisation campaign.

The approach, which was presented to the federation's national campaigns committee meeting last week, involves high-profile opposition to privatisation and identifying and exposing privatisation where it is taking place.

As far as high-profile opposition is concerned, COSATU has identified three priorities:

- embarking on a publicity campaign;
- working with other organisations to oppose privatisation, especially those that have already taken up the issue. One such example is the Campaign for Open Media, which is an alliance of media organisations opposed to the privatisation of the SABC [South African Broadcasting Corporation], and which is marching on the SABC tomorrow.
- formulating clear demands that can win the broadest possible support.

Demands that have already been suggested at a meeting between COSATU and the ANC [African National Congress] include: a national health service for all, housing for all the cheap, accessible transport, electricity and telecommunication.

COSATU is still discussing whether nationalisation should be demanded as an alternative to privatisation and whether the campaign takes into account the demands of workers in enterprises that have already been privatised.

Different COSATU affiliates are discussing whether nationalisation will suit their sectors. It is already becoming clear in the mining sector that nationalisation is likely to result in job losses as unprofitable marginal mines would probably be closed down by the state.

Addressing the second prong of the federation's campaign, COSATU observes that "contrary to some reports, there has been no change in state policy."

"The state remains committed to privatisation. However, due to the opposition by COSATU and its allies, the state is no longer privatising in a high-profile way."

Instead, the state is selling off part of enterprises without letting the public know.

For example, in many hospitals the provision of nurses, catering and pathology have been contracted out. Much of Eskom [Electricity Supply Commission] has also already been privatised.

The state is also preparing for privatisation by "commercialising" or changing its enterprises from being service-oriented to becoming profitable.

This is evident in the post office and telecommunications sector, where telecommunications has been divided into 14 business units while the post office has been divided into two.

"There is no obstacle to privatising telecommunications. It is a profitable company and will be even more so in a year or two. The state is on course for its target date for 1992," observes COSATU.

COSATU has identified publicity, demonstrations and declaring disputes as three possible ways of exposing enterprises involved in undercover privatisation.

*** Chemical Company, Japanese Firm Agree**

90AF0715D Johannesburg *ENGINEERING NEWS*
in English 17 Aug 90 p 32

[Text] One of South Africa's leading specialty chemical manufacturing companies, Reef Chemical Corporation, has entered into a licensing agreement with a Japanese firm.

The main products covered by the agreement are rolling oils for the steel industry.

These products will be manufactured at the company's Boksburg East factory.

The company benefited during December 1988 as a result of an outright purchase by Shell SA.

During the year the focus at Reef has been on further developing local technology and as a result investments have been made in laboratory extensions, equipment and qualified personnel.

Consequently, a number of additional potential technological sources were identified and further licensing agreements are being investigated.

New lubricants and coolants for the metal working industry are presently being developed by the company.

Considerable strides have also been made in the area of product quality, with the short term objective being the attainment of the South African Bureau of Standards quality award.

During 1989 the company received two Supplier of the Year awards from the automotive industry—Nissan and Delta.

These are notable achievements and highlight the company's status as a major reputable specialty chemical supplier to the automotive industry.

The range of products manufactured by the company are diverse, including liquid and powder detergents and cleaners, water treatment chemicals, zinc phosphating compounds, drawing compounds, metal coating compounds, rolling oils, rust preventatives, PVCs and bitumen emulsions.

The company recently celebrated its 25th anniversary.

*** Engineer Shortage Affects Chemical Industry**

90AF0715C Johannesburg *ENGINEERING NEWS*
in English 17 Aug 90 pp 18, 24, 30

[Interview with John Marriott, president of the SAChE (South African Institution of Chemical Engineers) by Elena Kyriacou; date and place not given; first paragraph is *ENGINEERING NEWS* introduction]

[Text] In South Africa, chemical engineers have been at the heart of many of the unique processes that are used to turn indigenous raw materials into products such as

plastics, fertilizers and plant protection chemicals. Yet despite this fact, the country is critically short of these people—only an estimated 100 engineers graduate each year from seven universities offering a course in chemical engineering. In an interview with the **ENGINEERING NEWS**, newly-elected president of the South African Institution of Chemical Engineers (SAIChE) John Marriott outlines some of the reasons for this shortfall and what can be done to alleviate this problem.

[Kyriacou] How many chemical engineers graduate from South African universities each year; how many chemical engineering graduates are required by South Africa, and how is the shortfall dealt with?

[Marriott] About 100 engineers graduate each year from the chemical engineering faculties of the seven universities with chemical engineering departments.

The country's requirements are difficult to determine exactly.

It is clear that there is a shortfall and that the shortfall would be greater if the restraints to economic growth were removed.

In the past, immigration added to the supply of engineers but this source is not significant at present.

Obviously industry and commerce manage with the present supply of engineers.

It is probable that the improvements in productivity and efficiency which are so necessary to increase the international competitiveness of the country, suffer as a result of the shortage.

Innovation and creativity are reduced by the shortage.

There is good news for the future as first year university admissions have increased significantly and we could see 180 to 200 chemical engineers graduating yearly from 1994 onwards.

[Kyriacou] What is the role of the chemical engineer in South Africa, and how is this role likely to change in the years ahead?

[Marriott] The process industries in general and the chemical process industries in particular, play a very important role in the development of any country.

South Africa, with its rich resources of raw materials, requires a strong process industry to lead its industrial development.

The chemical engineer and the associated technologists and technicians play an essential role in the establishment of the process industries.

The conceptualisation, design, construction, commissioning, operation and maintenance of plants, factories and indeed whole industries, would be impossible without chemical engineers.

[Kyriacou] How many chemical engineering technologists and technicians are there in South Africa, is the need for these being met by local graduates, and what is the role of such people in the chemical engineering field?

[Marriott] Statistics concerning technicians and technologists are harder to find.

That there is a shortage and that greater emphasis should be placed on their training is clear.

The engineer, technologists and technicians form a team, each handling that part of a job for which he is most qualified.

Much has been written in the media of the large disparity in this country in the ratio of technologists to engineers compared to some of the developed countries.

I do not have any specific suggestions to add to the arguments.

It is clear, however, that this country does have a problem which must be addressed as part of the whole crisis in education.

[Kyriacou] What is the role of the chemical engineer in preserving the environment?

[Marriott] The chemical engineer has a large role to play in ensuring that the industrial development that is needed for the growth in the economy does not happen at the expense of the environment.

The chemical engineer is well qualified not only to design and operate the processes but also to ensure that the available technology is used to protect the environment.

We have a unique opportunity in South Africa to see that we do not repeat the mistakes of the developed countries in this respect.

The chemical engineer will play a large and increasing role in carrying out our obligations towards the environment we live in and which we must protect for future generations.

[Kyriacou] From what tertiary institution can South Africans graduate in chemical engineering?

[Marriott] The seven South African universities which possess departments of chemical engineering as a part of their faculties of engineering are Cape Town, Stellenbosch, Pretoria, Witwatersrand, Potchefstroom, Natal and Durban-Westville.

[Kyriacou] What has been done by the South African Institution of Chemical Engineers to attract indigenous South Africans to the profession?

[Marriott] The institution and its members regard the activities to publicise a career in chemical engineering as an extremely important activity.

Many individual actions are planned and carried out by the institution council, its branches and individual members.

For example, literature concerning the profession is published and circulated, career functions are arranged, attended and addressed as required.

Other interesting projects which are organised by more than one branch annually are competitions among schools designed to interest scholars in chemical engineering.

[Kyriacou] How much are chemical engineering graduates able to command in monthly salaries when leaving tertiary institutions?

[Marriott] The institution annually conducts a salary survey and provides this data to members.

It is probably sufficient to state that starting salaries for graduate chemical engineers are very competitive.

Of even more importance is the fact that the chemical and process industries can certainly offer an extremely interesting and challenging career to any young graduate.

In comparison with many countries, it is clear that the opportunities and challenges available to engineers, particularly young engineers, are without equal.

[Kyriacou] How does the function of the chemical engineer dovetail with that of the industrial chemist and the metallurgist?

[Marriott] There is obviously a large overlap in the functions of the various professions involved in the process and metallurgical industries.

The chemical engineer can generally be seen to be the professional who converts the chemistry into a practical process whereas the industrial chemist and metallurgist are the experts who devise the physical and chemical processes involved.

I have already said that the professions essentially function as a team, each member contributing that bit for which he is best qualified.

A large proportion of qualified chemical engineers are employed in the mining and metallurgical industries and their contribution in these industries is just as crucial as in the process industry.

[Kyriacou] How is the chemical engineering fraternity assisting the country to create wealth through the conversion of raw materials with which South Africa has been blessed into exportable and import replacing products?

[Marriott] All the processes used to turn coal, oil and other chemical feedstocks into fuels, fertilizers, explosives, plastics, rubbers and detergents as well as many other essentials for modern life are the products of

processes which have been devised, designed, built and are operated and managed by chemical engineers.

There is just about no aspect of modern life which does not to some extent depend on a chemical engineer.

In South Africa, chemical engineers have been at the heart of many of the processes used to turn indigenous raw materials into products such as plastics, fertilizers, plant protection chemicals and so on.

I do not want to single out any individuals but there are many who have helped to make significant contributions to the state of development of this country today.

[Kyriacou] What do you think South Africa should do to add value to raw materials, and what scope is there to manufacture high value specialty chemicals for export?

[Marriott] The country has a number of competitive advantages in many industries and it is clear that these advantages should be exploited to the maximum.

The strategy of adding value to the indigenous raw materials and exporting high value products is an admirable one as it increased the value of raw materials and creates many additional employment opportunities.

In the chemicals area there is probably scope for doing just this.

[Kyriacou] There is renewed interest in the manufacture of aromatic chemicals such as toluene, xylene and benzene from coal or imported oil. (a) Why has this not been done in South Africa before, and what are the world markets like for these products? (b) Should the naphta cracker project, the Waterberg coal project as well as Sasol's ethylene project go ahead? Are we not in danger of over-producing ethylene?

[Marriott] Projects such as those mentioned by you seem to be very thoroughly debated in the media.

Surely it is far better if the companies involved in the projects do their own calculations and decide for themselves for good economic reasons whether these projects should go ahead or not.

I do not think that the SAICChE can add to this debate. It is important the government provides a stable environment in which major investment decisions such as these can be taken.

It is also important that local companies should not be worse off than their global competition with regard to tax rates, import protection and other factors that affect investment decisions.

Specifically I believe that benzene is already produced locally.

Any decision to expand this production or to extend it to toluene and xylene must obviously depend on downstream uses and markets for downstream products.

Global petrochemical economics is controlled by economies of scale to assure the long term profitability of any petrochemical venture.

It is essential to build plants on a global scale.

To do this obviously means that the products must be marketed globally as the local market is too small.

Local over-production is not an issue

[Kyriacou] Could you provide a vision of South Africa in the year 2000 from the perspective of the chemical engineering industry?

[Marriott] I am confident that the chemical engineering community will be equal to the challenges that undoubtedly lie ahead.

The chemical industry clearly has opportunities for huge growth in the future.

[Kyriacou] The manufacturing of synfuels and of bulk chemicals was the main preoccupation of the chemical and petro-chemical industries in the years gone by, but the winds of change are blowing against these costly coal-based projects. Why?

[Marriott] The change in the perception of the synfuels industry is simply one of a much lower price of oil.

The vast increases in the price of crude oil which occurred in the mid and late 70s have been forgotten.

We must not forget that South Africa does not have indigenous sources of crude oil.

While further synfuel projects are not likely at present, circumstances have swung around in the past and this could happen again at sometime during the future.

[Kyriacou] A small tonnage chemical group has been formed in South Africa. What role is envisaged for such a group, and what is your comment on its emergence?

[Marriott] There has been a huge interest in the institution-sponsored special interest group.

This is indicative of the number of people who see a future for small businesses occupying niches in the specialty chemicals area.

I think that the opportunities for the true entrepreneur are there.

We hope to see more people take advantage of these.

* Potential of Petrochemical Industry Viewed

90AF0715B Johannesburg *ENGINEERING NEWS*
in English 17 Aug 90 pp 28-29

[Text] The South Africa petro-chemical industry has the potential to become an important player in international markets, says SASOL's [South African Coal, Oil, and Gas Corporation] Executive Director Andre du Toit.

While the competitive advantage of synfuels (which has to be propped up by a special levy) is in doubt, the competitive position of petro-chemical feedstocks, derived from synfuel plants, is "substantially better."

"The reason behind this is that, internationally, these feedstocks are produced in capital intensive plants which use semi-refined fuels as raw materials (that is: ethylene and propylene from naphtha and benzene from platformate) and therefore, their prices are normally substantially higher than the fuels from which they are derived," De Toit explains.

Another factor of importance in the assessment of competitive ability, is the cash cost and variable cost of production.

The major component of cash cost and variable cost in petro-chemical production, is the cost of raw materials and, in this regard, the coal-based synfuel producer is better off than his international oil-based competitor.

"In order to establish why these inherent competitive advantages of the chemical/synfuel industries have not been exploited, it is necessary to take a brief look at the current status of this industry.

"The industry has the following main characteristics: it is based on coal instead of oil and therefore, has low variable cost and high value added—this is the main reason for its strong competitive position.

"Process characteristics are such that it produces 'world scale' volumes of certain important chemical feedstocks," says Du Toit.

"For example, at SASOL's Secunda plants the availability of ethylene, at 350,000 tons a year, exceeds local demand by about 40 percent, while the availability of propylene, at 300,000 tons a year, amounts to about 5 times the local demand.

"Downstream investment in the processing of chemical feedstocks is geared to supply this local demand and exports are limited to relatively small volumes, surplus to South African requirements.

"The industry is therefore, inwardly focused.

"Due to the limited size of the South African chemical market and the inward focus of the industry, local manufacturing plants are generally small by world standards.

"The small local market results in the export of a large proportion of output at significantly lower prices.

"Consequently, the South African world scale producer is at a serious competitive disadvantage to his counterpart in Europe and America as he normally exports only a small proportion of his production.

"As a result, the industry has become highly vertically fragmented, for example, SASOL's ethylene production is currently supplied to two independent polyethylene producers.

"The downstream sectors of the industry have become highly horizontally fragmented—we currently have one local producer of polypropylene and several hundred downstream converters of this polymer.

"A fragmented downstream industry, which simply produces for the local market, obviously also results in inadequate plant capacities and marketing skills in comparison to world standards.

"This horizontal fragmentation is partly due to relatively low capital requirements and consequent ease of entry into the downstream sector of the industry.

"These are the six basic characteristics of the local industry.

"In the jargon of the strategic analyst, the first two can be regarded as strengths and the last four as weaknesses," said Du Toit.

These weaknesses of the petro-chemical industry have had a major impact on new investments in recent years and the basic reason for the lack of investment, has been the following: under the previous system of import control the chemical industry became highly inwardly focussed.

Import control provided absolute protection against foreign competition as long as investments were geared mainly to the supply of the local market (that is, import replacement).

Investment to supply the export market had lower prospective returns and was very risky.

The removal of import control and the replacement thereof by moderate and selective tariff protection during the late 1970s and early 1980s was highly desirable from a long term point of view.

However, in the short to medium term, it further reduced investment in that it substantially increased the risks associated with import replacement operations.

This increased risk is due to the exposure of local manufacturers to fluctuating exchange rates, international price fluctuations and dumping by foreign competitors.

Excessive worldwide investment in chemical production, after the oil crises of the 1970s, resulted in oversupply of international markets and depressed prices for chemical products during the 1980s.

Structural weaknesses of the petro-chemical industry (especially vertical fragmentation, but also the small scale of local manufacturing operations) made it extremely difficult to evaluate and to exploit its international competitive advantages.

According to Du Toit, the lack of vertical integration is one of the most serious impediments to the development of a viable export-oriented chemical industry.

Due to its higher value added, a vertically integrated industry can compete more effectively in export markets.

"It is in the interest of both upstream and downstream producers, as well as the country as a whole, that we maximise value added to exports," Du Toit says.

"In our view, the only solution to this problem of vertical fragmentation is then, the formation of 'alliances' between upstream and downstream producers.

"However, over the past 2 or 3 years, we have seen some improvements in the investment climate.

"All the participants in the petro-chemical industry have now learned that their international competitive position must be properly evaluated whenever new investments are considered.

"They have also realised that plants must be world scale in order to compete effectively.

"World scale plants, together with a small local market, result in new projects that have a significant export bias," comments Du Toit.

The South African synfuels/chemicals industry can produce feedstock at internationally competitive prices, but these competitive advantages have hardly been exploited, mainly due to certain structural weaknesses.

"Synergy between synfuels and petro-chemicals presents South Africa with the opportunity to become an important player in international markets.

"In view of the inherent competitive advantages, we are sure that the required adjustments in government policy will be made to reinforce the other favourable changes in the investment climate," concludes Du Toit.

* Company Processing Chemical Compound

90AF0715FA Johannesburg *ENGINEERING NEWS* in English 17 Aug 90 p 25

[Article by Elena Kyriacou: "Highly-Poisonous Chemical Compound Now Processed by SA (Republic of South Africa) Company"]

[Text] Cypriot mining entrepreneur Loucas Pouroulis is diversifying his interests into the chemicals arena.

Apart from his latest mining venture—the Goudini chrome mine situated near Zeerust-Pouroulis is now interested in an extremely poisonous, but rare and most valuable platinum group metal (PGM) compound osmium tetroxide.

Osmium Corporation has been specifically set up for the manufacture of specialty chemicals and the refining of precious metals.

THE ENGINEERING NEWS paid a visit to this 8-month-old company in the hope of finding out exactly what it is that it does.

The company—seen as a pilot plant by its chief executive Dr Michel Albers—is run by a staff of 10.

It consists of three divisions—the analytical, the chemicals and the refinery divisions.

"The analytical division serves as the watchdog of the company; almost R500,000 [rands] have been spent on this division.

"The chemicals division deals with the manufacture of specialty chemicals, such as osmium tetroxide, which are sold to specialised industries like the electronics, the plating and medical institutions," says Dr Albers.

Osmium tetroxide is used as a cell-fixative in the diagnosis of certain diseases, such as cancer.

Osmium—named after the Greek "osme" which means odour—was discovered by a Cambridge professor, Smithson Tennant in 1803.

The chemical's vapour—with a smell similar to that of chlorine—is very poisonous and can cause blindness.

According to Dr Albers, the firm is presently exporting a small percentage of osmium tetroxide.

"Our third and last division, the refinery division, is used to purify precious metals for specialty chemicals.

"Precious metals, such as osmium, rhodium, gold, iridium and palladium are recovered in an in-house refinery which is capable of delivering all of the platinum group metals and gold," adds Dr Albers.

Sources of the precious metals are obtained from mine concentrates and spent catalysts.

Although reluctant to reveal more details, Dr Albers says that chromium recovered from Pouroulis' Goudini chrome mine could also be used for the manufacture of specialty chemicals.

"Chemicals are performance-orientated and our aim is to sell into the performance market as well as adding value to chemical products such as the plating industries."

A capital expenditure of around R2.5 million has been spent on the company.

"A third of that capex," says Dr Albers, "was spent on the refinery."

An additional R2-million was spent on research into new chemicals and better methods of refining the precious metals.

Last year THE ENGINEERING NEWS (11 August issue) reported that the CSIR [Council for Scientific and Industrial Research] is the only organisation in the

southern hemisphere with the necessary expertise to produce exportable volumes of osmium tetroxide.

It looks like this view might be contested by Pouroulis' company, so far believed to be the only company (barring the CSIR) to be manufacturing osmium tetroxide.

* SASOL Explains New Projects Under Way

90AF0715A Johannesburg ENGINEERING NEWS in English 17 Aug 90 pp 19, 31

[Interview with SASOL [South Africa Coal, Oil, and Gas Corporation] spokesperson; date and place not given; first paragraph is ENGINEERING NEWS introduction]

[Text] SASOL is reported to be spending an estimated R1.2 billion [rands] on 6 new projects. Just more than half of the (R750-million) will be spent on three specific projects—a wax expansion project, a new ammonia plant and a production facility for paraffin products—at Sasolburg.

[ENGINEERING NEWS] SASOL is building a 64,000 ton wax plant at Sasolburg which effectively doubles its wax capacity to 123,000 tons. What is the reason to go ahead with this plant?

[SASOL] The overall objective of the SASOL 1 renovation project is to ensure the profitable operation of the Sasolburg factory for at least the next 15 years.

After a cost reduction exercise is carried out, to ensure a healthy cost structure as a starting point, capital will be invested so as to permit more efficient usage of the synthesis gas that is produced by SASOL 1.

After studying numerous options, it was decided that the best possible strategy for SASOL 1 would be to invest R740-million in order to: shut down the fuels-producing synthol plant, which is no longer a profitable operation because of its small scale of operation; replace the existing ammonia plant with a larger and more efficient plant and expand the Arge plant to increase wax production and to allow economic recovery of the lighter hydrocarbons produced as paraffins.

Specifically with regard to waxes, the company believes it has a distinct leadership position, both locally and internationally, in the wax markets.

It has a rather unique source of waxes, the Arge process, that gives our products special properties.

[ENGINEERING NEWS] Could you please describe the features of the wax plant?

[SASOL] The heart of the wax production process are the fixed bed Fischer-Tropsch reactors (Arge Synthesis).

The Arge reactor capacity is to be almost doubled at SASOL 1 by the addition of two reactors that have the same capacity as the five existing reactors.

[ENGINEERING NEWS] What is the local content, and how much of the capital expenditure of the plant will remain in South Africa?

[SASOL] With regard to the split of capital expenditure between local and international suppliers, the capital estimates are only approximate to date.

A general philosophy of the project is that as much as possible will be locally sourced.

[ENGINEERING NEWS] What type of wax will be made, how much is to be used in South Africa and what are its chances for exportation?

[SASOL] Generally speaking, the medium waxes and the chemically modified hard waxes that are used in the candle industry, about 65,000 tons a year, will be sold locally as a first priority and the surplus will be exported.

An estimated 50,000 tons a month are being imported into South Africa.

[ENGINEERING NEWS] What is the present price of waxes of the type to be made by SASOL, and is there a chance of major fluctuations?

[SASOL] (SASOL declined to comment.)

[ENGINEERING NEWS] What are the main uses of wax and what is the size and worth of the world market?

[SASOL] The total world paraffinic wax market is estimated to be around 2 million tons a year.

However, the premium hard wax products markets are estimated to be only 200,000 tons a year of this total.

Medium waxes can be used in primarily candle blends, hot melt coatings and hot melt adhesives in paper conversion, polishes, waterproofing, textile impregnation, crayons, rubber blooming, cheese rinds, carbon paper wax, jewelry casting, tile glazing and electrical component sealers.

Hard waxes can be used in hot melt adhesives, gloss enhancement of plastics, electrical insulators, chewing gums, printing inks as pigment carriers, paints, plastic lubricants, thermostatic waxes and thermal transfer waxes.

[ENGINEERING NEWS] What work has been done so far on the project, what contracts have been awarded and what tenders are still to be invited?

[SASOL] To date, a first estimate of 20 percent accuracy has been compiled, most of the work having been done in-house by Sastech Engineering Services, with the use of local engineering contracting companies where necessary.

At this stage, the work package has been identified and submitted to the various locally represented engineering contractors for quotations.

[ENGINEERING NEWS] SASOL is to build a new 240,000 ton plant at Sasolburg to manufacture ammonia for the fertilizer and explosives industry. Why is SASOL going ahead with the plant and when is it poised to be commissioned?

[SASOL] The overall objective of the SASOL 1 renovation project is to ensure the profitable operation of the Sasolburg factory for at least the next 15 years.

It is also seen as an opportunity to replace some imported ammonia.

The estimated time of completion is in the last quarter of 1992.

[ENGINEERING NEWS] What work has been done on the plant, what contracts have been awarded—to whom and their value—and what tenders are to be invited?

[SASOL] The requirements of the process, in terms of its production rate and product quality, together with the definition of the available feed gas and SASOL 1's gas supply commitments, have been submitted to four major ammonia process suppliers.

An in-house evaluation was completed and an estimate made for the project viability studies.

[ENGINEERING NEWS] Could you please describe the plant, detailing the hardware and equipment required as well as the process whereby ammonia will be manufactured?

[SASOL] No plant equipment or processes have yet been specified to the tendering contractors.

[ENGINEERING NEWS] What is the local content and how much of the capex will remain in South Africa?

[SASOL] No split of local versus international capex is available yet for this part of the project, but again, the philosophy of as much local content as possible is adopted and communicated to the contractors.

[ENGINEERING NEWS] What will the ruling price of ammonia be and will it be used exclusively as feedstock for SASOL's own fertilizer and explosives enterprises?

[SASOL] The ammonia will not be used exclusively for SASOL's internal usage.

[ENGINEERING NEWS] What will become of SASOL's present 70,000 tons a year ammonia plant, and why is this being replaced?

[SASOL] The existing plant is old and needs replacement.

[ENGINEERING NEWS] SASOL will build a plant at Sasolburg to manufacture paraffin. What is the cost of this plant and when is it to be commissioned?

[SASOL] The paraffins are derived from the Arge reactor products. The plant will come on line in the last quarter of 1992.

[ENGINEERING NEWS] What is the ruling price for paraffinic products, and why is SASOL embarking on this project?

[SASOL] The Arge reactors produce light hydrocarbons that are blended into the total petrol and diesel pool at Sasolburg.

With the expansion of the Arge reactors, it is now economically viable to develop these hydrocarbons as paraffins rather than as fuels.

The Arge fuels are a low grade fuel because of their high linearity but make an excellent feedstock for the paraffin industry.

[ENGINEERING NEWS] What will be the uses of paraffinic products produced at Sasolburg and where are these products presently obtained?

[SASOL] Mainly as solvents.

[ENGINEERING NEWS] Please could you described the plant, detailing the proposed capacity, the hardware and equipment requirement and the expected local content of the plant?

[SASOL] Conventional tray distillation columns at atmospheric pressures are used to produce a crude paraffin feed material from the reactor products.

[ENGINEERING NEWS] What work has been done thus far, what contracts have been awarded—to whom and their values—and what tenders are to be invited?

[SASOL] A process-engineered proposal has been completed and submitted to various engineering contractors for bids.

* AZAPO Spells Out Position on Negotiations

90AF0712C Johannesburg CITY PRESS in English
19 Aug 90 p 12

[Article by Jerry Itumeleng Mosala: "AZAPO Rejects Plan for New SA"; first paragraph is CITY PRESS introduction]

[Text] Reacting to our editorial comment last Sunday, in which we said we believed the only option for AZAPO [Azanian People's Organization] and the PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress] was to form an alliance with the ANC [African National Congress] and intensify the struggle at the negotiating table, Jerry Itumeleng Mosala, senior lecturer in theology at the University of Cape Town and President of AZAPO, spells out his organisation's position on negotiations.

AZAPO rejects the present negotiations package for change in South Africa—change and not transformation, which is the real issue—offered by F.W. de Klerk and accepted by the ANC and its allies.

The official position of AZAPO is that working-class interests are not provided for, nor is there commitment by the negotiation lobbyists to redress social imbalances in our society.

No solution can exist in the absence of the democratic involvement of the oppressed and exploited in the resolution of the conflict in our country. The pace, direction, and methods of the struggle should reside within their ranks.

Negotiation can take place only among equal partners and the SA [Republic of South Africa] regime still controls the keys to prisons and retains political, military and economic power.

AZAPO therefore believes the timing of negotiations is premature and therefore cannot deliver the expected revolutionary change.

The talks can only benefit a few elitist groups in our society, to the exclusion of the under-privileged and disadvantaged, give a new lease of life to a capitalist system already showing signs of collapse and create confusion and inter-organisational conflict as liberation forces scramble for crumbs from the oppressor's table.

The peaceful settlement to which de Klerk is inviting liberation movements must be seen for what it is—peace for capitalism to exploit undisturbed. He has already spelled out what he wants from negotiations:

"A new democratic constitution, universal franchise, no domination, equality before an independent judiciary, the protection of minority and individual rights, freedom of religion, a sound economy based on proven economic principles of private enterprise, dynamic programmes directed at better education, health services and housing for all."

AZAPO rejects this programme of bourgeois liberal democratic rights. We understand that they are similar to the Freedom Charter, but we do not think they will liberate anybody.

Only a democratic socialist transformation of the economy and society will liberate the nation.

* Elite Mechanized Unit Garrison At Walvis Bay

90AF0711C Pretoria PARATUS in Afrikaans
Aug 90 pp 20-21

[Article by Lt. Etienne Garnett-Bennett: "61 Mechanized: The Cream of the Crop of Our Soldiers"]

[Text] He was the son of a farmer from the Orange Free State, strong, agile, and hardened by the northeastern Free State sun. He and many others came here with stars in their eyes, in search of adventure, excitement, and danger. They are the cream of the crop of our country's young soldiers.

For 61 Mechanized Battalion Group (61 Mechanized) of Rooikop near Walvis Bay, war is still a reality. If you talk

to their members, then it becomes quiet when they talk about past battles, narrow escapes, and the buddies that they will never see again. The unit's soldiers were the last South African forces to pull out of Namibia at the end of 1989 after a glorious saga of victories and heroic deeds in the bush war.

The first mechanized operations in South-West Africa were conducted in 1978 by then Combat Group Juliet. Because of their unparalleled success against SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization], it was decided to establish a permanent unit, and in 1979, 61 Mechanized came into being. With their Ratels, Elands, and Buffels, they were the spearhead of the South African attack force. Operations such as Hooper, Modular, Protea, and Smokeshell are today nothing more than chapters in the history book, but for them each one was a bloody battle that demanded the best of the unit. Over the years, 61 Mechanized has been expanded into an elite unit that has become famous far beyond the borders of Ovamboland.

Today, the war is over, and 61 Mechanized has pulled back to Rooikop Military Base, about 20 km outside Walvis Bay. "Although we are in a different situation, we are still the same unit with the same spirit and combat readiness," says Commander Mike Muller, the current commander of 61 Mechanized. Their base, previously the home of 2 SA Infantry Battalion, is located at the foot of Rooikop. The weather-beaten granite hill is a landmark in the area, and looms over the broad horizons of the Namib.

After 10 years in the tropical savannahs of Ovamboland, it was not easy for 61 Mechanized to adjust to the Namib Desert. "It makes sense that the unit is now dealing with an entirely different situation. It was a major adjustment to go from a fighting unit to a peacetime training unit," says Commander Muller. However, the open firing ranges and flat terrain of the "hard" desert are the ideal practice terrain for tanks and armored vehicles.

Serving here at the edge of the desert is no picnic. Besides the major daily temperature fluctuations and regular sandstorms, the troops here are farther from home than anyone else. Regular morale assessments are important, because homesickness can really grab hold of you when the wind howls for days on end and the sand gets into everything. "We really have to devote attention to morale, and problems are addressed as soon as possible," says the chaplain of 61 Mechanized, Reverend Anton Kemp.

Fortunately, the unit boasts a comfortable leisure center with four swimming pools, a canteen, video games, and relaxation areas. Because of the distances and lack of transportation, the troops here get an entire month's leave. "All the same, we also go to town regularly, and now and then we even go to the beach. On Sundays people also come from Walvis Bay to visit some of the

fellows," says a young conscript from Johannesburg. The commander also gives top priority to sports, and regular sport tours are organized.

All of these measures help keep the men's morale very high, as evidenced by the low percentage of sick reports and cases of AWOL.

A unit that must always be prepared and combat ready on the ground demands teamwork from everyone. "I believe that for the six months that troops are here with us they should be kept genuinely busy. It is myth that our troops do not have anything to do," says Commander Muller. Another misconception is that Walvis Bay serves as a sort of penal colony. Only the best soldiers in the country's training units are sent here for further, specialized training.

After an initial retraining phase, each corps or subunit is taught how to work together as a team. This leads to two major exercises in which the artillery, armored, anti-aircraft, and various infantry components are integrated as a combat group. Only then can the trained troops be regarded as full-fledged soldiers. In between training sessions, daily vehicle maintenance is a necessity. Because of the combination of sand, salt, and humid sea air, vehicles rust very easily.

A multimillion rand construction project by the unit is now nearing completion. The temporary buildings that have been in use for years are now being replaced by a modern headquarters, clubs, and messes for officers and noncommissioned officers, as well as barracks that will house around 1,500 men. Up to now, they have depended on tent accommodations. The RSM [Regimental Sergeant Major], AOI Kobus Kemp, has started an extensive gardening project to turn the unit into an oasis in the desert. They already boast green grass lawns and meter-high palm trees planted by their predecessors.

Water is plentiful and is drawn from the Kuseib, an underground river in the Namib.

But 61 Mechanized is still not finished with its chameleon act. They are now once again undergoing an adjustment process; this time, it is the black areas of Natal. Divisions from the unit have been deployed to that region to effect peace between the warring black factions in the area. They should be successful in this mission, as in so many before.

They have remained standing amidst bloody battles over the past 10 years. Even in peacetime, they are striving for the very top, because it is here that boys become men.

* Debate Over ANC-SACP Alliance Continues

90AF0725A London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL
in English 24 Aug 90 pp 2-4

[Article: "South Africa: The Ones That Got Away"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Since the public re-launch of the South African Communist Party (SACP) on 29 July, relations between it and the African National Congress (ANC) have changed. ANC insiders are now looking at the run-up to the ANC's Conference on 16 December, when it will be decided to what extent the Party will continue to dominate a new-look ANC.

Party members who came out of the closet on 29 July were those whose identity was least likely to cause a stir, including the non-blacks in the ANC leadership. Black members of the ANC's National Executive Committee (NEC) who were revealed as Party members included Chris Hani, who has never hidden his Party membership; Sizakele Sigxashe, who has always had a low profile; and John Nkadimeng who, as General Secretary of the now-defunct South African Congress of Trade Unions, is a natural champion of the working class.

Many of those revealed as Party members are people whose future in the ANC was increasingly unclear in any event. Publicly declaring Party membership is, for some, an elegant way of avoiding the ignominy of being voted out of the ANC leadership at the ANC's Consultative Conference scheduled for 16 December.

Latent tensions are now coming to the surface in the ANC. A good example is the visceral attack launched by ANC information chief Pallo Jordan, in which his targets were SACP General Secretary Joe Slovo and the cult of Stalinism. Never since the public declaration of alliance has a serving member of the ANC leadership attacked the Party publicly. Even the Gang of Eight did so only on the eve of their expulsion from the ANC in 1975. Jordan is himself a victim of the Stalinisation of the ANC, having been detained in 1983 for his criticism of excesses by the security organ Mbokodo (AC Vol 31 No 1).

Now that the Party has broken cover to some extent, a host of minor struggles could become subsumed in a new tussle between nationalists and communists. For example, the contest between Army Commander Joe Modise, and Army Chief of Staff Chris Hani, has always had a subtle ideological tinge due to the fact that Modise is not a Party member. Nevertheless, it is essentially a personality clash. Modise can now use the Party dimension to bolster his flagging status by claiming that his struggle with the Hani-Slovo faction is all about thwarting Party designs on the army.

We foresee several ANC leaders now playing the nationalist card. All are now struggling to find a popular base. With the suspension of the armed struggle, army leaders like Modise have lost their old power-base and must find another. Hani is cultivating a new constituency as champion of the working class and militant youth. He is further reinforced by his popularity in the Eastern Cape, a traditional ANC stronghold. This is a powerful boost for the Party.

The Party itself is bidding for new constituencies by unveiling as Party members respected leaders of the United Democratic Front (UDF). Cheryl Carolus has a

solid base in the women's movement and good standing in the Coloured community. With the demise of the Reverend Allan Boesak, she is emerging as the new cult figure for Coloured radicals. The Party will hope to woo the Coloured community away from the Trotskyite influence of Dr Neville Alexander and the Islamic fundamentalism of Qibla, which is close to the Pan-African Congress (PAC).

Similarly in the Indian community, where Billy Nair has also been revealed as a Party member. He is a leader of the Indian community, whose financial resources kept the UDF running through its darkest hours. It is also a community that can make or break Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi's dreams of a separate KwaZulu settlement. John Gomomo, from the Eastern Cape; Chris Dlamini, from the Transvaal, and Sidney Mafumadi, from the often under-represented Venda of northern Transvaal, all come from the labour movement. Jeremy Cronin, formerly of the UDF, represents the white left. Harry Gwala, a staunch Maoist, is important as a Zulu to be deployed against Buthelezi. These too have revealed themselves as Party members.

Despite making these efforts to produce members who are known for their internal activity rather than for membership of the ANC in exile, the Party has failed to deflect allegations that it dominates the ANC. Moreover, the Party's failure to reveal the identities of many black Party members in leading positions in the ANC is a gamble. Only three black leaders of the ANC in exile were unveiled as Party members, namely Hani, Sigxashe and Nkadimeng. By not revealing more, the Party risks being seen as led disproportionately by non-blacks, since it claims to have a 70 percent black membership. This may prove useful to organisations like the PAC which have long maintained that the Party—and hence the ANC—is dominated by non-blacks.

As expected (AC Vol 31 No 15), the Party did not reveal Thabo Mbeki. There is growing speculation about his present status within the Party. Some contend that he did not stand for re-election at the Havana Congress last year and may even have resigned. Others believe that Mbeki, who has not been an enthusiastic Party member for some years, may have allowed his membership to lapse without formally resigning. A third theory is that he asked his comrades to suspend his obligation to take part in SACP activities after his membership had been revealed (AC Vol 29 No 17), so as not to embarrass the ANC.

The following non-declared communists remain within the ANC's National Executive Committee:

—Alfred Nzo: ANC Secretary-General since 1964. He was until 1984 a member of the SACP Central Committee. His political fortunes have nosedived. One of his worst mistakes is to have read an internal memorandum in public during the annual 8 January leader's speech this year. The memorandum was an assessment of the impossibility of an armed seizure of power

which Nzo mistook for the text of the annual speech. He is unlikely to be re-elected to the NEC at the next ANC Conference.

- Josiah Jele: although a long-standing member of the NEC, Jele did not stand for re-election during the ANC's last conference at Kabwe in 1985. Delegates were told that he was going to concentrate on full-time Party work. He was undergoing training at the Lenin School in Moscow because the then SACP General Secretary, the late Moses Mabhida, was grooming Jele as his successor. Jele was subsequently defeated in a struggle with the Slovo-Hani Mac Maharaj faction of the Party and was dropped from the Party Politburo. Having lost this power struggle in the Party, he was rewarded by being co-opted to the ANC's governing body. He now appears to have been dropped from the Party's Central Committee and is likely to be dropped from the ANC's leadership in December.
 - Sindiso Mfenyane: head of the NEC secretariat, he is responsible for the day-to-day functioning of ANC structures. Like Jele, he was appointed (not elected) to the NEC.
 - Henry 'Squire' Makgothi: Deputy Secretary-General of the ANC and an important SACP member. He occupies a crucial position since his office has traditionally been the one charged with organising ANC conferences. The 16 December Conference may thus fall within his domain. By this means the Party may eventually have a hand in the choice of delegates to the conference. Makgothi is able and upwardly mobile and is likely to be re-elected in December.
 - Stanley Mabizela: deputy head of the Department of International Affairs, he was co-opted into the NEC in 1988. He will probably retain his seat because of his diplomatic experience. Unlike some of his comrades, Mabizela has not made many enemies.
 - Gertrude Shope: her likely replacement at the head of the ANC's Women's Section will mean her giving up her place on the NEC, a position she holds ex officio.
 - Jacob Zuma: ANC intelligence chief, Zuma is a member of the working group that has been studying the removal of obstacles to negotiation. He has a solid base in Natal, but he is unpopular in the ANC and will most likely not be re-elected.
 - Dr Simon Makana: a leading Party member, Makana serves as the ANC Ambassador in Moscow. He was the head of the Security and Intelligence organ until 1981. He has a reputation for timidity and could be dropped from the NEC in December.
 - Azir Pahad: a leading Party member and politico-military analyst. He is close to Thabo Mbeki and has been a staunch advocate of a negotiated settlement. He has also been a member of the group working on the details of negotiation. His brother is Essop Pahad, revealed as a member of the SACP Central Committee. Aziz is a strong candidate for re-election in December.
 - James Stuart: Party member and Lenin School graduate. Stuart was until recently the Administrative Secretary for the External Coordinating Committee. He will probably lose his place on the NEC this year.
 - Dr Francis Meli: the Party's specialist on the National Question, and until recently the editor of SECHABA [the people]. The Party has investigated him for two years. This has nearly destroyed him but has also created much sympathy for him. He is unlikely to be re-elected to the NEC.
 - Tony Mongalo: Administrative Secretary in the President General's Office, a position akin to that of White House Chief of Staff. A fifty-fifty chance of re-election.
 - Steve Tshwete: ex-National Executive member of the UDF, he has a strong base in the Eastern Cape. He is now co-National Organiser of the ANC jointly with Wilton Mkwayi. This office may help organise the December Conference together with the Secretary-General's Office. If so, this would give the Party all the influence it needs to organise the December Conference in the way it sees fit. Tshwete is very popular in South Africa and has good prospects for election to the NEC, which co-opted him in 1988 (AC Vol 29 No 16).
 - Timothy Mokoena: Umkhonto we Sizwe Commissar, popular because of his heroism in Angola. His role in the suppression of the 1984 mutiny, though, could haunt him. Mokoena was co-opted into the NEC in 1988 and could be elected this year. He is a true product of the Soweto generation and worked his way up through the ranks.
 - Jackie Selibe: Youth Section head and Chairman of the National Repatriation Committee. The Youth Section has resisted efforts to merge with the South African Youth Congress (SAYCO) for fear of being swamped by township militants. Selibe, a co-opted NEC member, has an even chance of re-election in December.
 - Robert Conco: the Party man at the Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College in Tanzania, he will definitely be dropped from the NEC this year.
- The Party still has 16 active but undeclared members within the NEC. This figure excludes Thabo Mbeki, who cannot be regarded as an active communist, and Stephen Dlamini, too old and infirm to be an activist. Together with the nine revealed on 29 July, they constitute a weighty majority.
- According to our estimates, at least five of the current NEC members who are also undeclared members of the Communist Party stand a good chance of re-election in December on merit alone. This means that if those whose Party membership has been revealed choose to

renounce their responsibilities in the ANC, the Party will still have a healthy representation. The Party will thus be able to operate on two fronts at once: the public front, manned by the powerful Party machine revealed on 29 July, and including some of the liberation movement's most dynamic and popular figures. They will survive on their own merits and cultivate a new base for the Party. At the same time the Party will also be operating on a clandestine front, operated by the underground communist machinery within the ANC. This goes beyond the National Executive Committee to embrace figures in key positions like the Administrative Secretary of the Treasurer-General's Office, Tickley Mohammed, education chief Seretse Choabi, International Affairs Administrative Secretary Noah Mnumzana and so on.

Some of those revealed as Party members are deeply unpopular in the ANC, to the point that they will probably lose their leadership positions at the next ANC Conference. Their revelation as Party members may save them from being dumped in December, when those in the Party's public front will perhaps not seek re-election. This category includes John Nkadimeng, discredited by the persecution of Thozamile Botha and Thozamile Makhetha, and disliked for his appointment of his sons David and Rogers as top aides. Sigxashe is also unpopular and could be damaged by reports of the excesses of the security organ in Angola. Mac Maharaj and Ronnie Kasrils are unpopular too.

Many in the ANC now feel that the conditions which caused the merger of the ANC and the SACP into one body with two heads, from 1961 onwards, are no longer extant. There is growing agitation for the two to revert to their old status as truly separate entities while remaining allies. For these people, the continued existence of a formidable Party underground inside the ANC is cause for concern.

* Oil Industry Urges Refinery Expansion

90AF0715E Johannesburg *ENGINEERING NEWS*
in English 17 Aug 90 p 27

[ENGINEERING NEWS [ENGEN] Technical Director Theo van der Pas discusses the issues which will dominate the South African refinery industry in the "post synfuels era"]

[Text] Based on the average 4-5 percent annual growth of the oil industry—and assuming that no further synfuel plants will be built for the time being—expansion of South Africa's refineries will become a necessity during the 1990's.

These are the words of, seasoned "oil man" and ENGEN technical director, Theo van der Pas, who says there are many reasons for this new direction.

"Today SASOL [South African Coal, Oil, and Gas Corporation] is in full production and the additional market growth must be taken up by the refineries.

"The oil refining industry faces a challenging period; enough reasonably priced crude oil will be available and particularly in the First World, petrol and diesel will have to satisfy environmental requirements and specific requirements of the modern engine.

"These requirements will become applicable to South Africa and refineries will have to become progressively more complex and costly and the planning will have to start now.

"Since the 1973 energy crisis, the South African refinery industry has been overshadowed by the production of synthetic automotive fuels.

"The postponing of the torbanite and methanol projects, in light of the low crude oil price, and the changing political situation signify a new approach."

"Because synfuel plants produce a significant range of hydrocarbon feedstocks, the expanded refineries will also have to cater for these products in the future."

Referring to number of graphic predictions from a variety of sources, Van der Pas says ENGEN foresees only moderate increases in the crude oil price over the next 10 years.

"The availability of crude oil should also be addressed; proven reserves are sufficient to supply the world for nearly 50 years at present consumption rates.

"Growth in worldwide consumption of crude oil is not expected to be above 3 percent and methods of improving efficiency should keep the figure at a minimum despite the fact that developing countries are using more and more fuel each year.

"ENGEN believes that all these factors contribute to need to expand South Africa's refinery capacity."

The company plans to expand its Genref refinery by 40 percent by 1992 and a further 40 percent by 1995.

The expansions are designed to cover market growth, third party crude oil processing and for the production of chemicals.

Van der Pas refers to environmental considerations which will affect the local petro-chemical industry in the 1990s.

He says through the years little has changed as far as composition and quality of petrol is concerned, except that high performance engines require high octane fuel.

"The cheapest way to increase the octane level is with the addition of lead, but with the increasing car population, the use of lead has become an ever increasing concern.

"Hydrocarbons and NOx are present in engine exhaust gasses and both have been found to be harmful to ecology.

"This led to the development of the platinum-based catalytic converter; but lead is a poison to platinum and the former had to be phased out of petrol in the First World.

"Lead had to be removed in order to remove other harmful components and the argument whether lead in exhaust gases is dangerous became uninteresting.

"There is often a misunderstanding in this area," says Van der Pas.

"To maintain or increase octane levels, predominantly aromatics were added.

"It has since been learned that particularly benzene is carcinogenic and new specifications are on the way to limiting aromatics in petrol.

"The latest development is 'reformulated fuels' which satisfy the requirements of a high performance engine and are less harmful to the environment.

"Reformulated fuels of the future will contain no lead, less aromatics and will have a reduced vapour pressure.

"The main concern about diesel fuel is its high aromatic content (up to 20 percent) and the allowable sulphur level.

"The carbon particles present in a diesel exhaust are also considered carcinogenic and soot will have to [be] reduced by improving engine design.

"It has been recommended that sulphur be reduced from a maximum of 0.5 percent to 0.05 percent.

"This can be achieved by additional hydrotreating; adding to the refining cost and the price of the product.

"Finally, a few words about pollution from refineries.

"SO₂, NO_x, hydrocarbons and possibly CO₂ are the significant pollutants."

The amount of SO₂, which is the result of burning sulphur containing fuel, can be controlled.

NO_x can be contained by using special burners but Van der Pas does not predict its removal from combustion gasses in local refineries in the foreseeable future.

Hydrocarbons are technically simple to contain although the process is very costly.

CO₂ is feared to be causing global warming and whether this is true remains to be seen.

In summary Van der Pas says a challenging decade lies ahead for the oil refining industry which must start planning now for complex and costly crude oil refineries.

* ANC Chastised for Capitulating on Talks

90AF0695B Cape Town CAPE TIMES in English
23 Aug 90 p 4

[Commentary by Dr. Neville Alexander, chairman of the Workers' Organization for Socialist Action: "WOSA: The Reasoning Behind the Need for an Assembly of the People"]

[Text] During the past four months South Africa has entered the period of its greatest danger since the end of WWII.

F.W. de Klerk's speech of February 2 and the response to it by the leadership of the African National Congress [ANC] were welcomed worldwide and, of course, inside South Africa as great acts of statecraft and *realpolitik*.

It was (and still is) generally expected that the logjam of politics of apartheid would be broken and we would enter a period of peace and prosperity leading to the desired haven of a non-racial, united, democratic South Africa.

There can be no doubt that the "politics of negotiation" has received the spontaneous support of the overwhelming majority of the people of this country. This is quite natural, since all people normally prefer peaceful means of resolving conflict to violence and warfare. The reasons why the National Party turned its dramatic policy somersault have been analysed in detail from every angle and need not be repeated here.
No Moral Right

The same cannot be said of the ANC leadership's about-turn. There is a tendency to present the politics of negotiation as the logical outcome of the organisation's armed struggle, as a victorious reaping of the fruits of three decades of guerrilla warfare. In this way, the thought that the present process might represent much less than "victory" and might even be an act of capitulation is not allowed to come into the foreground. What is clear, however, is that the process of negotiation is understood by prominent ANC-SACP [South African Communist Party] leaders as a process of *compromise*.

And it is at this point that a warning has to be flashed. The leaders of the ANC have no moral or political right to enter into compromises on behalf of all the oppressed people of this country. They have themselves made it clear that no matter how popular the organisation is, it is not the only representative voice of the oppressed and exploited majority of the people of South Africa.

This is a fundamental issue. No amount of wishful thinking or manipulation of the media can alter the fact that there are three or four other significant currents that run in the broad river of the national liberation movement.

It is for this reason that the Workers' Organisation for Socialist Action (WOSA) insists that the only way in which a new constitution can be drawn up for South

Africa/Azania is by a Constituent Assembly based on one person, one vote and on proportional representation. No other mechanism can give legitimacy to a new constitution.

Undo Dirty Work

Any constitution that eventuates from the present talks between the National Party and its allies on the one hand and the ANC and its allies on the other will be as illegitimate as was that of the Union of South Africa, that poisoned fruit of the notorious whites-only National Convention of 1908-1909. That constitution led to an 80-year struggle which continues to this day.

Before the leaders of the ANC-SACP tie us into the same kind of historical knot, they should pause and consider the wisdom of convening jointly—with all other political organisations of the oppressed and exploited people—a conference where the strategy and tactics of this new period can be discussed thoroughly. Should the majority of the delegates at such an Assembly of the People decide to enter into the politics of negotiation, those who refuse to join could still opt out in the full knowledge of the consequences of such an approach.

On the other hand, it is quite possible that the majority might decide to use the political space that has opened up since February 2 this year by continuing sustained extra-parliamentary mobilisation of the working people for the attainment of fundamental social reforms. It is quite possible that the views of other currents in the liberation movement will prevail at such a gathering. Thus, for instance, our view in WOSA, that if the de Klerk government is really committed to moving into a non-racial democratic future, as it claims, all it has to do is to repeal all discriminatory legislation and thus undo formally some of the dirty work of the past 80 years. There is no need to give it credibility and legitimacy by "negotiating" with it over precisely these criminal acts.

Deepening Divisions

Whatever happens at such a conference, there is no doubt that all the available options will be placed in front of all the people of this country with crystal clarity. There is no reason to mislead the people into believing that negotiations are the only "non-violent" (Welkom? Port Elizabeth? Thokoza? Soweto? etc?) option or even that they must succeed. The democratic way and the ultimate manner of legitimising any course of action is to place all possible options in front of those whose destiny will be decided by the choice that is made.

Not to agree to such a consultative conference, originally called for by the Azanian People's Organisation, is to accept the risk of deepening existing divisions within the liberation movement. Judging by the unprecedented carnage that is now occurring on the Rand, in Natal and elsewhere, all that is necessary is for access to arms and ammunition to be obtained for us to find ourselves in the middle of the Lebanon scenario. Not for nothing that some parts of some cities and villages in the country have

been renamed "Beirut" by "young comrades" battling against "vigilantes". Instead of the haven of peace and prosperity, we shall have been led over the precipice into a state of multiple civil war. If, as is to be expected, the Right wing adds its counter-revolutionary weight to this devastation, the result would be too ghastly to contemplate.

* Malan Admonishes ANC on Violence, Talks

90AF0695A Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English
27 Aug 90 p 10

[Article by Keith Abendroth: "Magnus Lashes Out at Mandela for Ducking Talks"]

[Text] The Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan, strongly criticised ANC [African National Congress] deputy-president Nelson Mandela at the weekend for continuing to side-step talking to Zulu leader Dr Mangosuthu Buthelezi in a bid to stop the spiral of anarchy.

In a hard-hitting address, interpreted as clearly questioning the sincerity of Mr Mandela to end the violence, General Malan also made it clear that the Defence Force had not "gone soft on security", as was being claimed in some political quarters.

The SADF [South African Defense Forces], he said, regarded unrest, violence and intimidation as the country's Enemy Number One—and its role was as important as ever, particularly as a stabilising force.

Addressing a colours parade at Voortrekkerhoogte of the Pretoria-based Group 15 commando units, General Malan stressed the multi-racial nature of the SADF; made it clear that there was no room for an "alternative army" which would only be the extension of a political party; condemned the "shocking unrest" in the country and slammed Mrs Winnie Mandela and Mr Chris Hani, ANC MK [Spear of the Nation] military wing commander, for continuing to promote the "armed struggle".

He said the impression was growing that the ANC was unable to "get its house in order", and hit at "leaders who try to hide behind transparent excuses for not entering into discussions with their political opponents".

The Defence Force, he said, was made up of people from all race groups in the country, selected according to ability—43 percent White, 33 percent Brown and 24 percent Black.

He said that within days of the signing of the Pretoria Minute, in which the ANC had forsworn violence, the spiral of violence had increased.

"In many cases, too many, the deed has not followed the word. Parties which should be partners in South Africa's future have still not abandoned violence," said General Malan.

In fact, Mr Mandela himself had said in a TV discussion on August 12 that "mass action" would continue and blamed "so-called State violence" for the country's problems.

Then, on the following Thursday, SA [Republic of South Africa] Council of Churches general secretary Rev Frank Chikane had directly blamed the SA Police.

Since the Pretoria Minute a number of ANC spokesmen had made statements which were in direct contrast with the agreement and among the ringleaders were Mrs Mandela and Mr Chris Hani.

At the same time, said General Malan, there was proof that infiltration and the caching of weapons was continuing—a result of Operation Vula, which started in 1987.

The commitment of the SADF to end the violence and the counter-action now being taken by the security forces should be proof for everyone that the government was not "soft on security", as was claimed in certain party circles.

And, said General Malan, the claim from within the ANC that its MK military wing had to be kept in readiness in case the negotiation process failed was "empty and invalid".

He said: "It has never been the terrorist operations of the ANC which played the decisive role which led to dialogue."

He concluded: "What is needed most of all is that the various parties end the violence, that they enforce discipline and establish trust.

"And if they don't want to, or can't, the impression could mount that they do not care if South Africa descends into anarchy."

Defence Minister Magnus Malan said that there were five absolute "musts" the ANC had to comply with to get the peace negotiations properly off the ground.

Spelling them out, he said they were acceptance that:

- A person could not practise peace and violence at the same time—once agreement had been reached on talks, violence and intimidation must stop;
- It could not be expected of one party only to remove stumbling blocks and act "with audacity"—something that was the responsibility of all participating parties, and not of the Government alone;
- There was a strong impression that the ANC could not get its political house in order and discipline itself. It was time the ANC solved this as most South Africans accepted the ANC as one of the parties to the talks;
- Black leaders must stop blaming each other. Mr Nelson Mandela must do his bit by talking to Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi who had repeatedly declared his willingness to do so;

- Black leaders must stop giving the State the blame for all the problems. It was a reflection on the excellent work being done by the Security Forces who acted with integrity and risked their lives. They did not deserve the accusations thrown at them.

* New Poor White Phenomenon Reported

90AF0694F Cape Town THE ARGUS in English
27 Aug 90 p 5

[Text] Johannesburg—Thousands of destitute and near-destitute Afrikaner families are waging an increasingly desperate battle for survival in the Witwatersrand-Pretoria-Brits region.

Afrikaner conservative leader Mrs Martie Hertzog (widow of the late founder-leader of the Herstigte Nasionale Party Dr Albert Hertzog) believes the poverty in Afrikanerdom "is rapidly reaching the 1933 Depression level again".

Newly Impoverished

And, Professor Ben Barkhuizen of the Transvaal Youth Trust confirms that "thousands of disadvantaged white children are given additional daily meals at school because they can't get food at home".

These newly impoverished people are unemployed or semi-employed middle-class and working-class families with small children, hundreds of penniless ex-farmers, but also middle-class pensioners whose incomes cannot keep up with galloping inflation.

Many of these "new poor whites" with their "nuclear-sized families" have no better-off relatives to fall back on, nor can they compete for the same jobs with working-class blacks in the cities.

The younger Afrikaner man can only find temporary work at organisations afflicted by strikes of black workers—or become policemen, soldiers or security guards.

Out of a mixture of pride and disenchantment with what many call "Afrikaner elitism" in the government and the main-stream Afrikaner churches, the new breed of Afrikaner poor rarely bothers to confront the red tape involved in applying for the several-hundred rand monthly welfare payouts.

Instead they "make do", exactly as tens-of-thousands did before the NP's [National Party] former Afrikaner-Nationalistic policies gave them government jobs after 1948—they sell their cottage crafts at street stalls, do menial labour, plumbing, odd repair and painting jobs, collect scrap metal, fix cars and roofs.

To supplement their meagre food intake, their families often eat at the Operation Hunger or Transvaal Education Department soup kitchens and feeding schemes run by churches.

Welfare Schemes

Welfare schemes are supported or run by numerous organisations and people including the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging, the Boerestaat Party and even ex-boxer Kallie Knoetze.

While figures were difficult to obtain, most spokesmen of these bodies estimated that thousands of Afrikaner families must already be living in dire circumstances on agricultural holdings and in urban and suburban communities.

They have not yet turned to illegal squatting, but usually are classic "bywoners"—occupying camping caravans, rooms, shanties or garages on the properties of more fortunate friends or relatives.

*** Afrikaner Homeland in Northwestern Cape Planned**

90AF0694G Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English
21 Aug 90 p 11

[Text] A plan for an Afrikaner homeland in the North Western Cape, which will eventually accommodate about two and a half million Afrikaners, will offer freedom for the Afrikaner, according to Professor Carel Boshoff, chairman of the Afrikanervolkswag.

Prof Boshoff said yesterday the historical development of reform which "must accommodate a growing Black population (at present 40 million) will bring home to all Afrikaners the realisation that they will be swamped in one community".

He said certain preconditions were necessary for such a state which included a viable economy, a sea front, water, agricultural ground, a harbour and industrial development.

His proposal is that the land south of the Namibian border to Saldanha, east to the Eastern banks of the H. F. Verwoerd dam and north to the Botswana border should form the outer perimeters of such a state.

He said some 100,000 people would form the core in the beginning and as circumstances developed total majority occupation would be achieved.

"An immediate great flow of people to the area is therefore not envisaged, unless an emergency situation arises.

"Approximately 400,000 Afrikaners in the territory will give majority Afrikaner occupation while effort must be made to resettle the Colored population in a reasonable manner," he said.

Prof Boshoff said it could be expected that attractive offers to the Coloured population would be made.

*** Trading Office Set Up in Budapest**

90AF0694E Cape Town CAPE TIMES in English
21 Aug 90 p 11

[Article by Audrey d'Angelo: "Trading Office in Budapest"]

[Text] Former Hungarian Minister of Trade, Tamas Beck—who now heads an SA [Republic of South Africa]-backed trading office in Budapest—is in this country to set up import and export deals.

The Budapest trading office has been opened by Kapegate International, a Swiss company connected to Cape Town-based Cape Gate which manufactures steel products and exports them through its international companies in the US, Britain, Switzerland, Israel and—now—Hungary.

The head of Cape Gate's export division, Milton Coplan, said yesterday that the difficulties encountered in exporting to some former Iron Curtain countries did not apply to Hungary.

"Hungary has been moving gradually away from a centrally planned economy for the past 10 or 12 years, and already carries on extensive trade with the West on normal business terms," he explained.

"Hungarians look for barter deals if they can, but they are quite capable of purchasing on normal Western terms.

"They are trying to shift away from Russia and other Eastern bloc suppliers from whom they have been obliged to buy certain things in the past. They have, for instance, arranged to buy iron ore from SA instead of the poorer quality ore they used to buy from Russia."

Coplan said Cape Gate became involved in helping to build up SA-Hungarian trade after its executive chairman, Mendel Kaplan, visited the country.

"He has international standing, as chairman of the Board of Governors of the Jewish Agency," Coplan explained. "He was given a red carpet welcome and asked for help in promoting trade."

However, Coplan warned, "Hungary is like any other export market—goods must be suitable and exporters must work to sell them."

This was why it was so useful to have Beck heading the trading office. "Hungary is in some ways very similar to SA and in others very different."

A spokesman for Cape Gate said that, until recently, trade between SA and Hungary had been "very low profile, mainly through barter agreements and third countries".

*** Mandela, Buthelezi Meeting 'Urgently Needed'**

90AF0694C Johannesburg SOWETAN in English
23 Aug 90 p 6

[Commentary by Thami Mazwai: "Officials Play the Fiddle While the Country Burns"]

[Text] While accusations and counter-accusations over the violence between township residents and hostel inmates fly all over the place, the architects of apartheid and their minions grin wolfishly from their graves or from offices in Pretoria and Cape Town.

Their long-term planning is paying off, and blacks are once more savaging each other. Communities and hostel inmates are pitted against each other.

I suspect that powerful forces with enough resources could be fuelling this carnage in an effort to achieve their ends. What ends? Anybody's guess. Who are these forces? I do not know.

What I do know is that because of the stakes involved, such people hardly bat an eyelid when people, even hundreds of them, perish.

Arguments

The African National Congress [ANC] and other black organisations must thus pull out all stops to bring peace to their communities.

Therefore, a meeting between Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi and deputy president Nelson Mandela is urgently needed.

Arguments that this meeting will not achieve much and will give credibility to Buthelezi for his stature is not equal to that of Mandela, are hardly worth a second thought.

Inkatha structures, as part of this great debate while lives are being lost, are refusing to participate in peace talks unless Mandela meets their leader.

It appears everybody is playing the fiddle while Rome burns.

Frankly speaking, I do not see how Buthelezi can enhance his image in the PWV [Pretoria, Witwatersrand, Vereeniging Industrial Area] solely on the basis of meeting with Mandela.

Butchery

In addition, some of the arguments why Mandela must not meet Buthelezi border on the metaphysical, the type of intellectually heavy stuff beyond simple minds like mine.

All some of us want is an end to the butchery of blacks by other blacks.

We are talking about putting a stop to wholesale slaughter, the saving of human lives. We are not concerned with statures or political credibilities, although we do believe that any leader who can help stop the carnage tearing our communities apart will have a special place in our hearts, even if he met with his political foe to save the lives of their followers.

Warring

Thus a public embrace by Mandela and Buthelezi, who are leaders of the warring factions, is the symbolism and tonic needed to get the message down to their foot soldiers that enough is enough.

It will give momentum to the valuable groundwork not being done.

Mandela was, incidentally, keen on such a meeting, and his first attempt was stopped by ANC officials in Natal. It now appears that such a meeting is considered inappropriate by the ANC. Walter Sisulu said as much at the weekend.

The ANC's reasoning is inexplicable. On the one hand Mandela is allowed to discuss this violence with F.W. de Klerk and Adriaan Vlok, but he is not allowed to speak to Buthelezi. Yet it is Buthelezi's and Mandela's followers who are involved in this bloodbath.

When have we started having faith in the Government and the police? What blows the mind is that during the thick of the fighting the ANC accused the police of taking sides. Have these same policemen now been cleansed?

What I, however, find astonishing, yet expected, is that the South African Council of Churches [SACC], which welcomed meetings between de Klerk and Mandela precisely because they believed they would put a stop to the political conflict costing the country thousands of lives, is silent when it comes to calling for a meeting between Mandela and Buthelezi.

Symbolise

Taking their argument into account, won't such a meeting symbolise some togetherness at the top which would permeate to the forces on the ground?

The SACC has instead called on the Government to take action—the ANC stance. My suspicions are that the SACC will not take a stand contrary to that of the ANC.

It is now understandable why Contralesa, strongly pro-ANC, early this week announced it would get Zulu- and Xhosa-speaking chiefs to the Reef to speak to their followers. It even ignores the fact that this is no ordinary tribal conflict, but one with heavy ANC-Inkatha overtones.

Who these chiefs will speak to in places like Mapetla, Dube, Meadowlands, [text illegible] confounds the [text illegible] in the Reef have no affinity with tribal rulers,

unless we are being told the Government did succeed is make us rekindle our tribal affiliations.

General Bantu Holomisa has even come to the Reef to talk about his kinsmen being killed by Zulus. Is he suggesting that there are no Xhosa-speaking hostel inmates and the township residents being attacked, or fighting, are only Xhosa speakers?

Committees

A specific section of the media is also hysterically fanning the tribal conflict story. Apparently overseas audiences, who logically expect a Mandela-Buthelezi meeting as a necessity to help stop the fighting between their followers, must be convinced this is merely a tribal issue and does not need Mandela.

Yet at local level attempts are being made—and it reports on them—to get peace committees consisting of ANC and Inkatha officials.

Is it not time to stop playing politics and get Mandela and Buthelezi together. Those being killed are our kith and kin, not merely statistics on police bulletins. The men and women who are dying in their hundreds have children they love and want to see grow.

* ANC To Review New Ciskei Constitution

90AF0694D Johannesburg *THE CITIZEN* in English
15 Aug 90 p 16

[Text] East London—A new constitution for Ciskei has been drafted, and will be presented to the territory's Council of State for ratification within the next fortnight.

And the African National Congress [ANC] will be asked to inspect it before it is adopted.

A State Council spokesman, Mr Ian Dixon, confirmed this yesterday, after being approached on the matter last week.

He said the architect of the new law was Professor Marinus Wiechers, who helped draft Namibia's new constitution.

Prof Wiechers is also an adviser to the Democratic Party on constitutional matters.

Two lawyers, Mr Izak Smuts and Mr Mickey Webb, had helped draft the law, Mr Dixon said.

He said claims that the executive director of the Free Market Foundation, Mr Leon Louw, was involved in the drafting, were incorrect.

Asked whether it was true the ANC had been approached for comment on the constitution, Mr Dixon said the ANC was going to be "invited to comment" prior to its adoption.

If any amendments were required, these would be embodied in the draft, he said.

Asked whether this effectively meant that any aspects of the new constitution which the ANC had problems with would be altered, he said the organisation was just one of those asked to comment, and was "not exerting undue influence on it at all".

Ciskei would not hold a referendum on whether or not to be reincorporated into South Africa, the military government has said.

A government spokesman said Ciskei citizens had already made their choice clear—they wanted to go back to being South African citizens.

The military government was asked to elaborate on recent remarks by the State Council's chairman, Brigadier Oupa Gqozo, hinting at the possibility of a referendum.

However, a government spokesman said that no referendum was planned as there was "no need for it".

"Everybody" in Ciskei wanted the territory to be reincorporated into a future South Africa, he said.

Ciskei was at present on the sidelines of the main game, and would join in as soon as the major players called it to do so, the spokesman said.

Ciskei's position differs from that of Transkei, whose military ruler, Major-General Bantu Holomisa, has taken steps towards holding a referendum on the issue.

Whereas Ciskei held a referendum on the question of independence in 1980, Transkei did not.

Shortly before the coup which toppled him in March, Ciskei's former president, Lennox Sebe, countered calls for a referendum by claiming the results of the 1980 poll were sufficient evidence of Ciskeians' wish to remain "independent".

According to the official results of that vote, 295,891 Ciskeians voted for independence, 1,642 voted against and 2,198 papers were spoiled in a 59.5 percent poll.

The Ciskei authorities welcomed the results, saying 99 percent of Ciskeians wanted independence.—Sapa.

* Ethnicity Dismissed as Cause of Violence

90AF0694B Cape Town *THE ARGUS* in English
25 Aug 90 p 13

[Commentary by Jon Qwelane: "Divide-and-Rule Policies at Heart of Hostel Bloodshed"]

[Text] The violent savagery of the past few days must have horrified and angered every decent South African because, in the end, all of us are the losers.

Only racists, even of the closet variety, are rubbing their hands in glee and nattering smugly: "You see, blacks

cannot be part of a Western system of government—their idea of democracy is the assegai and the knobkierie and Africa has proved it many times. Blacks are warlike and can never live in peace together. We told you so.”

They are even saying amaZulu can never agree to be ruled by amaXhosa, in allegedly the same way that amaXhosa can never bow to rule by Batswana and Basotho. And so on.

The truth, as far as I am concerned and my own inquiries at all the trouble spots found, is that serious political differences between two predominantly black organisations underline the tragedy.

Dismissing it purely as “black-on-black” violence, or even as amaZulu fighting amaXhosa in tribal or ethnic battles, is facile and misses the issue by a mile.

It is, purely and simply, violence as a direct consequence of successive white governments’ divide-and-rule policies.

Without in the least being defensive, I think we must never forget that violence—whatever the causes—is not peculiar to any tribe or nation.

The Crusades, the Wars of the Roses, the French Revolution, the Franco-Prussian War, the Crimean War, America’s War of Independence, the 1917 Revolution in Russia, World War 1 and World War 2, the Spanish Civil War, the Falklands War, the perennial strife between Britain and the Irish Republican Army, the Basques, the Baader-Meinhof gang, the Mafia, the recent Poll Tax riots in England—these and others throughout “white” history bear me out.

The fighting of recent days in our areas is, in my view, symptomatic of the society whites wanted to create—a society of whites united as a single entity and blacks divided into various groups along ethnic lines.

So the causes of the fighting, whether we like it or not, are traceable directly to the policies of white overlords since Europeans made themselves permanent guests in our midst.

The hostels, by their very nature, are divisive: migrant workers from the rural areas are physically separated from the established township communities by being housed in compounds where none but the boarders are permitted.

Hostels have their own cafes and sports facilities and, at mine hostels particularly, the inmates traditionally have been separated—deliberately—according to tribal lines.

Obviously therein lies the recipe for disaster. The faction fights that have broken out periodically at mine hostels, with deathly consequences and further alienation of the inmates bitterly nursing grievances against their fellow inmates, have demonstrated most clearly the dangers of separating people.

I think it is a fallacy to imagine people of, say, Zulu and Xhosa extraction having unbridgeable “differences” while not ascribing the same to Afrikaners and Jews or to English-speaking South Africans and those of Portuguese origin.

I also think the bloodshed of the past few days, albeit in a very cruel way, has proved even to the champions of partition that segregation is not the answer.

We have been forced into segregation for centuries—as blacks and whites, as Africans and “coloureds” and “Indians” and whites, as “coloureds” and “Indians,” and as Africans and Africans—and we have steadily reaped a sorry harvest down the years.

Sadly, yet very profoundly, the violence of these past days was a powerful statement against the continued separation of people on facile “tribal” or even “racial” grounds.

* Future Roles of Major Parties Analyzed

90AF0694A Cape Town *THE ARGUS* in English
25 Aug 90 p 14

[Commentary by Frans Esterhuyse: “Big Shifts Loom Left, Right and Centre”]

[Text] In the Democratic Party [DP] a forthcoming leadership change, due at its national congress next month, could start things moving.

In the National Party [NP] a decision to open its doors to all races could be the spark to set off that party’s political space flight, the end of which nobody dares to predict.

Such moves may seem trivial against the backdrop of the dramatic and momentous changes since the re-entry of the African National Congress [ANC] and others into “normal” political life, but they have a big potential for speeding up further developments in the party-political set-up.

Among those who foresee a big political shake-up—with the DP at its centre—is DP co-leader Dr Denis Worrall who has caused a stir with his decision to withdraw from the party’s leadership race.

Dr Worrall has made it clear that he intends to remain a member of the party, in the face of speculation that he might return to the NP fold.

He told Weekend Argus this week the DP had been the first party that was forced to face up to its role and its relevance in the new politics.

Whoever became its new leader would face the task of guiding the party through a period of major decisions.

Issues to be decided could include: “Do we link up with others? Should the party dissolve and release its politicians to play a role elsewhere? Should the party go out to get black support for its ideas, values, principles and policies?”

Dr Worrall said these were the kind of questions which every politician should be asking himself or herself.

Meanwhile the National Party is facing a final decision—possibly before the end of this year—on whether it will open its doors to all races.

NP sources say this thorny issue is likely to be tackled at the party's four provincial congresses, starting in Durban on August 30, to test grassroots sentiment.

Such a move has been encouraged by the decision of the formerly exclusively white National Party in Namibia to admit all races. Party leader Mr Kosie Pretorius told a media briefing this week the party felt "morally obliged" to bring its constitution in line with the constitution of Namibia.

Some analysts foresee a major shake-up in South African politics, involving the DP, the NP and others. There will be a shifting of members to and fro, a formation of new political alliances and possible changes in existing party structures and even policy directions.

The DP, some expect, may lose members to the NP and to extra-parliamentary groupings like the ANC. The NP may lose members to the DP and to the rightwing groupings, especially the CP. The CP, in turn, may lose members to the NP and to extreme right groupings like the AWB [Afrikaner Resistance Movement] and the Boerestaat Party.

An unknown but potentially potent factor in a possible reshaping of South African politics will be the role of the ANC/SACP/UDF/Cosatu [South African Communist Party/United Democratic Front/Congress of South African Trade Unions] alliance. If these groupings attract many whites it could have a profound affect on the political scene.

Even the balance of political power could change, with more weight shifting from traditionally "white" politics to extra-parliamentary groupings.

Professor Marinus Wiechers, professor of constitutional law at the University of South Africa and one of the DP's top-level advisers, says a change in leadership is not going to change the DP. Leadership as such has become a non-issue in white politics.

What really matters now is the "larger" politics concerning issues like the economic and constitutional systems in a "new South Africa." It is becoming increasingly important to have a party like the DP that is strong on liberal values.

Until now the DP has demonstrated its strength by the way it succeeded in getting President de Klerk into a negotiating position where he accepts liberal values fought for by the DP. What matters now is the role of the DP rather than who leads it.

Professor Wiechers sees the DP's role from now on as primarily that of a party of negotiation.

As far as the National Party is concerned, he does not foresee any large influx of new members into the NP if it were to open its membership to all races.

The effect of such a change will be more symbolic than anything else. It will release the NP and its leaders from accusations that it is a racist party for whites only.

The DP's task and relevance in coming years has been spelt out by DP politician Mr Colin Eglin, MP [Member of Parliament] for Sea Point.

He points out that for 30 years the DP and its predecessors have fought tenaciously for liberal values under tough and forbidding Nationalist regimes. It also fought for negotiation as a means for shaping a new democratic constitution.

Now, when at long last black and white leaders are committing themselves to negotiations for a non-racial constitution, there are strong reasons why the DP should continue its fight.

Mr Eglin argues that while it is true the negotiation process holds out great hope, there is still no certainty about the future. There are no guarantees and no certainty that South Africa will end up with a truly democratic government.

Professor Hennie Kotze, head of the department of political science at the University of Stellenbosch, thinks the DP has a key role to play as a bearer of liberal values.

He told Weekend Argus that recent opinion polls had shown its public support had declined to less than half of what it used to be. At the same time the party was up against the problem that a large part of its policy had been taken over by the NP.

With two of the party's three co-leaders—Mr Wynand Malan and Dr Worrall—withdrawing or stepping down, the party might be losing some of the fresh support brought in by the two.

Meanwhile the changes in the NP do not mean that it has become a liberal party—rather that it has become pragmatic.

On the possibility of the NP opening its doors to all races, Professor Kotze said there were signs that if this were to happen the NP would receive substantial support from people of colour, notably from the Indian and coloured communities but also from a large number of conservative blacks.

Professor Kotze agrees the impression may be created that the NP, by opening its membership to all races, will abandon any claim it may have to being the representative of whites at the negotiating table, thereby leaving the field for such claims open to the rightwing political groupings.

But he does not regard this as a serious factor. The NP, he argues, has already shed its claim to be an Afrikaner party by admitting many English-speaking members.

If it is to admit people of all races, it will for the first time become a "national" party in the true sense of the word.

*** Quality of Military Engineering School Praised**

90AF0693A Pretoria PARATUS in English
Aug 90 pp 34-35

[Article by Colin Ford: "School of Engineers: From Humble Beginning to One of Top Units"]

[Text] Military engineering has come a long way since the advent of the pre-historic battering ram and catapult—as has the School of Engineers in Kroonstad since its humble beginning in 1940 as a wing of the Engineer Training Centre at Zonderwater, near Cullinan.

The exceptional quality of training at Zonderwater during the Second World War earned the admiration of both friend and foe. The corps' presence was felt in East and North Africa as well as Italy, where, under demanding and dangerous circumstances, it executed a wide spectrum of tasks ranging from the building of roads, bridges and airstrips to the provision of water.

The corps expanded vastly during the war growing from 54 officers and 585 troops to a strength of over 16,000 members actively participating in the war.

After the war the Engineering Corps virtually dissolved and in 1946 the Engineering Training Centre was disbanded. However, a small training group was kept and installed as an Engineer Wing at the Military College (now SA [Republic of South Africa] Army College) in Voortrekkerhoogte. Here members of the Army and the Air Force were trained in basic engineering tasks.

In the middle of 1948, after two years at the Military College, the wing moved to the School of Artillery and Armour in Potchefstroom where it started a leadership course for Permanent Force (PF) and Active Citizen Force (ACF) members. Despite the desperate shortage of instructors, they managed to train 53 PF and 85 ACF staff members in the first year.

In 1948 a policy was presented to introduce Afrikaans into the Union Defence Force (as the SADF was then known). Up until this time all engineering training and terminology had been administered in English. The staff of the Engineer Wing were quick to jump into action and translate terms and manuals, creating, standardising and putting into use technical terms in Afrikaans.

In 1956, accommodation problems arose for the wing. These were identified by the wing's OC, Capt C. J. Spiller, as the following:

- The School of Artillery and Armour was not a natural home for the engineers.
- Their accommodation was dismal and incomplete.

- The grounds were too small to accommodate Artillery, Armour and Engineering training. With the introduction of the ballot system in 1953, including a three month basic training course, the engineers found themselves training outside the allotted areas for lack of space within them.

Capt Spiller identified Kroonstad as the perfect site for engineer training. It offered better terrain, with a large dammed river just outside the town offering excellent opportunities for water provision and the building of rafts and pontoon bridges.

A training area was available as well as the facility for ample accommodation of engineering staff and National Servicemen. Buildings were available for lecture rooms and two Belman hangars would be used for storage of equipment and vehicles. Apart from all that, Kroonstad is far more centrally situated than Potchefstroom.

Unfortunately the application for the wing to be transferred to Kroonstad as an independent unit was put on hold until accommodation was available. The engineers remained in Potchefstroom as a wing of Artillery School, changing their name to the Engineer Training Centre in January 1965, thus becoming a sub-unit.

In December 1968 the Directorate Engineers occupied the old grounds of Hoer Tegniese Skool De Wet Nel (De Wet Nel Technical High School) with the Engineering Training Centre and 35 Field Park Squadron as sub-units. In March the following year, the Engineer Training Centre was renamed the School of Engineers.

In March 1972 the Directorate Engineers relocated to Pretoria and both the School of Engineers and 35 Field Park Squadron became independent units. The School of Engineers was given command over the base as senior unit. Two years later, 35 Field Park Squadron was renamed 35 Engineer Support Unit—the name it still goes by today.

On 13 October 1976 the School of Engineers was granted the Freedom of Entrance into Kroonstad and on 5 April 1979 received its Colour from State President B.J. Vorster.

In 1979 the Junior Instructors' Squadron moved to Bossiespruit, a farm 11 km east of Kroonstad. Bossiespruit is the ideal training area—near the main base and right on the banks of the Vals River. The centre was built basically from scratch, using the school's own manpower.

The Junior Officers' Squadron also relocated in 1979, to an old convent—Notre Dame—approximately four kilometres from the main base. The convent was renamed "Vegkop" and junior officers received training there until instability of buildings in 1986 forced them to return to the main base. The Squadron is expected to return to Vegkop once restorations have been completed.

In the same year, building work got underway on a military community hall, the funds for which had been

raised by the school itself. In November 1979 the then Chief of the Army, Lt Gen C.L. Viljoen, laid the corner-stone and on 19 July 1981 the hall was officially opened by the Vice-State President, Mr Alwyn Schlebusch, and his wife, who was the first person to officially unlock the door.

The hall was built to serve the military community of Kroonstad, but the School of Engineers' benevolence extends beyond the SADF. In 1978 Kleuterkommando, a nursery school open to all the children of Kroonstad, was opened on the base. The "kindergarten" provides military and civilian parents with child-care facilities during the day.

But the engineers' goodwill stretches far beyond the municipal boundaries of Kroonstad to places as far afield as Bloemfontein, Douglas, Upington, Kakamas and Keimoes—areas affected by the 1988 floods in the Cape and Orange Free State.

An Engineer Support Group consisting of 6 officers, 12 NCO's, 10 inflatable boats and an assortment of water supply equipment, offered their services to the residents of towns hit by the floods. They used the boats to transport people and supply isolated families with food and water. Much the same was done for the residents of Kroonstad in the same year, when they also experienced large scale floods.

During 1988 plans were drawn up to transform approximately 170 hectares of the Bossiespruit area into a game enclosure. In February 1989 work got underway on the erection of a 1.5m game fence and by November the first ostriches were introduced—despite the fact that the fence was only completed in December. Although the enclosure occupies a large area of the training ground, its construction has had no adverse effects on the availability of terrain for practical training.

The School of Engineers' first five decades have been challenging, but despite numerous difficulties along the way it has risen to become one of the top units in the country, serving the needs of its people and the SADF from first to last.

School of Engineers celebrated its fiftieth anniversary earlier this year with a touch of Olympic spirit.

Over a week before the unit's official birthday, a flame was lit at the original site of the school at Zonderwater, in Cullinan near Pretoria. From there a team of runners, headed by Maj H. C. du Plessis, set off on an arduous journey to run the flame along the path of movement the School has taken over the last half-century.

A 50-year commemorative statuette, in the form of a brass key, was presented by the Managing Director of INTESCO [expansion unknown], Mr H. Bremmerman, to the school's OC, Col A. F. Prins.

Special medallions were minted and presented to Permanent Force and civilian members and ex-members of the school.

Also part of the festivities was a flag hoisting parade, the releasing of balloons, firing of the 8mm QF gun, a medal parade and a thanksgiving and dedication service. A formal function in the evening brought the celebrations to a close.

* New Future for District Six Envisaged

* ANC Stance

90AF0692A Cape Town *THE ARGUS* in English
28 Aug 90 p 1

[Article by Anthony Doman: "District Six: New Deal Proposed"]

[Text] The government should take responsibility for providing affordable housing in District Six, the ANC [African National Congress] said today.

Speaking after a call by the Administrator of the Cape, Mr Kobus Meiring, for a halt to development in the controversial area while a special committee meets to plan its future, the ANC's Western Cape co-convenor, Mr Trevor Manuel, spelled out the organisation's stand.

He said the committee is a "task group" representing all interested parties.

"The developers may claim that they represent different interests and are entitled to separate representation. Even though we are of one mind we could claim the same thing," he said.

"The position was put that there should be a weighting of those present in favour of the community." Those organisations present at yesterday's meeting had within their ranks town planners and representatives of community bodies.

"On the Cards"

He said the impression was being created that the Administrator had decreed certain things.

"Right at the outset we set out certain points to describe our perspective on developments in District six," he said.

These included:

- No development while apartheid legislation such as the Group Areas Act was "on the cards".
- Planning now for a "post-group areas society".
- All current development to stop to allow the process of deciding on development priorities to get under way.
- Many landowners had bought "at a steal" at a time when there was great community resistance to buying land in District Six.
- Affordable housing should be built for working-class families and a significant part of this should be rented.
- The government should take much of the responsibility for providing affordable housing.

The redevelopment of District Six in this manner had to be seen in the context of identifying land for housing within the Central Business District and metropolitan area.

Mr Meiring has asked developers to halt planning and building activities in District Six until recommendations have been provided for the area in a post-group areas city.

He said, in anticipation of the possible repeal of the Group Areas Act, a working committee would be appointed by the Cape Town City Council.

This committee would synchronise the planning of future developments in District Six in such a way that it would contribute to the establishment of a post-group areas city.

It would also provide for affordable housing acceptable to the community generally and could contribute towards bringing people back into the city and restoring a vibrant city life.

* Working Committee Formed

90AF0692B Cape Town *THE ARGUS* in English
28 Aug 90 p 15

[Article by Anthony Doman: "Hopes of 'New District Six' Rekindled"]

[Text] Dreams of low-cost housing rising from the ashes of District Six have been rekindled with the announcement of a working committee to plan the area's future in a form "acceptable to the community at large".

Up to now, this dream has been thwarted by many obstacles, not least of which are the many different organisations and people laying claim to the land.

In a bid to overcome this, the broadly-based committee will plan redevelopment and make provision for affordable housing "acceptable to the community at large".

Slow Process

As a result all property developers involved in the area have been asked to suspend their projects for the time being.

The committee was formed as a result of talks yesterday involving the Administrator of the Cape, the African National Congress, the United Democratic Front, the Cape Technikon, private developers, property owners and residents.

Reaching this point has been a painful, slow process.

The moral question remains a major stumbling block to redevelopment. Some people have pleaded for the area to remain barren as a monument to Cape Town's biggest forced removal, at least as long as apartheid exists.

But purely practical considerations such as racial zoning and the high costs of building and property are certain to have their own major impact on any plans for low-cost housing.

In its heyday in the 1960s, most of District Six was owned by absentee landlords and traders, according to Father Basil van Rensburg, former parish priest. He said many landlords were immigrants from Eastern Europe.

"Although most of the coloured people in the area were tenants, some owned their own homes and properties there," he said.

The District Six of 1990 belongs mostly to government and municipal bodies.

The biggest landowner is the Cape Technikon, which occupies about half the total area.

Others, in diminishing order, are the House of Representatives, the Cape Town City Council, the House of Assembly, the Provincial Administration and the House of Delegates.

Another body with a significant holding of land is the Diocese of Cape Town, which owns about the same area as that owned by the House of Assembly.

Land held in private ownership is largely confined to several business sites close to the central city and Sir Lowry Road and a few pockets of residential land.

Land Owners

Owners of what appear to be residential land include:

- Frontline Investments CC, address given as P O Box 3170 Cape Town—several adjacent properties in Caledon Street;
- Ummah Ltd, P O Box 493 Salt River—Russell Street;
- Faircape Homes—Constitution Street;
- Lowbury Estates, P O Box 535 Cape Town—104 Upper Darling Street and Keizersgracht;
- Several other companies including Relix (Pty) Ltd, Transocean House, A M Raw Holdings and Davidson Ewing Holdings—Keizersgracht.

Many individuals own houses built after the area was cleared, declared white and developed by private enterprise.

This is a far cry from the first seeds of what was to become District Six, in the 1840s.

According to the Standard Encyclopedia of Southern Africa, by the 1840s "the Buitenkant ceased to mark the limit of the city, and respectable middle-class whites moved into what was to become District Six. Mingled with them were a number of Malay and coloured residents, mostly artisans and small businessmen".

District six was given its name in 1867 when the Municipal Board Amendments Act divided Cape Town into six electoral districts. The name stuck through subsequent delimitations.

By the turn of the century it had become a slum. After large-scale evacuations during the bubonic plague of 1901 large areas were razed, but hastily-built houses replaced the old.

By the mid-1960s, District Six was home to a mostly coloured population of more than 55,000.

Then the mass forced removal took place in the name of slum clearance.

The demolition crews moved in and by the early 1980s only a few church buildings relieved the wasteland that District Six had become.

Angola

* French Credit Destined for Cotton Production

90AF0731A Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA
in Portuguese 30 Aug 90 p 3

[Text] A credit agreement in the amount of 27 million French francs was signed Tuesday in Luanda between the National Bank of Angola (BNA) and the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation (CCCE) of France.

The purpose of the aforementioned credit is to finance the reactivation of cotton production in the municipality of Porto Amboim, in Kwanza-Sul Province.

The project is in keeping with the rural development of the area and includes not only cotton production but also the production of other agricultural products as well as the raising of cattle.

A few years ago, Kwanza-Sul Province was second only to Malanje among Angola's cotton-producing areas.

The departure of many of the planters and instability in the cultivated areas, resulting from the war, caused production to drop to less than 5,000 tons in Porto Amboim.

The agreement for the line of credit was signed by Amilcar da Silva, deputy governor of the BNA, and Christien Flamant, representative of the CCCE in Angola, in the presence of Stanislas Filiol, French ambassador accredited in Luanda.

Until now, the CCCE has granted Angola 18 loans out of a total sum of 508 million French francs, destined to be used by productive sectors, economic and urban infrastructures, and the training of skilled personnel.

* Operation of Egg Farms Near Luanda Described

90AF0731D Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA
in Portuguese 90 Aug 90 p 3

[Article by Graca Campos]

[Text] They are not known by the public at large in Luanda. Or because the items they produce have little impact on the market of the millions—that which daily supplies most of the Luanda residents—for once they have arrived, they are sold at the same prices as those obtained for imported merchandise.

We are speaking to you about the Muzanga Agro-Industrial and Commercial Company Lta and about the Yara Sofia farm.

Located at scarcely 12 km from Luanda, Muzanga is now undoubtedly the biggest producer of consumer eggs in Luanda and perhaps in the country.

With 70,000 egg-laying hens, Muzanga currently produces one million eggs per month. The reader who would like to see a small quantity of those eggs in his freezer or

refrigerator will certainly be interested in knowing where and how those eggs are sold.

Abel Silva, one of the partners, explains: "We sell most of the eggs to Angoy and to all retail outlets." With that explanation, the reader is given to understand that he can only consume Muzanga eggs if he buys them from a retail store or exchanges them for "green stuff" at a wholesale market. But, exceptionally, the customer can also have access to those eggs if "he advises the owners that he needs large quantities of eggs for weddings or baptisms, for example."

Extending over an area of seven hectares and employing somewhat more than 300 employees, Muzanga has its own plant for feeding the poultry. The feed plant is also sustained through supplementary products purchased on the domestic market. Corn, the decisive element in the feed, is totally furnished by the Ministry of Agriculture. This is also the feed given to the chicks.

At this point—speaking of the supply of chicks—Abel Silva favors greater liberalization in the firm's activity and, following his own line of reasoning, says: "We should have other importers of chicks, not just the Ministry of Agriculture. And the same holds true for corn. We receive an X quantity of corn or chicks. Sometimes those imports fail to consider our capabilities or requirements. Therefore, it would be best for the producer to contact the Ministry of Agriculture or some other importer to advise him as to when and how many of the chicks and how much of the corn is needed."

An identical problem faces the Yara Sofia farm. Being engaged in other activities, not just egg production, this farm would like to produce many more eggs if, as one of its co-owners, the Portuguese Orlando Coelho, says: "We could import whatever we need. What happens in my case, for example, is not having enough egg-laying hens to fill up the poultry-raising facilities in existence. This means that we could do and certainly would do much more than we are presently doing."

While Muzanga sells most of its eggs to Angoy and retail outlets, Yara Sofia prefers to sell to Fina Petroleos and independent grocers. And Orlando Coelho gives two reasons for his retail procedure: "I sell my eggs to Fina and Intermarket because they, in turn, give me the essential basic products I need to support my employees. As for the independent grocers, I sell them the eggs because this is the only way I can recover the money I spent in engaging in this venture. You might like to know why I do not sell my products to Frescangol; I shall tell you why: I do not sell because the prices they demand are not in keeping with our production costs."

Whatever the case may be, the fact is that here in Luanda we have two egg-producing facilities which can produce much more than they are currently producing. Provided the government would relax its policy on what for several years has been its monopoly on the import of chicks and corn. The producers want a certain degree of autonomy. And they are willing to prove that having that autonomy

they could do much more. For example, producing more eggs in Viana would mean reducing the import of eggs to Luanda. Is that not what we all want?

* Medicine Manufacturing Plant Announced

90AF0731B Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA
in Portuguese 30 Aug 90 p 3

[Text] A medicine manufacturing plant covering 50 percent of the people's needs is to be completed within a few months in Luanda, according to information given to the Angolan Press Agency (ANGOP) Saturday by a source associated with the project.

According to this source, the plant is expected to produce urgently needed medicines and save the country about \$6 million in foreign currency.

The construction of the aforementioned plant resulted from an accord signed on 1 December 1988 between the Ministry of Health (MINSA) and the Belgian firm, Sobert Internacional, covering the construction of two other medicine-producing plants in Benguela and Dundo.

The project, budgeted at \$40 million, is being principally financed by the African Development Bank (ADB) in the amount of \$30 million, and by the governments of Angola and Belgium which are contributing \$6 million and \$4 million respectively.

The plant will have 23 technicians, seven of them being upper-echelon employees now being trained abroad in the areas of production control, quality control, and administration.

Studies were made and steps taken over a period of three months for the purpose of analyzing the soil; this was done in cooperation with the Angolan Engineering Laboratory (LEA), the Geotechnics Company, and the Technical Department of the Ministry of Construction, and it was for this reason that there was a delay in the completion of the project, scheduled for last July.

According to our source, MINSA is preparing a file to be presented to the Council of Defense and Security to obtain funding for additional costs incurred in soil analysis (Luanda and Benguela), and this has serious financial implications.

* One Day in 'Roque Santeiro' Market Described

90AF0731E Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA
in Portuguese 25 Aug 90 p 2

[Article by Luisa Rogerio]

[Text] Last Saturday I was in "Roque Santeiro." I went there to make some purchases; I have nothing to hide. Realists as we are, we admit without hypocrisy that no one can live on his wages. The purchasing power of the Luanda residents depends exclusively on a number of items at the mercy of planners, mathematicians, gymnasts, etc. And in the last analysis, many hours are spent

in devious schemes, calculations, and mental exercises involving various ways to cheat the customers and live in a reasonable manner.

On that Saturday I made preparations to be a heroine, spectator, actress, and victim. I completely ignored the bandits and the terrorist stories related by the people. Despite being at a disadvantage, I took heart, the natural consequence of my sporting background: that of a beginner. As a result, my "laurels" are less spectacular and this is reflected by my purse. Thus, I readily acquiesced, and without hesitation, in the company of "brow-beaten" individuals, chose the black market path. The sun had not yet arisen when I arrived. One was aware of the activity already underway. I do not know why, but I remember the saying: "In the lack of something better, the worst is excellent."

As soon as I was at the entrance, the so-called "callers" began their spiel. Being mostly children of school age, their mission is to steer potential buyers by taxi to various parts of the city. They do this skillfully at a rhythmic and enticing pace. What competence! For this they receive as much as 20,000 kwanzas per day.

With much effort I left the "callers" behind. I continued to walk. I then mixed with the crowd. This was enough to convince me that it is in the early morning that the city's dirtiest and most evil business deals occur. Moreover, it is inadvisable to sell certain articles in broad daylight. For example, genuine firearms or implements used by certain "professionals" engaged in nocturnal activities.

At various intervals while making my purchases, I attended a number of films of different types, real and imaginary. Whoever said that Hollywood is the movie mecca? Whoever did was mistaken. Almost unnoticed, a young man was crying bitterly for having lost the 70,000 reserved for the purchase of shoes for a long-awaited Saturday wedding. At another point, a woman, swearing, is heaping curse upon curse on the unfeeling wretch who took advantage of her inattentiveness in tricking her out of 100,000. On at least five occasions I saw a certain individual sell the same article to different persons. How? He is unbelievably clever. He sells and takes back what he sells. I believe it is unnecessary to specify his methods.

Meanwhile, the American came to see me, the hero of the day. They tell me that he is rather famous in my district. For all I know, he never thought to engage in a state or private enterprise. He hates schedules and having to wait 30 days for his pay. In his universe, school is the equivalent of wasted time. In short, without being intelligent he is well endowed with knowledge. He is an expert and that is how he makes his living. He began with little transactions, "shady deals" arranged I do not know where. Now he has made an about-face, respected and feared in the obscure "business world." He became an expensive intermediary; receives fabulous commissions which provide him with luxuries, cars, videos of the latest vintage, trips to musical bands, etc.

However, his "profession" has its drawback. It is not reliable. Long years of experience do not prevent him from becoming unemployed. Which, at times, implies hitting rock-bottom. Saturday was one of those days. A gloomy day. I watched him sell the same jacket which, a few hours earlier, he himself was wearing (he dresses impeccably, only the finest attire). I was ecstatic upon hearing him say: "It came from the United States. A businessman sold it to me—one who manages an office making travel arrangements. I paid 90,000, but since it is of no use to me, I shall accept 80,000. No hassle, good buy, exclusive model..."

I refused to believe what I was hearing. The American selling his own clothing? Who could imagine that! But there he was engaging in all of the tricks of the trade. Then what happened to those acclaimed millions, those notorious exploits, his friends? Under what conditions does a man reach that extreme?

Questions after questions. Only one thing is certain: the status of a go-between is not always valid.

From that point on, other thoughts, previously unimaginable, occurred to me. I assumed the role of a sociology student and came to the conclusion that something is far from right, despite the impossibility of thinking in terms of an extraterrestrial or, if you prefer, an extra-Luanda resident. We are all making a terrible mistake. In addition to the tourist attractions and the splendor which not even the lack of security diminishes, the "Roque" is one of Luanda's biggest commercial centers. There is where the real People's Bank operates. Aside from the daily volume of business, which amounts to billions, it makes monetary transfers. Calmly and far from tediously.

In like manner, we find the headquarters of an extensive chain of small and large hotels, highly worthy of the envy they instill on the part of the "Meridiens" we find scattered throughout the world. The accounts well kept; the drinks and goodies cheaper. And another peculiarity is that no one pays any attention to one's attire. Moreover, they say that improper currency trading is acceptable and that many of the deals are made in "green stuff." The exchanging and sale of this currency is observed by everyone. With impunity.

Finally, at "Roque Santeiro", everybody does everything he can to accomplish his immediate objective. The exercise of "democracy" is so great that John's freedom has nothing to do with that of Antonio. The concept of human rights advises one to offend, disrespect, and even kill one's neighbor, if the circumstances so require. The only law which seems valid is that of the survival of the fittest. The weak can only lament their plight.

Without difficulty I conclude that business at "Roque Santeiro" is prospering. They do not pay taxes to the state, they do not engage in highly complicated bureaucratic procedures, and they do not lose time insisting on "ceilings" in selling imported articles. It is true that ultramodern computers do not reach this point. In any case, this would not make any significant change. The

accounts are always up-to-date, thus avoiding discrepancies which might otherwise cause a temporary disruption of business in some of the commercial establishments.

I had the good fortune to make my purchases and, better yet, I understood that the term "conjuncture" does not signify the caricature of the word as implied in the Luanda vocabulary. Moreover, "Roque Santeiro" portrays the final product of conjunctures characteristic of Luanda. To be taken seriously.

Zambia

President Kaunda Discusses Multiparty Elections

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0635 GMT 6 Oct 90

[Interview with President Kenneth Kaunda by Patricia Golding in the "Saturdays Only" program; recorded in Lusaka—date not given]

[Text] [Kaunda] My views are not changed. My views are still the same. However, having examined carefully the (?dilemma) of those who are campaigning for a multiparty system it became quite clear to me that we were heading for bloodshed in the country. So, really, it's just fear of bloodshed that made me take this decision.

[Golding] What was it that made you fear the bloodshed? Can you give me some examples of why you feared this?

[Kaunda] Their campaign showed clearly what their thoughts were. What they said and did all demonstrated quite clearly to me that they did not mind what happened after the referendum. They were going to go all out to campaign violently. I had to stop that.

[Golding] And you believe that now that there won't be any sort of rivalry like that, there won't be violence.

[Kaunda] I can't say that, but it's better that we try this way which is...[pause] How would I put it? It is the lesser of the two evils.

[Golding] You have also spoken in the past about your fears that multipartyism would lead to tribal alliances again. Do you still believe that?

[Kaunda] How far can you go in not knowing what's taking place in Zambia, my dear sister? You already have heard some people saying they want to renew [words indistinct] status for Zambia, for the Western Province of Zambia which means [words indistinct] of the nation. So, already you can see signs on the horizon. Ugly signs, I must say.

[Golding] And if UNIP [United National Independence Party] wins the elections, will you go back, will you revert to one-partyism? Do you at heart still believe in the one-party system?

[Kaunda] You are saying, if UNIP wins. UNIP is going to win the elections. It's not a question of if. It's a

question of when the elections are held UNIP will win those elections. Well, we have decided to go multiparty. We will give it a try again. It is not for fear of the opposition that we (?would probably) go one party. It was the fear of violence. If that violence comes again, I will go back to the people and tell them: This is what (?you did). Should it continue? And if they say, yes, it continues [words indistinct]. If they say at that stage we have had enough of this, we should go back to one party. It will be their decision. I am a democrat through and through. I only go the way the people themselves say.

[Golding] What is it that convinces you that UNIP can win the elections?

[Kaunda] Is there any credible leadership on their side, to begin with? Have you seen them? Who is there to lead this nation? There is nobody left out. Their own [words indistinct] record, each one of them, speaks volumes. They are only cashing in on the bad economic situation which they can't put right anyway.

[Golding] People who are in the opposition or will be the opposition are calling for the lifting of the state of emergency. How can you justify after so long keeping the state of emergency in power?

[Kaunda] Look, my dear sister. Zambia offered itself as a base for all liberation movements in southern Africa: MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola], Angola; Frelimo [Mozambique Liberation Front], Mozambique; ZANU [Zimbabwe African National Union], ZAPU [Zimbabwe African People's Union], Zimbabwe, happily today, then Rhodesia, Botswana and Bechuanaland, Namibia, now South Africa, etc. All these countries had their liberation movements in Zambia. As a result of that Lusaka has had many bombings [words indistinct] we have lost many bridges, rail bridges, road bridges. We have lost oil tankers. We have lost many, many things: a lot of property. And above all, above all we have lost lives. And we have lived in that emergency situation until early this year, and only now as I am speaking to you you know of our people who have been killed on the road to our Eastern Province. [sentence as heard] We have lost many lives on that road already. Now, it is Renamo [Mozambique National Resistance], a South African-sponsored and supported organization. These are bandits who are killing for the sake of killing. I know of no cause that they have to do that [words indistinct] but they just want to destabilize us. And I can't think of any sensible leader in Zambian society who would say that we should lift the state of emergency when all these things are happening. Now, the state of emergency is not against the Zambian people. The state of emergency in Zambia is protecting Zambian life and property. No one can tell me where I have used the state of emergency against Zambians. No (?evidence) at all. They are just crying out as a political slogan. That's cheap politics because they must value Zambian lives. They must value Zambian property.

[Golding] But the terms of the state of emergency actually could impose restrictions on people gathering, forming...[pause] They could be detained under the powers of....[pause] This is their fear, anyway. What do you say to that?

[Kaunda] What do fear they? They have been organizing rallies here, most of them.

[Golding] I wanted to come on to the repealing of Article 4 of the Constitution.

[Kaunda] [Words indistinct] already.

[Golding] Yes, I know, but how quickly do you think that bill will go to Parliament to allow for the 30 days?

[Kaunda] We have to.... [pause] Parliament meets early next month. It fits in very well because if we give notice now, this week or early next week, it will be in time for Parliament to repeal that act. So, there is no problem at all.

[Golding] But at the moment UNIP has an advantage in that you can start your campaign, but the opposition can't even form a party yet, never mind start their campaign. Don't you think this is unfair?

[Kaunda] If you want to help them, tell them that they should just be patient. UNIP will not put itself in top gear. We are still very low gear because we want to give them a chance. We are not afraid of them. They are a nonentity, completely a political nonentity. Nonentity. They can't... [pause] They have no chance at all of beating UNIP and it's going to be a fair game. We believe in a fair game.

[Golding] They have also called for an interim government, saying that if UNIP runs the election campaign it can't be free and fair. What do you say to that?

[Kaunda] Absolute rubbish, absolute rubbish. I am annoyed, I am annoyed. UNIP has run this country on the basis of love, truth, social justice, and fair play. Those are our principles, not theirs. And [words indistinct] there is no question of UNIP [words indistinct] whom. To whom? To those people. UNIP is fully in control of the situation. UNIP will continue to be democratic. UNIP will fight for democratic elections. UNIP will fight for free and fair elections. That has been our line. It still remains our line. It will be our line tomorrow and the day after, and forever.

[Golding] Don't you think there should be an interim government so that there can be....

[Kaunda, interrupting] What for? What for? [Words indistinct] UNIP is running a decent government, in a decent form and there is no question of us giving [words indistinct] to that point. There is not going to be any interim government. There is a (?real) freely elected government of the people of Zambia, and I am its president. And I am saying there is no question of any interim government in Zambia. None. And we are going

to do these things in a decent way, but there is no question of me lending my hand to the breaking of the law [words indistinct]. There is no question of me running an indecent election because I am not... [pause] To begin with, I am a principled man. I love God, my creator, and I love the men he has made on his image, regardless of any [words indistinct] (?opposition). That's my line of [words indistinct] and action, and I am not going to yield to pressures coming from people who are planning to kill people. I can't. There is no way I can do that.

[Golding] Can I talk about the Electoral Commission? How are you going to guarantee that there is a cross section participation on the Electoral Commission?

[Kaunda] To begin with, the judiciary in Zambia is free and independent. The man who has run elections in Zambia is the deputy chief justice of the Republic of Zambia. The judiciary....[pause] No one has ever complained against our judiciary. No one. And what reason have they to complain now to fear that the elections will be rigged? The deputy chief justice of Zambia is the man

who has been running these elections, and he has run them very well, freely and [words indistinct], freely and fairly. [words indistinct] the deputy chief justice is still going to be the man in charge of the elections. He runs the elections. He will be watching. If they have anything to complain about, they will say so at (?that) time. At the moment I see no reason at all for any doubt that elections will not be run fairly. So, there is no question of me getting some people from the opposition to come and join the Electoral Commission. For what? If the judiciary is independent, I don't control it, they don't control it.

[Golding] Will the opposition be represented on the commission that is to change and consider the Constitution, to make the necessary amendments to the Constitution in order to allow a multiparty democracy?

[Kaunda] They will be represented. The church will be represented. Labor unions will be represented. The (?Law Association) of Zambia will be represented. The party will be represented. The government will be represented. The judiciary itself will be represented.

Benin

*** Minister Pelletier Endorses Increased Aid**

90AF0644C Cotonou LA NATION in French
6 Aug 90 pp 3, 8

[Article by Ephrem Dossavi-Messy: "End of Mr. Pelletier's Working Visit; For Greater Cooperation"]

[Text] French Cooperation and Development Minister Jacques Pelletier went back to Paris last Friday after a stay of 48 hours. Mr. Pelletier returned very pleased with the talks and working sessions he had with officials at various levels in our country. He also returned pleased with the very warm welcome people accorded him during unofficial visits made for his own pleasure. He went to Ouidah (42 km from Cotonou) in the morning to lay a wreath of flowers in the French Cemetery on the monument to the memory of French soldiers who died during the war of conquest between 1890 and 1892. Taps for the dead, a moment of silent remembrance, and then he headed for the Joint Project for Research on the Improvement of Traditional Salt-Mining Techniques (PIRATTES), located in Djegbadji. On his return, he visited the office of the ex-prefect, which was followed by explanations of the project for the development of the town of Ouidah. A few minutes at French Fort, Python Temple, the Basilica, and a tour of the town constituted the highlights of his visit to Ouidah. And the refreshments offered Mr. Pelletier and his entire delegation by the General Union for the Development of Ouidah (UGDO) in Mr. Anagonou Barthelemy's orchard gave Mrs. Noelle Apithy, nee da Costa and head of the urban district, an opportunity to present him with a postcard depicting her town, rich in history, which has for centuries played an important role in trade since the French presence dominated the scene. This presence goes back to 1671 with the establishment of the first French trading post, which later became French Fort.

Then UGDO president Anagonou Barthelemy took advantage of the opportunity to call Mr. Pelletier's attention to those projects that have been launched and are in progress jointly with French NGO's [non-governmental organizations] and to ask for his support in the renovation of French Fort Square and the restoration of historical sites for the purposes of tourism. Mr. Anagonou then asked for Mr. Pelletier's support in intensifying the dialogue with Cotes du Nord with a decentralized cooperative venture with the Ouidah area in mind so that the town may have a network of roads maintained by suitable drainage, benefit from improvement funds to rebuild them, and be deserving of its claim to being a city of touristic and cultural interest.

Mr. Pelletier's words were essentially words of thanks for the welcome and kindness which he and his delegation had received. For him, this area knows how to harmoniously combine tradition and modernity. The example of the salt marshes at Djegbadji is an eloquent illustration of this. Then there are the well-executed and well-planned urban development projects inside the town,

which are often rare in Africa. Mr. Pelletier said that UGDO was right in saying that a town cannot actually develop itself without a good urban development plan. He noted his devotion to decentralized cooperation, cooperation with NGO's, because they are on the spot, close to the local people, and are more familiar with their aspirations than anyone else. He promised to make every effort with the aid of Mr. Charasse, the minister of budget, to cofinance projects initiated by local communities, NGO's.... [He said:] "It also seems to me that your town is a town of tolerance. The proof is this voodoo temple in front of the basilica. I have the impression that they get along well together. That is the way things should be everywhere because we see too much conflict due to intolerance in the world. I hope that Benin, and particularly Ouidah, will continue to be a place of great tolerance."

Then the delegation set out for Cotonou for the last talks with the prime minister before visiting the French Cultural Center late in the morning and the National University Hospital Center in the early afternoon.

And shortly before flying to Paris, Mr. Jacques Pelletier drew conclusions on his stay in Benin. "Most of us had never been to Benin and we have the impression that we are among friends whom we do not ever want to leave. After all, this proves that there is a very old current that runs between your country and France and that is now, after a few more difficult years during which cooperation never ceased, again running between them. There was never a break in relations between France and Benin. I think that this is an asset for today we are starting out again on renewed bases of cooperation between two peoples who have great affection for each other. We are much struck by this and I'm very happy about it." Mr. Pelletier announced an imminent working visit by Prime Minister Nicéphore Soglo, a visit that will permit him to discuss matters and meet Prime Minister Michel Rocard and other members of the French Government. Mr. Jacques Pelletier alluded to the projects he had visited on this occasion, particularly the one at Foun a Save, a joint project that seemed to him to be an exemplary one for Africa.

"We can say," Mr. Jacques Pelletier noted, "that we are optimistic. Benin has experienced and will experience very serious economic difficulties. A financial equilibrium that is more than doubtful, to such an extent that donors will have to be called on at the end of the year to secure the budget. So, I have announced that, in addition to the 2.2 billion that has already been granted as aid for the budget, we are going to make available a loan of 7.5 billion CFA francs to help our Beninese friends get through 1990 in the hope that negotiations with the IMF and the World Bank for the 1991-93 program will be resumed very soon. I have also promised a supplementary grant in aid of 200 million CFA francs for the next democratic elections in Benin and for the technical preparations for the referendum and parliamentary and presidential elections. Regarding technical assistance, efforts certainly have to be made to bring money into the

treasury, very specifically in terms of taxes and customs duties. With the aid of my friend, Charasse, I have promised all the technical assistance that Benin may ask for to meet its new obligations. I therefore think that we have made a significant effort to see to it that the cooperation that has existed between us for many years can now be increased.

"The big joint commission that is to meet in Paris at the end of November is going to take stock of the past and make plans for the next two or three years. Our cooperation mission and the Beninese Government agencies are going to get to work now in preparation for this joint commission meeting."

This was a visit that ended well and that constitutes a more dynamic resumption of cooperation between our two countries.

The 30th anniversary of our independence and the experiment in democratization in progress here are opening a new era for Franco-Beninese cooperation.

* Cisse's Pending Trial Said To Worry Kerekou

90AF0729A London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL
in English 10 Aug 90 p 6

[Article: "Benin: The Devil's Return"]

[Text] Mohamed Amadou Cisse, known as Djine ("The Devil"), the former adviser and eminence grise to President Mathieu Kerekou, has been extradited from Cote d'Ivoire to Benin.

In pulling off this stroke Prime Minister Nicephore Soglo has made himself popular with the Beninese public, impatient with the slow pace of Soglo's reforms and by his government's apparent unwillingness to mete out justice to members of the previous government. Although Kerekou remains president of the country, he no longer governs or presides over the council of ministers.

Cisse, a marabout of Malian origin credited with supernatural powers, is to face charges connected with the misappropriation of 30,000 million CFA [African Financial Community] francs (600 mn. French francs) belonging to the Commercial Bank of Benin. Once the strong man of the Kerekou government, he can be counted upon to take some former associates with him. It is unclear whether Kerekou himself would escape unscathed once his former right-hand man starts to talk. The fledgling democracy in Benin is facing its first real trial of strength.

Last April, after Soglo's new government had issued an international arrest warrant for Cisse, Kerekou secretly set up a presidential commission under his close friend Commandant Jean N'Tcha, the head of the presidential guard. The commission was ordered to launch a definitive investigation into the Cisse affair, precluding inquiries from any other government department.

As a former coordinator of the security services, Cisse knows all the economic and political secrets of the former government. Kerekou, who had begun to have hopes of an honourable retirement, is now under threat. Many other former dignitaries are now suffering from sleepless nights.

The current government is also reported to have evidence implicating Cisse in drug-trafficking, of which Cotonou is one of the West African capitals. Western intelligence services are well-acquainted with the Cotonou narcotics trade. A high-ranking official of the West German police visited Benin in May 1989 to cooperate in the anti-drug campaign whose local point-man is Commissioner Christophe Aguele, Interpol chief for Benin.

There are now several possibilities:

- Someone might spring Cisse from prison. Kerekou still controls the army and the presidential guard. Moreover, Benin has a long history of prison escapes. Cisse's escape would provoke a political crisis which could even threaten the country's young democracy. According to radio trottoir, extremists in the army, the security and the former ruling party have plans to assassinate the prime minister, interior minister Jean-Florentin Feliho and justice minister Yves Yahouessi.

- Cisse could be murdered in prison to silence him forever.

- Cisse may make revelations about his former associates. The government would then have to decide whether it dare pursue these by arresting top officials of the former government, possibly including Kerekou himself.

Cisse's arrest in Abidjan is a sign of the times. It is also a feather in the cap of Ivorian justice, which arrested and extradited a man who had managed to leave France after payment of a bond of five million French francs.

* Crowd Applauds Removal of Lenin's Statue

90AF0644A Cotonou LA GAZETTE DU GOLFE
(National edition) in French 10 Aug 90 p 3

[Article by Marcus Boni Teiga: "Lenin's Statue Sent Back to Moscow"]

[Text] The wheel of history will not be reversed. Over and above any ideological considerations, Lenin remains an eminent statesman and he should be treated as such. The renunciation of Marxist-Leninism does not ipso facto entail the demolition of the Marxist-Leninist heritage, which has assumed historical importance. Following the "blows and wounds" the statue of Lenin suffered during the anti-Kerekou demonstrations last December, it will probably be repaired in the USSR.

It was before the curious gaze of about 100 men and women on last 3 August that the crane that was removing Lenin's statue from Akpakpa stopped moving at about

1920 hours. "There are too many people," the technician responsible for taking down the statue of Lenin and the plaque bearing his name confided to us.

A compact crowd had indeed taken by storm Lenin Square, located near the GL Hotel and were heaping it with insults just as if it were a real person. Even old people, who did not know anything about Marxist-Leninism began to dance on the square in celebration of the statue of Lenin's departure. What ecstasy for those young adolescents to participate in tearing down the statue in question.

Uncontrolled Ecstasy

Lost somewhere in the crowd, I heard someone say: "Lenin, it was he who brought famine to Benin." I turned to the man who had uttered those words. The old man in front of me was illiterate. Another voice cried: "Moscow, we've had our fill of books. We need financial aid, and now." This time, it was a student who was doing the talking.

Obviously, it was not Lenin who had managed the affairs of state for 15 years. Consequently, it was fitting that they should find fault, a priori, with the so-called revolutionaries of the People's Revolution Party of Benin who during their "reign" had interpreted Marxist-Leninism in their own way, practicing "Marxist-Beninism" instead. Today, of course, the Marxist-Leninist ideology exhibits shortcomings. But in its time, it was above all viewed as a historical necessity. Didn't the African independence movements take on a communist character at one time? The objective was, in fact, to achieve the liberation of the oppressed masses. To accomplish this, the law of opposites decreed that socialism based on Marxist-Leninism materialize and evolve.

Many Curious People

Some women clapped their hands and danced endlessly, thus attracting more curious people. This forced the technician and his workers to suspend the work of taking down the statue. However, the crowd did not break up. They stayed there waiting for Lenin to come down. At midnight the demolition team found it necessary to continue their work because all attempts aimed at dispersing the crowd had been in vain. Beneath photographers' flashguns and the television camera, the tarpaulin that had covered Lenin until then was removed. In a few minutes the crane removed the statue of Lenin. It had scarcely been taken down when the young people rushed it, hitting it with sticks, pouring sand over it, or stroking Lenin's beard.

What a ridiculous spectacle! "Lenin would have turned over in his grave several times over and felt the pain of the blows inflicted on him in Cotonou," our driver whispered in my ear. Instead of letting the carpenters who built the crate pack the statue, several individuals were fighting over Lenin's statue, which they had momentarily turned into a horse. Finally, the crane

raised the statue again and loaded it into the crate. Aided by many spectators, the carpenters nailed the crate shut, the "coffin," to use the expression people coined. That took three hours.

Put Lenin in a Museum!

The young people used pieces of coal to write all over the crate: "Unknown body, picked up, destination USSR," "Lenin, do not come back," "Farewell, Lenin," "Condolences to our dear Kerekou".... All of them statements that had profound significance only for their authors. It was after 0300 hours that a Berlier truck, license plate number C4819RPB, hauled the crate containing the statue toward the autonomous port of Cotonou. A few "Zemijans" who had remained until the statue was loaded onto the truck played the role of motorcycle police under the circumstances. Oil-palm leaves had been placed on top of the crate previously to indicate, as is customary, that there was a body in the crate. Furthermore, the "Zemijans" who were leading the procession all had palm leaves attached to their handlebars. When they arrived at the port at about 0400, the police who were on duty there refused to let them unload the statue of Lenin because, they said, "all activities at the port cease at midnight and are not resumed before 0600." In addition, they appealed [to the police] on the basis of a message from the office of the President of the Republic authorizing shipment of the statue of Lenin. Signed by Director of Urban Development and Environment Bernadin Viou and the subject of which was "the work of removing the statue of Lenin and the plaque bearing his name," the message was not enough to convince the police.

According to the message in question, which, moreover, was not dated, the work was to have been completed well before the independence celebration, alas.... All things considered, on Saturday, 4 August, Lenin's statue was unloaded early in the morning at the autonomous port of Cotonou according to instructions and deposited in Warehouse Number 1 for shipment. We still believe reports that the statue of Lenin will be going to the USSR for repairs. Even though Benin has made an ideological turnabout in officially renouncing Marxist-Leninism, we cannot understand why the statue of Lenin would ultimately be returned to Moscow when our country has museums. After all, Lenin is still a scholar who left an indelible mark on his time. Perhaps if Lenin and Marx were still alive, they would certainly have made adjustments in this ideology to conform to the evolution of the world. Their "disciples" were incapable of doing this. And these are the people with whom we must find fault today. If we insist on destroying the Marxist-Leninist heritage, history will hold us accountable for it tomorrow. Abandon Dimitrov (Papa Bulgaria) and bring back Lenin! Posterity needs him.

Nigeria

* Oil Production Boost To Increase Revenue

90AF0738A Lagos BUSINESS TIMES in English
3 Sep 90 pp 1, 16

[Article by Mike Oduniyi, energy correspondent: "Nigeria's Oil Output Rise to 1.861 mbd" (million barrels per day)]

[Text] Ministry of Petroleum Resources, through the NNPC [Nigerian National Petroleum Company], has directed oil producing companies operating in the country to increase the nation's daily oil production from 1.611 million barrels to 1.861 million barrels. This represents 16 percent (250,000 barrels) rise.

Oil industry source said in Lagos last week that this became necessary because of last week's agreement by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) that its member countries should raise their quotas to bridge the gap created by Iraq and Kuwait political tension. The increase will be as long as the Gulf crisis lasts.

The production gap is about 4.5 mbd, however, OPEC member countries hoped to produce about 3.5 mbd. Nigeria's officially assigned OPEC quota is 1.611 mbd for the first half of the year.

The additional increase in production means higher revenue for the country because this year's budget was based on the quota of 1.611 mbd and a base price of 16 dollars a barrel.

The price of oil since the last week of July has risen above 20 dollars a barrel.

Only a fortnight ago, it peaked at 32 dollars a barrel, the highest level in more than six years.

However, opinion was divided in Lagos last week on if Nigeria has the productive capacity to produce the additional allocation.

Production capacity means if all oil-producing companies operating in the country are allowed to produce their maximum, what the nation will get at any given period.

The managing director of Shell Petroleum Development Company, Mr. Brian Lavers, said in Lagos last week that Nigeria could conveniently meet her new production level.

Mr. Lavers disclosed that the NNPC/Shell joint venture production capacity alone, had already reached one million barrels per day, saying that the joint venture planned to increase its investment in oil exploration from \$1 billion this year, to \$1.3 billion till 1995 to maintain this level of oil production.

Meanwhile, Nigeria's major export reference crude, the Bonny Light, finished at \$27.95 a barrel at the close of business in the London futures market on Friday.

Senegal

* Reaction to Critique of PS Party Congress

* Appointments 'Worrisome'

90AF0681A Dakar WAL FADJRI in French
3-9 Aug 90 p 3

[Commentary by Saliou Thiam: "Ministerial Council Nominees: Politicians or Administrators?"]

[Text] Last Tuesday's appointments were widely talked about, although everyone already knew Samba Diallo and Marcel Ndione were on borrowed time. Their successors, while not lacking in credentials for their new positions, are also avowed politicians. In fact, they might easily be called political commissars...

Some images inspire fear. Because of what they mean and what memories from the past they rekindle, or what they bode for the future. Tidiane Daly Ndiaye and El Hadj Ibrahima Ndao, through the short presentation on national television that followed the announcement of their appointments, have become symbols of a political initiative, which if confirmed, would mark a return to perennial old practices that it had been thought were doomed to extinction by the rise of ability as the criterion of selection.

Tidiane Daly Ndiaye replaced Marcel Ndione as head of ORTS [Senegalese Radio and Television Office], while El Hadj Ibrahima Ndao was named general manager of SENELEC [Senegal Electric Company]. There is certainly no need to point up the strategic importance of these sectors for the democratic process and the national economy.

What is interesting here is not the competence of the two new managers. Indeed, we think they have the requisite qualifications and very much deserve the promotions they received last Tuesday. No, what is disturbing and even disconcerting is their political orientation as portrayed on television. The television archivists were seemingly unable to find film clips showing the two men doing anything but pledging allegiance to their party. What the clips showed us were party loyalists—in positions where a technocratic image would have been more reassuring to those who cherish [the country's] political and economic "well being." It was as if the PS [Socialist Party] is now trying—even harder than in the days of the single party—to implement a plan to colonize the entire state apparatus, a plan that is therefore completely incompatible with democratic principles. It is also noteworthy that the men who were replaced, Marcel Ndione and Samba Diallo, had never distinguished themselves as party militants.

This plan, inadvertently revealed by the television presentation, tends to persuade us that in future the destiny of the big [state-owned] enterprises is going to be in the hands of political commissars rather than technocrats or administrators. Perhaps this was what the president meant when he said in his press conference after the [PS] congress that some people think technocratic-administrative advancement should depend on party loyalty. If he himself does not agree with this formulation, then these latest nominations are incomprehensible.

However competent they may be, El Hadj Ibrahima Ndao is first of all a former member of the PS Executive Committee, while Tidiane Daly Ndiaye is deeply involved in the affairs of the PS in Louga.

Senegal is in crisis. Even that statement is a euphemism at a time when layoffs in the private sector, voluntary and involuntary departures from government service, have become an everyday event. Now the overstaffing of the public and parastatal sectors is the consequence of precisely the kind of favoritism shown by the "political commissars" chosen—by politicians in need of supporters—to head gigantic enterprises and turn them into "re-employment agencies." Even the most sensible politician loses all sense of rationality when his political career is at stake.

The new general manager of ORTS is a journalist. If that were all he was, there would be no problem. But now he has the power to decide how much air time the government information service will give to his political adversaries. This power could be used to undermine democracy, albeit thus far there is no evidence Tidiane Daly Ndiaye will abuse it. Except for the fact that he was running the NIS [News Press of Senegal] when SOPI [a newspaper] was denied printing facilities on purely political grounds.

El Hadj Ibrahima Ndao is an excellent engineer. He is qualified to run SENELEC. But he is also a former member of the executive bureau of the PS, whose political interests are not necessarily convergent with the company's economic interests. He must decide between the two. Unfortunately, the risk of confusing them is great.

The only reassuring facet of the new policy of installing PS loyalists in the machinery of government is that both men in the cases at hand seem qualified—at least so far—for their new jobs.

* 'Tired' Faces, Ideas

90AF0681B Dakar WAL FADJRI in French
3-9 Aug 90 p 3

[Editorial by Abdou Sow: "Very Ordinary Congress"]

[Text] A paleontologist would have found himself right at home in the PS [Socialist Party] Political Bureau. That body is at least half composed of honorable relics, dinosaurs thought to have been buried once and for all

under the thick sedimentary strata of "opening" and "renovation." But miraculously the fossils have come to life again, broken the time barrier and risen back to the surface. Here they are, more determined than ever to outlive their own geological era. And they are succeeding beyond all hope, since it now seems to be their turn to relegate the supporters of renovation and opening to oblivion.

A symbolic image: Babacar Sine is now Mamadou Diop's deputy in the Political Bureau. Moustapha Kasse, another celebrated renovator, has been dismissed from that organ, which constitutes the PS inner sanctum. Jean Collin, who inspired the policy of opening and renovation, has been the victim of a typical Stalinist purge: neither mentioned nor quoted, he was treated as an "unperson" from beginning to end of the congress.

The official socialist rhetoric was still in place, of course, forcefully linked throughout the proceedings to the themes of opening and renovation. But the decisions made and the procedures employed—the secretary general's re-election by acclamation, for example—gave proof of the governing party's refusal to allow the political system to evolve beyond a status quo that serves its interests so handsomely. But it is not necessary to get into all the subtleties of the rhetoric to see how determined the socialists are to avoid change: instead, one need only examine a few of the anomalies that distinguished the 12th Congress, its preparation, and its aftermath.

The public transport system was badly disrupted last weekend. Workers watched as dozens of buses packed with socialist militants were diverted from their normal runs to haul people to PS headquarters. SOTRAC [Dakar Transportation Company] did not even feel obliged to inform its customers of the schedule changes, even though a goodly number of them had commuter passes. But the congress delegates were clearly of higher priority than the workers, and the bus company blithely ignored its contractual obligation to provide passholders with reliable transport. How many man-hours of Senegalese labor were lost to the economy because of the socialist congress and the absence of public transportation? No one knows, and no one cares.

But beyond these statistical concerns there arises the problem of legitimacy and equality among Senegal's various political parties. Is it possible to draft the country's biggest transport company—a state-owned company, at that—into the service of a political party, even the majority party, without doing considerable damage to the nation's economic well being? It should be emphasized that no other political party would be allowed to appropriate virtually all the buses running in Dakar just to enable it to transport its militants. Some workers, appalled by the shortage of transport—especially SOTRAC buses—very understandably suggested it might be more sensible to declare public holidays when the PS holds a congress.

It is easy to appreciate the dual concern of the socialist leaders. They wanted first of all to ensure a large turnout for their congress by providing free transport to the militants (many buses were only half full, it was noted). But second, the artificially manufactured transport shortage was intended to impress the people, remind them of the important event taking place that day, and convince the public of the "massive and gigantic" stature of the Socialist Party, as Abdou Diouf, its secretary general, described it in a press conference following the congress. The conclusion the public was expected to draw was very simple: if there are enough socialist militants to fill all of SOTRAC's buses, there must be an incredible throng of them, and they really must represent the majority.

The implicit message behind the confiscation of public transport facilities for the exclusive benefit of the PS has been taken up by the government-controlled media organs, which do not even belong to the ruling party, juridically at any rate. A huge press campaign was unleashed on radio, television, and in the national daily to magnify the importance of the socialists and the big changes they are going to bring about under the leadership of their chief, who is also—and above all—the country's president. No political party has a just claim to this kind of special treatment.

But the PS is definitely not just another political party. Not because it is in power, but because it is totally identified with the state, and this perception is drilled into its militants, even at the highest levels. We were dumfounded when the leader of that party, who is at the same time the head of state, admitted there might be a grain of truth to the idea that PS endorsement is necessary for appointment to high positions in government service. He was laying down a political marker.

In other developments, the continuing irresistible rise of various corrupt individuals was noted without surprise or indignation. The former president of the Red Cross, for example, seems no closer than ever to paying for her misdeeds: indeed, she continues to ascend in the hierarchy of the PS women's movement and now sits on the Central Committee. This of course did not prevent the leader of that group from emphasizing, in the keynote speech, the need to respect the public interest.

Overall, what we saw was a major failure on the part of the PS to meet certain popular expectations, to wit: the equality of all with respect to the law and the use of state resources, the definition of a new relationship between majority and opposition, the end of the party-state, an emphasis on ability rather than political cliques...

In light of all these missed opportunities, the 12th Ordinary Congress of the Socialist Party must be described as...very "ordinary" indeed.

* Renewal Policy Ended

90AF0681C Dakar WAL FADJRI in French
3-9 Aug 90 p 5

[Commentary by Abdourahmane Camara: "Twice-Killed Collin"]

[Text] The parenthesis of renovation is now closed. The PS, lacking a firm vision of its future, is returning to its old ways...

The "barons" are back. In force. The 12th Congress of the PS [Socialist Party] has endorsed their return. Only yesterday despised and denounced as forces of inertia, blockage and ossification, they are today being showered with adulation, courted by the secretary general himself, who denies ever having approved a campaign to purge the party or "liquidate the so-called barons." The "dinosaurs" are making their comeback with great fanfare, and suddenly—almost miraculously—certain buzzwords (blockage, "saddling" [i.e. saddling the people of a constituency with an unwanted outsider chosen from above]) have been expunged from the secretary general's vocabulary. By involving them in the party's administration, Abdou Diouf is making a definitive break with a certain concept of renovation and turning his back on all the policies of restructuring and the personnel changes about which he talked so much before last March. In any event, Abdou Diouf's actions on 29 July amounted to the coup de grace for Jean Collin, his ex-number two.

Could he really do without the services of Magatte Lo, Assane Seck, Alioune Badare Mengue, etc., men who have shown themselves so indispensable to the conduct of the PS's affairs? If the regional unions were set up without too much opposition, it was only because they were willing to lend a hand and extricate Diouf from his inability to overcome all the disunity provoked by the renovation process. What they had going for them was the fact that throughout their time in the political wilderness they never lost touch with the base, where their influence has remained intact. That being the case, there was really no reason (?) why Diouf should not call on Moustapha Niasse or Habib Thiam, who are more useful within the PS than outside its governing bodies.

But the 12 barons have not returned just to sit in the back row. They wanted a lot of space, a great deal of room to maneuver, and they have obtained it: they are not a dependency of the secretary general, since their mandate comes from a [party] congress. They wanted clout in the party, and they have it, since as inspectors they have become the eyes and ears of the secretary general, reporting directly to him rather than the Political Bureau, to which they are not responsible. To quote Abdou Diouf, "the inspectors' corps is at the disposal of the secretary general, who will use it, [begin emphasis] more so than in the past [end emphasis]. (Editor's note: our emphasis) to keep ourselves informed on actual conditions within the party..." Even more, they will sit in as observers at meetings of the Central Committee and

may also benefit from the expansion of the Political Bureau in event of a crisis, since nothing will be done without them.

Means of Control

By exhuming these "fossils" as he did at the ordinary congress of 28-29 July, Abdou Diouf may hope to undercut Moustapha Niasse. Diouf, after all, did not call for the barons to come to his rescue until after Moustapha Niasse's article appeared in SUD HEBDO (issue No. 212). Now that the first obstacle has been overcome in this assiduous courtship of the barons, it remains to be seen whether they will really play ball with Diouf. Can they soon forget all the years of humiliation when they were shunned as lepers? The answer to that question will determine the party's success in strengthening itself and broadening its base.

In reality, the PS's biggest need today is to pull itself back together after the difficult period it has just been through, but at the same time it would like to cast its nets wider in preparation for municipal and rural elections. This explains why all the factions and currents of thought have now been brought together in the Central Committee, which has thus become quite a hodgepodge. Its authority to oversee the Political Bureau is only further attenuated by the fact that its prerogatives as the guardian of political orthodoxy have been confiscated by the party's Study and Research Group (GER), whose mission is to "guide the party's thinking" and predict future social trends.

In the aftermath of the PS congress, one strong impression remains: Diouf wants stronger levers of control than the party ever had in the past. Averse to any heir apparent, he has avoided establishing the post of deputy secretary general. The key positions in the party—its finances, its international relations and ongoing education programs—have been entrusted to close associates. He is thus in a position to fulfill the old dream he and Jean Collin once cherished: to concentrate all decision-making power in Avenue Roume. To get there, he had to sacrifice the renovators, who were not accepted by the base, and a few "Collinists" like Papa Alioune Ndao, who failed to get a seat on the Political Bureau.

The parenthesis of renovation is thus closed, giving way to preparations for the upcoming elections. With a political bureau and central committee chosen for what they can bring to the political campaign, the PS wants to efface the last vestiges of factional turmoil before the elections.

* Diouf Handpicks Officials

90AF0681D Dakar SUD HEBDO in French
3 Aug 90 p 3

[Commentary by Ibrahima Fall: "Defeat of the Renovators"]

[Text] It was a maneuver carried out by brute force—the very antithesis of democratic procedure: the secretary

general of the Socialist Party [PS] installed the political people of his choice without even consulting the congress delegates. On Sunday 29 July at 2035 hours President Abdou Diouf took the podium to make a speech. The atmosphere in the hall was electric. Tension was visible in the faces of a number of delegates, who feared their political future might not survive an elective determination of membership on the Central Committee and above all the Political Bureau, the holy of holies. Some were soon to take heart—especially those who flaunt their Dioufism the way others parade their pride—since those elections were not to be held. In peak form, Abdou Diouf first noted that PS bylaws provide for the congress to pick the National Council and the council to elect the Central Committee, which in turn chooses the Political Bureau. But then he added, very sure of himself, "this procedure takes too long. So I propose to you another method." What he then proposed, without waiting for delegates' views on the matter, was the following: "National Council: total of 216 delegates from the Dakar region, 90 from the Diourbel region," etc. Then he named off the members of the Central Committee. Again, the same smooth and risk-free method. Except that at this level a question still remained. Before giving the quota for the youth and women's groups, Mr. Diouf suddenly changed his mind and said: "The young people and women are under-represented. Their quota will be determined later." Wasn't it the PS secretary general himself who drew up the lists to be imposed? Else why did he not act to remedy the anomaly before coming to the podium? Or was it simply that he came belatedly to recognize the truth? In any event, he showed himself markedly lacking in foresight, as well as a very poor tactician.

The same virtually miraculous procedure was used to select the 30 members of the Political Bureau. People like our colleague Adama Gaye of JEUNE AFRIQUE who expressed astonishment at these practices so characteristic of autocratic systems were rebuffed by Abdou Diouf, who asserted baldly at his press conference that the names proposed "reflect the will of the PS militants." It was evident that someone must have gone to the trouble of taking soundings.

This lock-step "election" had moreover been "tested" the day before via the motion for re-election submitted by the president of the socialist youth group. In contrast with procedures in previous congresses, the "re-electors" waited until their leader finished reading his report before renewing his mandate by acclamation. In addition to these scandalous transgressions of internal democracy and the principle of transparency, the 12th Ordinary Congress of the PS was distinguished on 28 July by the reading of a 55-page (14X21 cm format) report devoted to the usual topics (developments in the international situation, the historic option for multipartyism, the international economic situation, the vigor of democratic socialism, the perfection of Senegalese democracy, democratic dialogue, acts of vandalism and looting, improvisations about "a certain political official

who spends most of his time abroad vilifying his country," separatism and fundamentalist movements) before launching—after 91 minutes of discourse—into an analysis of the PS's internal situation "since the congress of 4-5 March 1989." Followed by some very wooden rhetoric about a strong state, disinformation, and crypto-personal calumnies, etc. According to the PS leader—who once again denied the existence of a political crisis—it was only after averting those perils that democratic dialogue could be promoted seriously. "It is in that spirit," he said, "that I will once more take initiatives vis-a-vis the political parties, the social partners that make up the state, and civilian society, in an effort to re-launch the political and social dialogue, hoping that this time we will be correctly understood."

Regarding renovation, "a process intended to give impetus to qualitative change within the Socialist Party," Mr. Diouf said this "gigantic" enterprise was "courageously embraced by the different structures of the party." However, it must be admitted that renovation—which is not really the last word in terms of the philosophical, methodological, and instrumental orientation of the PS—has scarcely shown the enormous vitality Collin predicted for it. Witness the ouster from the Political Bureau of certain figureheads in the executive bureau such as Moustapha Kasse, or El Hadj Ibrahima Ndao, who was left in the lurch in the inordinate expansion of the Central Committee (to make room for all shades of opinion!). Or—even more tangible proof—the demotion of Babacar Sine, the "grey eminence" and acknowledged theoretician of renovation, who was given a minor role in the Political Bureau as a deputy member responsible for academic matters. One journalist-militant cuttingly observed that "he was given a last-minute reprieve." The party has in any case saved itself, with the naming of 12 inspectors to provide training in patronage politics and build a war machine capable of winning elections no matter what the cost. In addition to dressing the wounds resulting from personnel changes, the PS leader was also preoccupied with the task of creating a machine capable of winning the municipal and rural elections scheduled for 25 November 1990. With the conclusion of this congress, the PS seems to have solved its own problems—albeit not necessarily those of the nation. How long must we wait before those problems are given serious thought?

* Taxes Blamed for Increased Price of Basics

90AF0676B Dakar SUD HEBDO in French
3 Aug 90 p 8

[Article by Jean Pierre Faye: "The August of All the Increases"]

[Text] Everything is going to increase as of 1 August 1990. In fact, on 23 July 1990, the Ministry of Economy and Finance convened employers to notify them of the increase in rates of special or specific taxes and new customs measures.

For instance, there will be a 20-percent hike in the tax on alcohol and tobacco and a 10-percent rise in taxes on carbonated beverages, coffee, tea, cola, and fats. In addition, the rate for stamp duties will double; the stamp on passports, for example, will go up from 5,000 to 10,000 francs. Another measure that will make all travellers groan is a stamp of 4,000 francs that will be exacted from all passengers on departure from and arrival at Dakar-Yoff Airport, not to mention the 1,000-franc stamp already collected for the account of ASECNA [Agency for Air Navigation Safety in Africa and Madagascar].

From the standpoint of customs, the most important measure contributing to a rise in the cost price of merchandise and a resulting rise in the sales price is the 3-percent customs stamp on all imports. This measure is regarded as a Senegalese "innovation," an elastic stamp actually representing an additional customs duty. Other decisions have to do with the conversion of official prices to a minimum rate, and the lowering of this same rate by 20 percent for cigarettes.

All these decisions appear in ordinances. Up against the wall, at the end of its resources, and having lost the ear of financial institutions that are stingy with the loans and subsidies they give it, the government has decided once again to make the consumers pay.

How far will this spiral of increases that are encumbering budgets and puncturing incomes go? Too many taxes kill the tax, as the saying goes. These measures will do nothing to curb the fraud, which is still going strong. How many reports have experts written on exports from Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Las Palmas, etc. to Senegal, only a mere third of which generated the anticipated customs revenue? It is well-known that the under-invoicing of cosmetics and hair straighteners sold by the United States to Senegal is a common practice. An example: Hair straighteners that leave the United States at an ex-factory price of \$35 a dozen arrive at the port in Dakar at \$16 a dozen, thanks to the complicity of "front" companies. The loss in earnings for the Treasury is \$19, and when this is multiplied by hundreds of thousands of products coming from the United States, it makes a huge amount of money.

Another example, this time at Dakar-Yoff Airport, where we constantly see "businesswomen" arriving in the latest styles found in the large Parisian department stores and the "Tati" style clearance stores, with products purchased at prices below the cost prices of the local firms.

What then can we do about this? Are these lobbies so powerful that they have become untouchable? How can we make this sector pay back what it is taking away from the government treasury, which would prevent the price escalations we have been experiencing for the past three years, that have been penalizing all citizens? Will the creation of a unit of policemen to work with customs bring about decisive results without causing problems of

jurisdiction or conflicts? In fact here as elsewhere it is a matter of improving the moral standards of the institutions, methods, and operators in the economic and social world. The situation must be cleaned up, and all sectors must be involved, especially the ones that are responsible for bringing in money.

At a time when staff cuts and lay-offs are rampant, when there are enormous numbers of unemployed, there is no longer any room for worthless people and liars. And rather than requiring additional sacrifices of the citizens who cannot tolerate any more, it is high time to clean house. The month of August being the month of symbols, when will we have our night of 4 August?*

*It was during the night of 4 August 1789 that the Constituent Assembly put an end to feudal, tax, and other privileges....

* Difficulties of Agricultural Sector Detailed

* Rains Delayed

90AF0678A Dakar WAL FADJRI in French
20-26 Jul 90 p 4

[Article by Ousseynou Gueye]

[Text] Worry pervades the rural regions. Everywhere we went in the Thies region the farmers gave vent to their uneasiness, an uneasiness caused by the late onset of rain. Traditionally, July is a month of intense farming activity, but the fields are unusually quiet as farmers wait nervously in the shade of trees for the sky to come to their rescue. As of 10 July, the region had seen only one slight rain, not enough to quench the thirsty soil. With the weeding and fencing completed a long while back, there is nothing to keep the farmers busy in their fields.

In the small Serer hamlet of Lelo in the Pout arrondissement, worry is gradually giving way to alarm. Here, the farmers had planted their millet by 20 June, but the lack of water has delayed sprouting. Millet has its particularities: It must be sown at least two weeks before the onset of rain if the seedlings are to grow rapidly. Thus, the farmers went ahead with their sowing, remembering that last year 13 June was the date of the first major rainfall. In fact, another farmer adds, "by 27 June Lelo had seen four major rainfalls." Exactly the reverse of the situation this year, with its significant shortage of rain. And so the farmers worry about the millet they have planted.

Inspections of the fields have shown that only a minute portion of the millet planted has sprouted through the soil. Most fields will have to be replanted. And Lelo is not the only region affected. Everywhere else, the situation is similar.

The lack of rain is not the only source of worry to farmers. Seeds pose a problem as well, seeds for growing peanuts in particular. It is a quandary for the farmers. The same lament is heard everywhere: "We don't have

any seeds for a peanut crop because our village's extension office didn't distribute any," says Ousmane Faye, a farmer we met in Djilah in the department of Mbour. To be eligible to obtain seeds on credit from the National Agricultural Credit Fund [CNCA], certain conditions must be satisfied and for the average farmer, they are often difficult to meet (see article below). In fact, village extension offices have practically ceased to exist in many regions.

Rationing Consumption

Thus, it is up to the farmer to find ways of obtaining seeds. "We buy our seeds at the weekly markets since we are unable to afford the select seeds sold by SONACOS [National Oleaginous Product Marketing Company of Senegal]," says a farmer from Tivaouane. In fact, according to the president of the Departmental Union of Cooperatives in Thies, "fewer than 4 percent of farmers have seeds, and most of those who do are farmers with means." This was confirmed by an inspector who works for the now practically defunct Cooperative Action Board in Thies: "By the 30 June deadline, none of the village extension offices had received any seeds. The CNCA is willing only to provide breeder seeds, whereas the farmers need the ordinary select seeds. To our way of thinking, that is tantamount to saying that the CNCA refuses to distribute seeds to the farmers."

What about fertilizer? Fertilizer is almost a luxury for these farmers who have nothing to plant as yet. "For 10 years, we haven't used fertilizer on our fields," reveals a young farmer from Tasset, 20 km from Thies. That is not to say there is no need for it, but the farmers say it is too expensive (see related article on fertilizer use).

The farming community is thus experiencing a period of trial at a time when food stocks are running out. The store houses are practically empty. In fact, consumption may have to be severely rationed to avoid a premature drain on supplies. Meals have become more simple. Certain situations provide a clear illustration of the difficulties experienced by the rural world. Here, people eat their "rice and fish" without any fish or vegetables. A meal consists of a small bowl of rice rapidly cooked in oil. That one bowl of rice must feed 10 strapping men, barely enough to survive. Elsewhere, the morning and evening meal consists of couscous or a porridge of millet. The children prefer to eat mangoes to quiet their stomachs.

According to the farmers, the reasons for these poor living conditions are their low incomes. Some say they earn less than 70,000 francs a year. One farmer explained to us how he spends the 90,000 francs he earns: "We have the same responsibilities as do the civil servants. Our children go to school and we have to buy their clothes, school supplies, and food. In addition to that, there are prescription medicines to pay for and other expenses required to run a household." One question constantly arises: "Is it possible to make ends meet on such a modest income?" That is why some farmers do

not hesitate to send their children to the city to earn a living. "Even if it is risky, it is better than keeping them here where they have nothing to do but twiddle their thumbs."

* Poor Seeds, High Costs

90AF0678B Dakar WAL FADJRI in French
20-26 Jul 90 p 4

[Text] 1984 would mark the end of an era for the rural world. Across the Senegalese economy, the winds of liberalization were blowing. They affected the distribution of farming supplies: Gone was the policy of subsidizing the factors of production. Room was opened up for a market economy with the dissolution of SONAR [National Rural Supply Company]. The drafting of a New Agricultural Policy (NPA) marked a new phase. Under the new policy, the state would withdraw from the market of agricultural supplies to allow the private sector to take its place. The state treasury was no longer authorized to finance the factors of production. It was now up to the producer to find the means to meet his own requirements for seeds.

SONACOS, the National Oleaginous Product Marketing Company of Senegal, is responsible for the sale of select seed through its seed division. This year SONACOS is handling a volume of 17,500 metric tons. It sells its seeds for cash at the price of 120 francs for the N-I variety and 110 francs for the N-II variety. As of 10 July, cash sales had reached 3,415 metric tons. An additional 2,280 metric tons had been purchased by the National Agricultural Credit Fund (CNCA), which sells the seed it buys from SONACOS on credit to producers, but its conditions are rather drastic. A farmer buying on credit must deposit 35 percent of the amount with the Fund and pay service charges of 1.5 francs per kilo of peanuts. In addition, he must pay interest of 15 percent a year.

These factors together account for the small volume of sales. Only one-third of stocks were marketed. The farmers see the explanation for this in the relatively high costs of peanut seed combined with a 22-percent drop in producers' purchasing power. The producer price for peanuts has fallen from 90 francs in 1988 to 70 francs, but the cost price structure for select seed has failed to reflect that decline. For this reason, the farmers are urgently demanding that seed prices be lowered. According to El-Hadj Baba Diagne Sall, president of Senegal's National Union of Cooperatives, "It is unacceptable for SONACOS to purchase select seed at 80 francs to resell it at 120 francs. A 15-franc profit margin would have been sufficient."

Unpaid Debts

To plead his case, the director general of SONACOS-Seeds, Mr. Coly, argues that "the cost of select seed is 119 francs." According to him, peanut seed is purchased at 85 francs a kilo for the first category of seed and at 80 francs a kilo for the second. In addition, he explains, there are shipping costs, the stock manager's monthly

salary of 80,000 francs, and the cost of products needed to preserve the seed. Mr. Coly, putting in a plug for his own product, said that SONACOS sells high-quality seeds certified by the seed service. But according to an official in the Office of Seed Production and Conservation in Louga, the quality of SONACOS seed is not the best, yielding a rate of germination of about 70 percent. Mr. Tidiane Ba also deplores "the lack of coordination between his office and SONACOS for the selection of quality seed." These remarks were made at a meeting of the Regional Development Commission in Louga on 10 July.

For its part, the CNCA has ceased to handle all but breeder seeds, citing large amounts in unpaid debts owed to it by farmers. The Fund's credit director, whom we contacted by telephone, refused to make any statements without authorization from his superior. But the director general himself could not be reached in Dakar at the time, or so his office told us.

The upshot of all this is that the farmers must resort to other means to obtain their seeds. Further complicating matters, seed requirements are estimated to be 100,000 metric tons. If we subtract SONACOS sales of 6,500 metric tons, that leaves 93,000 to be found. At the Office of Agriculture, it is said that farmers have carried over their own seeds from last year's harvest. By way of proof, the high volume of peanuts produced in 1989 (more 800,000 metric tons) was cited.

But when you look closely at what is actually happening in the rural world, you realize that fewer tracts are being sown in the peanut-producing basin. In 1988, 886,000 hectares were sown as compared with only 765,000 last year: a marked drop that reflects a shift toward food crops, the seeds for which are easier for farmers to obtain. Millet requires about four kilos per hectare whereas 120 to 130 kilos per hectare of seed are needed for a crop of peanuts. Moreover, Mr. Mamadou Samb, president of the Kaolack Regional Union of Cooperatives said, "we used to produce more than 1 million metric tons, but we now produce little more than 500,000."

Small producers must now turn to vendors of ordinary seed in the marketplaces. Prices vary with market conditions, ranging from 90 to 105 francs. But the risks are enormous because of the poor quality of ordinary seed. A farmer from Khombole, who had almost nothing to harvest last year, blames the inferior seed he was given when he bought whatever was available at the weekly markets.

At this time, just as rain is beginning to fall over most of the nation, the seed problem is far from being resolved, particularly in view of the fact that the survey of farmers' private stocks did not take place. It is simply being assumed that the farmers will always find some way to obtain seed. As one official in the Ministry of Rural Development and Water Resources sees it, "the farmers are telling themselves that the state will not just abandon

us." If there is any serious foundation to that thinking, it can only be the state's willingness to throw up its hands. But can there be a healthy farming sector without subsidization?

* Fertilizer Use Down

90AF0678C Dakar WAL FADJRI in French
20-26 Jul 90 pp 4-5

[Text] The fields of Senegal are hungry for fertilizer, say the agricultural specialists. Some time ago, a sharp drop occurred in fertilizer consumption, which now hovers around 20,000 metric tons whereas needs are estimated at 100,000. According to the farmers, the primary reason for this loss of interest in fertilizer is its price—roughly 70,600 francs per metric ton. That is the factory's price to wholesalers who add their own profit margin on top of that before selling it on the open market. For the farmers, the price is too high: Once he has purchased his seed, the farmer's next priority is to think about his food and his family.

Fertilizer, says a farmer in Thies, "is unaffordable on our meager budgets and to buy it, you have to go to the city," which results in additional expenses.

The price is also too high in the opinion of an official in the Office of Agriculture, but it is explained, he says, by the fact that the SENCHIM fertilizer factory is operating at a low speed. Not to mention the high cost of importing nitrogen and potash which are used to make fertilizer. These all add up to high costs which are reflected in the price to farmers.

Whatever the case, farmers do without fertilizer whenever possible. Starting in the early 1980s, there was a precipitous drop in fertilizer purchases in the farming areas. In 1981, SONAR [National Rural Supply Company] managed to sell only 37,000 out of a total 51,000 metric tons of subsidized fertilizer at a price of 25 francs per kilo. Sales dropped again in 1982: Only 16,000 out of 32,000 metric tons were distributed. Under the New Agricultural Policy, prices rose to 70 francs a kilo. But in 1986, in an effort to stimulate fertilizer use, USAID [US Agency for International Development] and the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation initiated a subsidy that would be gradually phased out over a three-year period, starting at 24 francs the first year (1986), dropping to 18 francs in 1987, and to 8 francs in 1988. The policy did not result in a noticeable increase in fertilizer consumption, which stood at 23,000 metric tons in 1986, 20,000 in 1987, and at about 28,000 in 1988. This year's level is estimated at 22,000 metric tons. It should be noted, however, that fertilizer ceased to be subsidized after 1988 and the producer has had to buy his supplies on the open market ever since.

Lacking fertilizer, the farmers are turning to extensive farming, which means that they cultivate larger tracts of ground, reaching into fallow lands to meet production targets. Extensive farming requires that new land be

claimed from the forest which is being destroyed at a rapid pace due to uncontrolled clearing.

"Senegal's soil has been damaged," an alarmed agricultural specialist warns. "If we are not careful, lower outputs will result in a mass migration of farmers who will no longer consider it worth their while to work the land." And yet, there is the example provided by the company SODEFITEX [Society for the Development of Textile Fibers], which could have been extended successfully to other farming sectors: SODEFITEX's 50-percent subsidy of the fertilizers used in cotton-growing has resulted in very high yields.

* Costs Outweigh Returns

90AF0678D Dakar WAL FADJRI in French
20-26 Jul 90 p 5

[Text] "The poor can no longer afford to grow peanuts as their main crop. The state is abandoning us at a time when the costs already burdening us are rising and our revenues are shrinking. The extension workers have vanished and the cooperatives serve as nothing more than collection points during the growing season. We have no idea which way to turn." These are the words of a farmer who belongs to the National Union of Agricultural Cooperatives of Senegal. On the New Agricultural Policy [NPA], his verdict is without appeal: "The NPA is a calamity for the average farmer." In point of fact, farmers are leaving the land in large numbers to take up other activities. The area of land under cultivation has dwindled by the thousands of hectares—by 100,000 hectares to be exact, according to an agricultural inspector.

The farmers have many bitter complaints to make about the NPA. The president of Kaolack's Regional Union of Agricultural Cooperatives, Mamadou Samb, believes that two factors have had a crippling effect: the sudden drying up of state aid and the elimination of subsidies for seeds and fertilizer. Not to mention the difficulties of obtaining credit. "Independent financing is all well and good if you have means of your own. If we had the means, we would not be contracting debts at high interest rates that weigh on our budgets," he said.

Be that as it may, the Ministry of Rural Development indicates that farmer indebtedness has reached a critical level. This is partially explained, the farmers argue, by the high volume of losses incurred in 1988 when locusts invaded the fields. But that is a temporary state of affairs whereas an agriculture inspector believes that the root of the problem lies in the credit mechanism. "The producers were always sensitive to their overall debt burden and always repaid their debts as long as the debt burden remained below 30 percent of the value of their output. Indeed, how can a producer repay his debts if, as recognized in the basic document of the special CRD [Regional Development Commission] meeting on farm supply problems, "the impact on production is highly disproportionate to the cost of the credit obtained." A calculation shows that if the farmer buys 120 kilos of

seed and 150 kilos of fertilizer from the CNCA [National Agricultural Credit Fund], he will have to reimburse 345 kilos per hectare, well above the maximum yield of 250 kilos per hectare. That is what's known as highway robbery.

It was suggested at the CRD meeting in Diourbel that the financial costs involved in the marketing of seeds could be significantly lowered by adopting another mode of financing without SONACOS [National Oleaginous Product Marketing Company of Senegal] as intermediary. Another proposal recommended borrowing on the French market as SODEFITEX [Society for the Development of Textile Fibers] has done at relatively low interest rates on the order of 4.5 percent. SODEFITEX was thus able "to save 700 million in the collection of cotton, or about 23.8 francs per kilo." A similar savings "in the seed sector would result in a lower price for seeds."

In place of the state, producers are turning to the cooperatives, only to discover the shortcomings of these organizations, which do not have the means to live up to their ambitions. The cooperatives must raise their operating revenues from the sales margin on peanuts allocated by SONACOS. That margin is fixed at one franc per kilo of peanuts collected during the marketing period. But the 1989-90 season closed with a deficit of nearly 70 million. Cooperative members therefore accuse SONACOS of favoring the private entrepreneurs who sell peanut seed in competition with the cooperatives.

But that cannot be allowed to obscure the fact that the cooperatives are riddled with internal quarrels. The problems between Socialist Party factions are also felt at the cooperative level. As a result, no new elections have been held since 1983, even though cooperative officials are elected to three-year terms. The illegality of their situation does little to enhance their reputation in decisionmaking circles.

For that matter, when SONACOS offered a special bonus to producers last year totalling 722 million, it preferred to make the payments directly to those eligible, at a rate of two francs per kilo of ordinary peanuts and four francs per kilo for seed quality peanuts.

Taken as a whole, the bonus represents a substantial amount. For some farmers, however, it proved to be a derisory sum of 200 or 300 francs. Rather than pay transportation costs exceeding the bonus they would have received, some preferred to stay at home. In all, SONACOS was left with 90 million in unclaimed bonuses. That money is being demanded by the National Union of Agricultural Cooperatives to help farmers with their seed purchases. At least that was the proposal made by Mamadou Sam at a CRD meeting in Kaolack. The proposal has yet to receive a response from SONACOS, which has entered into a clean-up program and is counting on the seed sector to balance its accounts, its oil sector having posted a deficit of 2.5 billion. To close the

gap, plans call for reducing the number of collection points and for bringing private entrepreneurs into marketing activities. Let us hope that there are safety mechanisms to prevent the return of trafficking. If farmers are left in the hands of unscrupulous middlemen, the door will be open to all types of abuses.

The Ministry of Rural Development is aware of the rural world's troubles, it seems. It is studying possible measures to lighten the tax burden on agricultural equipment and fertilizer so that "the state's withdrawal from its former role will not be synonymous with abandonment."

Sierra Leone

* 'Triumvirate' Said Most Influential on President

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[Quotation marks as published]

[Text] The next 12 months are likely to see great political and economic changes. An election should be held, probably in May 1991. However, election rumours, and gossip about a cabinet reshuffle, have not silenced the growing clamour for a return to multi-party politics. This prospect is undermining the ruling All-People's Congress (APC) party and the prominent Limba politicians closely associated with it.

The 1990-91 period will also see the first year of implementation of a new 3-year structural adjustment programme (SAP) approved by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. This involves the complete liberalisation of the import-export trade. The social costs involved in adjusting may lead to a reluctance to pursue reform further, echoing the government's retreat from adjustment in 1986. Consequently, political and economic change may be temporary or partial, and stalled by President Joseph Momoh under the influence of his ruling party cronies.

Momoh was justifiably confident in leaving on an extended overseas trip from 24 June to 15 July, ostensibly to secure further aid from Yugoslavia and China. Although there have been strikes by teachers and protests in provincial towns, the army remains loyal under the 'FC': Force Commander Mohammed Tarawallie. Following the execution of former Vice-President Francis Minah late last year, Momoh has few visible rivals. Taking a large entourage with him, Momoh was also able to make holiday visits to London and to his estranged wife.

The president, Foreign Minister Abdul K. Koroma, and many other political figures and officials were all overseas whilst peace-talks on the Liberian crisis (AC Vol 31 No 15) took place in Freetown and more than 20,000 Liberian refugees, mostly from President Samuel Doe's Krahn ethnic group, flooded into Sierra Leone. Momoh's government has played little part in seeking an

end to the conflict, despite the costs—and the hostilities—engendered by the influx of refugees. In Momoh's absence, the role of acting president was played by Salia Jusu-Sheriff who, due to his political base in Kenema, is the standard-bearer of the Mende and the Eastern Province. Jusu-Sheriff is nationally Momoh's second-in-command but, in effect, power is now wielded by a triumvirate of politicians closely associated with the president: 'E.T.', 'Bambay' and the 'FC.'

E.T. Kamara is minister of state for party affairs, while James Bambay Kamara is inspector general of police. The third key man, Force Commander Tarawallie, is another close and trusted friend. This group has ties with Momoh dating from well before his appearance in national politics in the 1970s. The triumvirate has become far more powerful than Jusu-Sheriff, the once powerful A.K. Turay, the minister of state for presidential affairs, and newcomers such as Finance Minister Tommy Taylor-Morgan. Ekutay, the Limba communal association, remains influential but is broadening to include non-Limbass.

The triumvirate will guide the course of a future reshuffle. Another Momoh favourite, Trade and Industry Minister Ben Kanu, is likely to retain his position but several ministers face demotion or removal from the cabinet. The lacklustre performance of Moses Dumbuya at education when confronted by striking teachers will mean movement for him. Information and broadcasting's Victor Mambu has become an embarrassment due to his frequent public fights with journalists. The new Finance Minister Taylor-Morgan, may also find his position threatened if there is an adverse reaction to structural adjustment.

He is a wealthy pharmacist with property holdings in the capital, a nominated member of parliament with little experience in the cabinet, which he joined only last December. As a rather too fervent supporter of IMF policy prescriptions, his position is shaky. He should survive until at least mid-1991.

The cost of the elections will be an extra item for Taylor-Morgan's budgeting, already burdened by overspending and the perennial problem of 'ghost-workers.' Much electoral scheming is going on. It is rumoured Momoh will try to ensure the polls are relatively free from violence by using the army to police them. It is also thought he will support favourites such as Foreign Minister Dr Koroma, who faces a serious challenge in Tonkolili North from A.P. Bangura, son of the local Paramount Chief. Potentially violent contests loom in Bo Central, where former minister A.F. 'Joe' Jackson is seeking to regain his seat; in Makeni, where Franklin Kaloko is challenging; and in several Freetown seats. There will be major battles in the Freetown Mountain constituency of Health Minister Wiltshire Johnson and in Freetown Central One, which journalist and Momoh favourite Sabba Sam Tumoe is contesting.

Being a member of parliament [MP] is now a lucrative occupation. Official allowances for MPs were substantially increased in 1989, and include a free car. Most MPs also have several extra jobs as businessmen or lobbyists. Israel, North and South Korea, and various expatriate mining companies use MPs for lobbying, although the N.R. Scipa mining company now has a much lower profile (AC Vol 30 No 18). The greater influence of the Backbenchers' Association and figures such as Ariko Dumbuya, MP for Port Loko, have stimulated interest in the views of MPs and their ability to influence the president. Because parliament is a route to wealth and influence, the forthcoming elections could be bitterly contested. Powerful figures may use violence to retain their seats and the APC [All Peoples Congress] machinery can be brought into play to prevent effective opposition. Momoh will want to retain his favourites. The potential supervisory roles of the army and police (with the FC and Bambay as key figures) are therefore crucial.

Election gossip has not sidetracked the continuing debate over the rival of multi-party politics. A very energetic debate started in Freetown's press in April and May (AC Vol 31 No 11). There were demonstrations in Makeni and Bo calling for a return to multi-party politics. The old banners of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) were raised. The APC party offices in Bo were sacked. At first, Momoh seemed to favour a move towards pluralism and allowed the press free rein. Later, he spoke out against multi-partyism in his 8 June speech opening parliament. The speech was a well-argued attempt to end the public debate by coming down decisively in favour of the one-party system. It failed. Momoh's speech was written for him by a group of academics and journalists associated with Dr Turay.

Despite still being minister of state for presidential affairs (with a large office in State House), Turay's position has weakened since Momoh's assumption of power in 1985. The triumvirate influenced Momoh to come out strongly against political pluralism and in favour of the APC's continued hegemony. They see the party monopoly as a vehicle to maintain their own power and a way of ensuring that there is no serious challenge to the Northern Limba-dominated coalition that rules. The party is weakly organised, has no real ideological basis and is factionally divided over the ethnic and regional distribution of resources.

A new 'reforming' wing of the party emerged in 1989. It is associated with the 'Makeni Declaration' of the 1989 party congress, and figures include Jusu-Sheriff and Bambay Kamara, and academics and lawyers such as Ahmed Dumbuya and Gustav Devenaux. The declaration was a leadership code, encouraging adherence to principles of honesty and self-discipline in government service. Notable nonadherents to this reforming wing of the party include the APC chief, E.T. Kamara. He made himself even more unpopular recently by boasting during the teachers' strike that it didn't worry him, as all

his children were being educated overseas. Other alignments in the party hierarchy include supporters of a more 'radical' foreign policy and a move towards greater recognition of Islamic institutions, states and values.

The party hierarchy, including in particular E.T., felt very threatened by the open debate on multi-party politics. Momoh's June speech has not closed this issue, and prominent groups, such as the Bar Association, have recently come out in favour of constitutional reform to allow multi-party politics.

Other influential pressure groups, such as the university's academic staff, have been silent on this issue. Many academics are preoccupied with entering politics via the elections. Despite this, it is likely there will be growing pressure both from the people and from abroad for a move towards political pluralism. Domestic pressure for change will continue to come from a range of groups. Teachers have been radicalised by their strike. They have thrown up a new leader, Abu Kanu, a lecturer at Magburaka Teachers' College, who organised the Makeni demonstrations and is heading a campaign to restore multi-partyism.

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